247 Minn.
Volume 247 — Minnesota Reports
71 opinions
- 247 Minn. 1Hursh v. Village of Long Lake (1956)
- 247 Minn. 6Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation (1956)
- 247 Minn. 25Botkin v. Botkin (1956)
- 247 Minn. 32Wormsbecker v. Donovan Construction Co. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 50Freeman v. Winkelman (1956)
- 247 Minn. 50In Re Trust Created Under Will of Freeman (1956)
- 247 Minn. 60Jenswold v. St. Louis County Welfare Board (1956)
- 247 Minn. 67State v. Stevens (1956)
- 247 Minn. 71Local 1142 v. United Electrical, Radio & MacHine Workers (1956)
- 247 Minn. 80Pangalos v. Halpern (1956)
- 247 Minn. 88Nybladh v. Peoples State Bank of Warren (1956)
- 247 Minn. 98Doerr v. Warner (1956)
<bold>Jurisdiction — acquisition — failure to join indispensable</bold> <bold>party</bold>. <block_quote> 1. Although an indispensable party to an action must be joined, and for failure to join him the action must be dismissed since the adjudication cannot proceed to judgment without him, such defect is not jurisdictional.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 2. The joinder of all indispensable parties is not a prerequisite to the acquirement of jurisdiction by the court over the subject matter of an action, and the court acquires such jurisdiction the moment the action is commenced despite the fact that an indispensable party has been omitted.</block_quote> <bold>Same — effect of removal to Federal court — remand to state</bold> <bold>court</bold>. <block_quote> 3. An order remanding an action to the Federal court does not absolutely divest the state court of its jurisdiction but merely suspends or holds that jurisdiction in abeyance either until the action is terminated in the Federal court or until the latter court remands the action to the state court; and in the event of a remand, the state court's continuous, though dormant, jurisdiction is revived and such court then proceeds to a final determination of the action in the exercise of its continuing original jurisdiction which was acquired when the action was originally commenced.</block_quote> <bold>Trusts — administration — proper forum</bold>. <block_quote> 4. Among the factors deemed controlling by the courts in determining the proper territorial forum for the administration of a trust are these: (1) The provisions of the trust instrument; (2) the residence of the beneficiaries, the settlor, and the trustee; (3) the location of the<page_number>Page 99</page_number> trust res; (4) the place of the trust business; and (5) the personal jurisdiction acquired over the parties interested in the trust through personal service.</block_quote> <bold>Injunction — restraint of prosecution of other suits —</bold> <bold>nonresident trustee</bold>. <block_quote> 5. When a court of equity assumes jurisdiction of a controversy it has jurisdiction to determine all relevant issues, and in the exercise of that power it may restrain the prosecution of other suits which raise the same issues until a final judgment has been rendered; and it is well settled that the court first obtaining jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties may properly restrain one of the parties from proceeding in another state.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 6. The true reason for denying an injunction against a nonresident is not that the court has no jurisdiction but that if the injunction were granted it could not ordinarily be enforced.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 7. Where an action has been commenced for the confirmation of a trust — as well as for an accounting and other relief — whereby the court has acquired a jurisdiction in personam over the trustee and a quasi in rem jurisdiction over the trust res then located within the state, and when the orderly and uninterrupted exercise of that jurisdiction pursuant to a controlling statute (M.S.A. <cross_reference>501.33</cross_reference>) will give the court a full in rem jurisdiction over the trust, and while the action is thus pending the trustee in a calculated and systematic manner seeks to deprive the court of its jurisdiction by removing the trust res to another state, it becomes the duty of the court, in the interest of the orderly administration of justice, to protect its jurisdiction by enjoining such nonresident trustee from prosecuting a similar action in another state insofar as, in the exercise of a sound discretion, the court can directly enforce its commands by imposing a penalty upon such nonresident or can indirectly enforce obedience by denying him judicial aid necessary for the enjoyment and protection of his rights in its forum.</block_quote>
- 247 Minn. 110State Ex Rel. Alexander v. Rigg (1956)
- 247 Minn. 115Mottinger v. Halfman (1956)
- 247 Minn. 122In Re Trust Created by Will of Tuthill (1956)
- 247 Minn. 122Bickford v. Wicklow (1956)
- 247 Minn. 130Glaser v. Alexander (1956)
- 247 Minn. 140Jablinske v. Eckstrom (1956)
- 247 Minn. 149State Ex Rel. Koalska v. Rigg (1956)
- 247 Minn. 151Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. v. Smith (1956)
- 247 Minn. 159Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Nadasdy (1956)
- 247 Minn. 168Tynan v. KSTP, INC. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 186Lynghaug v. Payte (1956)
- 247 Minn. 198Carroll v. Pratt (1956)
- 247 Minn. 205Hursh v. Theis (1956)
- 247 Minn. 205In Re Estate of Healy (1956)
- 247 Minn. 213Goldberg v. Fields (1956)
- 247 Minn. 217Ramsey v. CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY CO. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 228Maynard v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 230Allen v. Nessler (1956)
<bold>Conflict of laws — survival of action for personal injuries on</bold> <bold>death of tortfeasor — law determining</bold>. <bold>Executors and administrators — action for personal injuries —</bold> <bold>survival on death of tortfeasor</bold>. <block_quote> Where a cause of action for personal injuries does not survive the death of the alleged tortfeasor under the law of the state where the cause of action arose, it may not be prosecuted in this state even though such cause of action would have survived under the law of this state.</block_quote>
- 247 Minn. 243Root v. City of Duluth (1956)
- 247 Minn. 250McDonough v. Newmans Cloak & Suit Co. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 264State Ex Rel. Village of Orono v. Village of Long Lake (1956)
- 247 Minn. 277Berkman v. Weckerling (1956)
- 247 Minn. 288Schoch v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. (1956)
<bold>Workmen's compensation — proceedings — review — findings of</bold> <bold>Industrial Commission</bold>. <block_quote> 1. In appeal from order of Industrial Commission evidence must be viewed in light most favorable to its findings, and such findings on questions of fact will not be disturbed unless a consideration of the evidence and the permissible inferences therefrom requires reasonable minds to adopt a contrary conclusion.</block_quote> <bold>Same — compensable injury — causal connection with accident</bold> <bold>— conflicting evidence</bold>. <block_quote> 2. Where there is a conflict between the testimony of the employer's and employee's medical experts as to the causal connection between the employee's injuries and the alleged accident, a fact issue is presented for the Industrial Commission to determine and, where there is evidence in the record reasonably sustaining the conclusion reached by the commission, such decision will not be disturbed.</block_quote>
- 247 Minn. 295Casey v. Northern States Power Co. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 314Shastid v. Shue (1956)
- 247 Minn. 339Sims v. Hallett Construction Co. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 347City of Fergus Falls v. Whitlock (1956)
<bold>Municipal corporations — conveyance to city for park purposes</bold> <bold>— valid acceptance</bold>. <block_quote> 1. Action by city council accepting conveyances to municipality of real estate "for park and for recreational purposes" without resolution adopted by two-thirds majority, as provided in M.S.A. 1945, § <cross_reference>465.03</cross_reference>, <italic>held</italic> to constitute a valid acceptance as trustee of charitable trust created under first paragraph of M. S. A. <cross_reference>501.11</cross_reference>(7).</block_quote> <bold>Deeds — quitclaim deed — effect</bold>. <block_quote> 2. After having conveyed title to the city of Fergus Falls, grantors executed quitclaim deed covering part of same property to defendant, which deed contained purported release of restriction as to use contained in the original deed; such quitclaim deed construed to have no legal effect other than perhaps release, on the part of the grantors, the covenants limiting the use of the property for park and recreational purposes.</block_quote> <bold>Municipal corporations — power of city officials — legal</bold> <bold>effect of unauthorized acts</bold>. <block_quote> 3. Where the power to permit private use of municipal property is vested in the city council, the unauthorized acts of city officials in permitting one to move a structure upon such property are of no legal effect and do not bind the municipality.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 4. A municipality is not estopped to deny authority of its agents or employees who permit a person to move a structure upon city property and occupy the same since the power to grant such permission is vested in the city council.</block_quote> <bold>Same — title to property — estoppel to assert where taxes</bold> <bold>collected</bold>. <block_quote> 5. The payment of taxes on property by one who occupies it without right, when title is in a municipality, will not estop the municipality from asserting its title to the property.</block_quote><page_number>Page 348</page_number> <bold>Same — same — abandonment</bold>. <block_quote> 6. Where occupancy encroaches into area of an unopened but dedicated street, the fact that said occupancy continues with knowledge of city employees is insufficient to constitute abandonment by the municipality; in order to constitute abandonment, nonuser by municipality must be accompanied by some affirmative or unequivocal acts indicative of an intent to abandon and inconsistent with continued existence of the easement.</block_quote> <bold>Abandonment — loss of title thereby</bold>. <block_quote> 7. A perfect title to realty is never lost solely by abandonment.</block_quote>
- 247 Minn. 356Mortenson Ex Rel. Mortenson v. Hindahl (1956)
- 247 Minn. 362Sand v. Cade (1956)
- 247 Minn. 362In Re Estate of Hartz (1956)
- 247 Minn. 368Patton v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 380Hentges v. Schuttler (1956)
- 247 Minn. 387Excelsior Baking Co. v. City of Northfield (1956)
- 247 Minn. 396Fleischer v. State Department of Highways (1956)
- 247 Minn. 401Rikala v. Rundquist Construction Co. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 413Minneapolis Eastern Railway Co. v. City of Minneapolis (1956)
- 247 Minn. 420Faust Ex Rel. Faust v. Przybilla (1956)
- 247 Minn. 426Crow & Crow, Inc. v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 432Johnson v. Agerbeck (1956)
- 247 Minn. 444State v. Pliam (1956)
- 247 Minn. 452Dostal v. County of McLeod (1956)
- 247 Minn. 458Combined Insurance Co. of America v. Bode (1956)
- 247 Minn. 469State v. Anderson (1956)
- 247 Minn. 481Thomas v. Mrkonich (1956)
- 247 Minn. 486State v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 498Engwall v. County of Ramsey (1956)
- 247 Minn. 502Gruman v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 510Shawley v. Husman (1956)
- 247 Minn. 515Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Co. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 520Reyburn v. Minnesota State Board of Optometry (1956)
- 247 Minn. 529Erickson v. Turnquist (1956)
- 247 Minn. 534State v. North Itasca Electric Co-Operative, Inc. (1956)
- 247 Minn. 538Anderson v. Grasberg (1956)
- 247 Minn. 559Bain v. Northwestern National Bank (1956)
- 247 Minn. 559In Re Trusteeship Under Last Will of Menzel (1956)
- 247 Minn. 571State v. Haller (1956)
- 247 Minn. 573Otto B. Ashbach & Sons, Inc. v. State (1956)
- 247 Minn. 580Parker v. Barrett (1956)
- 247 Minn. 580In Re Estate of Koenig (1956)