Volume 246 — United States Reports

The case is stated in the opinion. It is not denied that under the construction placed upon this statute by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia there is no discrimination against manufacturers because they do not have their residence in the State; but it is maintained that there is a discrimination against goods which are not manufactured in Virginia, in favor of goods which are manufactured therein, in this, that where goods are manufactured there the manufacturer may…

The case is stated in the opinion. Whether or not a patentee, in dealing with his monopoly right to sell, owns or retains title to the physical article, is not conclusive as to his intent in disposing of his monopoly right to sell. He may conditionally dispose of the right to sell, even though he had or has no title to the article itself. Bement v. Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 88, 91, 92, 93.

Held: following Cramp & (Sons Co. v. International Curtis Marine Turbine Co., ante, 28: (1) That, if the making of the appliances would be per se an infringement, the Act of June 25, 1910, construed in that case, afforded no defense; but (2) if, as contended and not decided in the courts below, the appliances as- called for were so far incomplete that their making' and furnishing would at most contribute to infringement…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF .MISSOURI.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that one who under a deed of the Denver Pacific Railway & Telegraph Company and through mesne con *70 veyances came into, and retained, possession of a parcel of land, which, because of a preemption filing, was excepted from the- grant made to that company (supra), was in a position to acquire full title by purchase under the Adjustment Act of March 3,1887, c. 376, 24 Stat. 556 , § 5; and the regulations of the Land…

Held: that the defendant corporation of New Jersey undertook in good faith to carry out a decree of dissolution made by the Circuit Court in New York, and to .divest itself of a former branch business in Louisiana; and that subsequent service of process, upon the former manager of that business, in Louisiana, was ineffectual to bind the corporation.

<p>Under the Supplemental Agreement' with the Choctaws and Chickasaws of July 1, 1902, c. 1362, 32 Stat. 641, a homestead allotment of a full-blood Choctaw became free from the restrictions imposed by § 12 at the death of the allottee, and the heir of the allottee, though a full-blood, might alienate the land without approval of the conveyance by the Secretary of the Interior. Mullen v.- United States, 224 U. S. 448.</p> <p>But, by virtue of the Act of April 26,1906, e. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, § 22, the right in such case was again restricted so that the full-blood heir could no longer convey without the Secretary’s approval.</p> <p>In determining the effect of the Act of 1906, supra, upon the right of a full-blood Indian to alienate, no distinction can be made between cases in which restrictions, previously imposed, were existent at the date of the act (Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U. S. 286), and those in which they had expired. Congress was dealing with tribal Indians still under its control and subject to national guardianship; and the act, comprehensive, and applying alike to all the Five Civilized Tribes, evinces a purpose to substitute a new and uniform scheme controlling alienation as to all the full-blood allottees and their full-blood heirs. Section 22 is to be construed accordingly.</p> <p>In view of the repeated decisions of this court, there can be no doubt of the constitutional authority of Congress to impose the new restriction. United States v. First National Bank, 234 U. S. 245; and United States v. Waller, 243 U. S. 452, distinguished.</p>

<p>A state statute giving a wife a right of action against any person who injures her means of support by selling intoxicating liquor to her husband, does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by providing further that the judgment for damages so recovered shall be a lien upon the premises where the liquor was sold, as against an owner who leased, or knowingly permitted the use of, such premises for the sale of intoxicating liquor.</p> <p>Dram Shop Act, Illinois Rev. Stats., c. 43, § 10, upheld as involved in this case.</p> <p>Such a statute has the effect of making the tenant the agent of the landlord for its purposes; and the landlord is not denied due process by taking the judgment against the tenant, (in the absence of collusion or fraud,) as conclusive upon the, amount of the damages suffered and the right to recover them, if, in the proceeding to enforce the lien, the landlord be allowed due opportunity to controvert the rendition of such judgment and the making of the lease authorizing sale of intoxicating liquor, or, if such be the issue, his knowledge of such use of the premises.</p>

<p>The Cherokee Agreement of July 1,1902, c. 1375,32 Stat. 716, imposed no restriction, other than that of minority, upon the alienation by the heir of his interest in land allotted under § 20 in the name of an ancestor who died before receiving an allotment.</p> <p>The Act of April 26, 1906, c. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, § 22, applied to allotments made before its date under § 20 of the Cherokee Agreement (.Brader v. James, ante, 88,) and required that a guardian’s contract, made on May 11, 1906, to convey the minor’s interest in such an allotment, be approved by the United States court for the Indian Territory, as a condition to the validity of the contract.</p>

The case is stated m the opinion. The law required the leases to plaintiff and defendants to be filed, recorded and approved’by. the Secretary of the Interior. When this was done, the instrument related back to the time of its execution. Plaintiff’s lease was executed March 28, 1912, filed with the Indian Commissioner on March 30, 1912, and recorded April 1, 1912.

Held: that the death of one of the solicitors suspended the proceedings until someone legally capable of asserting and defending his interest could be substituted. Substitution, formerly effected by a bill of revivor, or a bill of that nature, is now ordered upon motion under new Equity Rule 45. Petition dismissed.

Held: that, so changed, the law in its essential and practical operation is like those held- invalid- in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, supra, and other cases ■ cited, including Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178 ; and that a tax exacted under it for the privilege of doing local business, from a foreign corporation largely engaged in interstate commerce, and *136 whose property and business were largely in other…

Held: void, upon the authority of International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, ante, 135, and cases there cited.. 228 Massachusetts, 117, reversed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Charles A. Snow, with whom Mr. Frank T. Benner and Mr. William P. Everts were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

Held: valid, as applied to corporations doing local as well as'interstate business, upon the authority of Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231. U. S. 68. International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, ante, 135, distinguished.

IN EQUITY. This is an original suit in equity brought by the State of Arkansas against the State of Tennessee for the purpose of determining the location of the boundary line between those States along that portion of the bed of the Mississippi River that was left dry as the result of an avulsion which occurred March 7, 1876, when a new channel was formed known as the "Centennial Cut-off.” .

Held: that these provisions were inconsistent with declarations in the preamble characterizing the company as a tenant by sufferance and disclaiming any intention to recognize its right to *179 occupy the streets or continue the service; and that the ordinance should be construed liberally, so as to preserve the substantial rights of both parties, viz: as recognizing the city’s dependence on the plant, as conferring,…

<p>In a suit in the District Court to set aside testamentary dispositions and adjudge the property to the plaintiffs and partition it among them as heirs, a defendant who, being also an heir, would share in the relief if obtained, should not be aligned as a plaintiff for the purpose of testing jurisdiction by diversity of citizenship, if such defendant be adversely interested as legatee.</p> <p>Under constitution and statutes of Texas, the county court has no equitable jurisdiction of a suit inter partes to annul a disposition in a will and partition the property among the plaintiffs as heirs where title to land is involved and the amount in controversy exceeds $1,000.</p> <p>Under the constitution of Texas, the District Courts of the State have no jurisdiction to annul by an original proceeding the action of a ■ county court in probating a will; and a suit under Stats.- Art. 5699 to contest the validity of a will so probated must be brought in the county court and calls for an exercise of original probate jurisdiction.</p> <p>A suit which, in an essential feature, is a suit to annul a will, and which under the state law is in character merely supplemental to proceedings for probate and cognizable only by the probate court, is not- ' within the jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States though diversity of citizenship exist and the requisite jurisdictional amount be in controversy.</p>

The cases are stated in the opinion. in support of their contention that the right of a qualified person to make settlement upon unappropriated public land under the Homestead Law may not be thwarted or embarrassed by the unauthorized occupancy of another or by the state forcible entry and detainer statutes, relied upon a number of decisions of this court affirming the dominancy ,of federal laws respecting the public domain. The settler may go and remain upon the land.

Held: that the appropriation so expressed in the appropriation act for the fiscal year 1915 was repeated for the fiscal year 1916 by the Joint Resolution of March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. 1228 , which, in default of a new appropriation act, declared the *215 appropriations for the former year continued for the latter, employing only the general language of the former appropriation acts to designate the purposes, and providing…

The cases are stated in the opinion. Congress may, by appropriate legislation, protect any right or privilege arising from, created or secured by* or dependent upon the Constitution of the United States. The right of suffrage in the election of presidential electors, United States senators, and members of Congress, is such a right. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 388, 389; Ex parte. Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 663; United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383; and other cases.

Held: that there was no law then -in force making an adjudication of heirship, either by a federal court or by the Secretary, a condition precedent to the validity of the conveyance. McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458 , distinguished.

Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States applied the "rule of reason" to the internal trading rules of a commodity market. Section 1 of the Sherman Act flatly states: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." However, in evaluating the U.S.

Held: that whatever preference the company may have gained under the general laws of the State, as against rival corporations and municipalities, its right of appropriation, no property having been acquired under it, was subject to the State’s reserved power exerted by the act of the legislature, and that the appropriation for the city was not an unconstitutional taking of the company’s property.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that groceries and provisions furnished the contractor and so consumed .by the laborers were materials used “in the prosecution” of the work, within the meaning of the aforesaid acts and the bond given to secure the contract.

<p>Whether, in view of the limitations of Art. IV, § 3, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the Constitution, Congress has power to exempt from state taxation land purchased for a tribal Indian which when acquired was part of the mass of private property subject to the state taxing power and’ jurisdiction, is a substantial constitutional question, affording ground, if .properly raised, for direct appeal from a decree of the District Court.</p> <p>Upon a direct appeal from the District Court, based upon a constitutional question, all questions involved are open' for review and there , is no occasion to consider the constitutional question if the case may be disposed of on other grounds.</p> <p>The Acts of June 28, 1906, c. 3572, 34 Stat. 539, and April 18, 1912, c. 83, 37 Stat. 86, respecting the Osage Indians, do not authorizé the Secretary of the Interior to impose restrictions upon private land purchased for a non-competent Osage allottee with his trust money, previously released under § 5 of the latter act, and thus exempt it as a governmental instrumentality, during such restraint, from the power of the State of Oklahoma to tax it and to sell it for the collection of such taxes. United Stales v. Riekert, 188 "[J. S. 432, distinguished.</p> <p>The land was originally part of the Osage Reservation but had been Sold under the Osage Townsite Act, and for some years had been part of the private land in the State and had. been taxed as such. The taxes in question were imposed after tue purchase for the allottee and attempted imposition of restrictions.</p> <p>Section 5 of the Act of April 18,1912, supra, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior in his discretion and under rules and regulations to be prescribed by him to pay to any Osage allottee all or any part of the funds held for his. benefit when satisfied that the allottee is competent or that the payment would be to his manifest best interests and welfare, and the regulations issued thereunder dated June 26,1912, both contemplate supervision of the expenditure of the money but not control of property for which the money may be expended. In this case, moreover, where the land purchased was first conveyed to a trustee for the allottee and another, the terms of the trust not here. appearing, and later was deeded by the trustee to the allottee with an expressed restriction on alienation, non constat that the restriction was a continuation of control reserved by the Secretary rather than an assumption of control of part of-the Indian's estate theretofore freed.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.</p> <p>The cases axe stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OP MONTANA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: valid and effectual to exclude the lands from the Northern Pacific grant, although not formally sanctioned by the President until after the railroad had filed its plat of definite location. 230 Fed. Rep. 591 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Charles Donnelly, with whom Mr. Charles W. Bunn was on the brief, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Kearful for defendant in error.

Held: contrary to.the rule laid down by this court in Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U. S. 1 , and still adhered, to, that the boundary line did not follow, the middle of the channel of commerce, but was fixed and defined as “a line along the. middle of the main channel, of the river equidistant from the visible and permanent banks confining its waters.” The court found that the change made in the channel in the year 1876 at…

Held: that the act could not be reexamined and modified by a New Jersey court in replevin. 87 N. J. L. 552 , 704, affirmed. The cases are stated in the opinion. Mr. John M. Enright, with whom Mr. Oscar B. Houston and Mr. James D. Carpenter, Jr., were on the brief, for plaintiff in error. , *299 Mr. Eli J. Blair, with whom Mr. Frank H. Platt was on the brief, for defendant in error. Mb.

Held: that the case; as thus stated, was within the jurisdiction of the District Court, and that the facts,.not mentioned in the bill, that the property had . been seized,- condemned and sold for war purposes by the Constitu-tionalist forces in revolution in Mexico, acting under authority of General Carranza, whose government was later recognized by the United States, did not deprive.the courts of jurisdiction to…

<p>The case having been dismissed for want of a federal question, the court grants leave to file, and treats as filed, a petition for rehearing and orders that the case stand for consideration on the prior submission, the fact that a federal question was raised and decided on a former hearing in the state court being shown' by the official report of its opinion and the failure of counsel to include that opinion in the record, as should have been done, or to refer to the decision in their briefs and arguments, being due to excusable inadvertence.</p>

Held: reviewing the pleadings in the former case and the findings and conclusions of the Circuit Court of Appeals as displayed in its opinion, (1) that the issues as to the common-law right were the same in . both eases; (2) that the former decree established against G, in favor of the predecessors of H, a title by prior appropriation, and not merely a defensive right limited to the type of whiskey (“blended”) they were…

Held: that the contention did not draw in question the validity of the authority exercised under the arresting State by its governor in issuing his warrant and .in holding the petitioner for removal, but merely the correctness of the exercise, and that a judgment of the state court holding, on the indictment and *324 evidence, that petitioner was a fugitive, and dismissing the habeas corpus, could not be reviewed by writ…

Held: that a suit to restrain. him from annulling the contract and from interfering with its further performance was in effect a suit against the United States, and was therefore properly dismissed. 44 App. D. C. 276 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Daniel Thew Wright, with whom Mr. T. Morris Wampler was on the briefs, for appellant. Mr. Assistant to the Attorney General Todd for appellee.

<p>Under the Act of June 16, 1880, c. 243, 21 Stat. 284, as amended March 3’, 1881, c. 134, 21 Stat. 566, conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims over certain claims against the District of Columbia, a claimant is not entitled to receive interest as such; save any that may accrue after rendition of the judgment, where the recovery is not based upon a contract expressly stipulating for interest. Rev. Stats., §.1091.</p> <p>The provision of § 6 of the Act of 1880, swpra, for satisfying such judgments wHh bonds bearing coupons for' interest from the date upon which the claims were due-and payable, amounted to giving interest, at' a limited rate, before and after judgment, where payment was made in that mode; but where the amount of such-bonds remaining unissued, of the maximum authorized by that section, was less than the amount of the claim allowed,.the Court of Claims properly adjudged that, with respect to any part of the claim not paid in that special manner, there was, no right to intérest prior to the rendition ■of the judgment.</p>

Held: That the police power of the State extends over the federal public domain, at least where there is no legislation by Congress on the subject. (2) That in segregating sheep from cattle the Idaho law was primarily designed to preserve the peace, and is not an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the police power.

Held: that the company was liable over to the owners of the cargo and by subrogation to the insurers, and could recover its full value from the vessel owners under their express warranty of seaworthiness, in the charter party, even if technically the possession of the cargo was with the vessel owners.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR ■'*' NINTH CIRCUIT. In 1908 tlie Spring Valley Water Company, the appellant, commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of' California a suit against the City and County of San Francisco to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance fixing the water rates for that year.

Held: that the judgment, if not actually conclusive upon the District Court, must be accepted as of much weight in determining whether the later ordinance replaced the earlier and gave new contract rights to operate the city exchange. Grants of rights or privileges by a State or its municipalities are strictly construed; what is hot unequivocally granted is withheld; nothing passes by mere implication.

Held: that the ordinance granted a perpetual franchise to the first company, and was not merely a consent that it acquire the right of the second.

Held: that, a requirement *435 (under Minnesota Laws, 1913, c. 78, § 1) that a sidewalk be built to extend the street sidewalk across the right of way on either side of the planking, along one side of the street where people must frequently cross, could not be regarded as an arbitrary or unreasonable requirement depriving of due process or denying the equal protection of the laws. 132 Minnesota, 474, affirmed.

Held: bind- . ing upon the shipper so long as the published tariff remains in force, .this court has not held a bill of lading containing a limitation against liability for loss caused by, the carrier’s negligence, such as is here involved, to be conclusive of the shipper’s right to recover.

Held: that the tax was a property tax, not a tax on gross earnings burdening interstate commerce, and was not distinguishable from the tax sustained in United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 .

<p>A material part of the business conducted in Virginia by plaintiff in error — a foreign corporation — was intrastate, and the company was therefore subject to the licensing power of the State.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the payment was voluntary and gave no cause of action in the Court of Claims. 51 Ct. Clms. 394, affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. James H. Hayden for appellant. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Thompson for the United States.

<p>In an action under the' Employers’ Liability Act on behalf of the widow of a deceased employee, an instruction that the measure of damages should be such as would fairly and reasonably compensate her for the loss of pecuniary benefits she might reasonably have received but for her husband’s death, held correct, as a general instruction, leaving to the defendant the right to have it supplemented by another indicating that, in estimating the amount of .such compensation, future benefits must be considered at their present value.</p> <p>Under the Employers’ Liability Act, defendant is not entitled to have the jury instructed, as matter of law, that the value of money to the beneficiary should be measured by a specific (the legal) rate of interest, or that the duration of future benefits could not have exceeded the life expectancy of the deceased employee, as given by an actuarial table.</p> <p>Whether the state court has obeyed a local rule of practice requiring the substitution of correct instructions for defective ones requested, is a question of state law not reviewable by this court in an action under the Employers’ Liability Act.</p> <p>When not based upon an erroneous theory of federal law, refusal of' the state court to reverse a judgment upon the ground that the damages are excessive is not reviewable here in an action under the Employers’ Liability Act.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA,</p> <p>Thu case is stated in the opinion.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion. The powers, functions, and duties of a national bank receiver are such as to constitute him an “agent” of the bank, within the broad meaning of that word, as used in Revised Statutes, § 5209. It should be noted that a statutory receiver of a national banking association is not the officer of, nor appointed by, or responsible to, any court. In re Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443, 458.

<p>Under Jud. Code, § 237, as amended by the Act of September 6,1916, a final judgment of a state court is not reviewable by writ of error if no treaty or statute or authority exercised under a State or the United States was drawn in question.</p> <p>An objection that the judgment of a state court ordering sale of real estate denies due process to nonresident parties served by publication, in that the order was made before the service was complete under the state statutes, merely challenges the power of the state court to proceed to a decision, and this does not draw in question the validity of any authority exercised under the State, within the meaning of Jud. Code, § 237,. as amended. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Gilbert, 245 U. S. 162.</p>

Held: that he was neither owner nor lienor, notwithstanding the bonds had become worthless and his vendee insolvent; and that there was no ' basis for a suit by his administrator in the Court of Claims. Whitfield v. United States-, 92 U. S. 165 .

The case is stated in the opinion. In the- absence of limitation the Government may sue either to annul the patent or to recover the value of the land. The authority of the Attorney General to make this election of remedies results from his general authority to sue ill behalf of the United States upon all just grounds that are available to private individuals. United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, 279.

On January 29, 1917, Virginia submitted her motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus, and for an order directed to the State of West Virginia and the members of her legislature requiring them to show cause why the writ should not issue, commanding the levy of a tax to satisfy the judgment heretofore recovered by Virginia.- The motion was granted February 5, 1917, and the rule issued returnable March 6th following.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: therefore, that the right of a parent to emancipate minor children and thus endow them with capacity to make a valid mortgage of their real estate persisted notwithstanding the Code of Civil Procedure.

Held: that the ruling, even if erroneous, became harm-dess in view of a judgment in the earlier action by which the va- . lidity of the mortgage was correctly sustained.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF. THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That an undertaking for. proper care and service implied with the company’s contract to furnish cars to .the shipper could not be a basis for liability under the Carmack Amendment. (2) Upon the theory that the car company and the railroad were part- ' ners as to the shipments, the former would become a common carrier pro hoc vice, and the amount involved would be insufficient. Act of July 20,1914, amending Jud.

Held: without special discussion of the point, in Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk Western Ry.

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California.</p>

<p>In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third -Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Rhode Island.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court óf the State of Wisconsin.</p>

<p>In error, to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Claims.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of North Carolina.</p>

<p>In error to the Appellate Court, First District of the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>In error to the Kansas City Court of Appeals of the State of Missouri.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York,.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland.</p>

<p>In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for ■the Sixth . Circuit.</p>

<p>On writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals" for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.</p>

<p>On writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida.</p>