Doucette v. Pomes’s Empirical Analysis
1999
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 156 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 158 later decisions — most recently September 2018 · most notably H.O.R.S.E. of Connecticut, Inc. v. Town of Washington (2001), Wasko v. Manella (2004)
2 federal appellate · 156 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (§ 2 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act) · 5 U.S.C. § 801 (Truth in Regulating Act of 2000)
Relies on Home Insurance v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. · Mead v. Burns · Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. · Conway v. Town of Wilton · State v. Kish
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 158 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
34 later decisions quote this exact passage“" should be able to turn to the state's insurance guaranty association fund for protection. See 2 NAIC Proceedings, supra, p. 770 (`[i]f the excess insurance company is not able to deliver on its contractual promises, the insurance guaranty fund can be called upon if the excess company is a licensed company' ); id., p. 783 (`[l]icensed excess insurance companies not only are subject to closer regulatory supervision than unlicensed companies, but also provide workers' compensation groups with the additional protection afforded by state insolvency funds' )."”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“allows an employer that has paid or become obligated to pay compensation to the injured employee under the Workers' Compensation Act to take action against a third person who is legally liable to pay damages for an injury to an employee. . . .[The Supreme Court has] stated that the employer's right of action under § 31-293 is separate and distinct CT Page 2634 from the employee's right, noting that it is a right vested in the employer exclusively; it is not the right of the employee.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.