State v. Coppes’s Empirical Analysis
1956
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 1 district · 18 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 21 later decisions — most recently November 2011
2 federal appellate · 1 district · 18 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Connally v. General Construction Co. · Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States · Lanzetta v. State New Jersey · Nash v. United States · Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which, either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. [Citation.] “* * * The legislature * * * must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit, so that he may have an understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. * * * It is axiomatic that statutes creating and defining crimes cannot be extended by intendment. Purely statutory offenses cannot be established by implication * # #”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Garland · Matter of Kaster“The statute requires that the operator of a car shall not proceed at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. This test can be applied in evaluating the act or acts or omission to act under conditions that are actual and potential hazards at certain speeds. It is always a question of fact to be determined on all the evidence before the Court [whether] or not the case comes within the purview of the statute. Every person knows that under certain conditions the speed of a car can be dangerous and hazardous to the occupant and others using the public highway or property adjoining the same. The statute as worded is an adequate standard by which a driver’s conduct can be tested and is, therefore, held to be no abridgement of . . . constitutional rights”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Pilcher“Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the highway and of any other conditions then existing, and no person shall drive any vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead, such driver having the right to assume, however, that all persons using said highway will observe the law.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Mullenix
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.