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← 247 So. 2d 697 - Johnson v. State

247 So. 2d 697 - Johnson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1971

Citation profile

12
cited by 12 later decisions
1
states following
June 2008
most recently cited

12 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently June 2008

12 state decisions

401971198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Crowell v. State · Sanford v. State · Manning v. State · Sartorious v. State · Thompson v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In Sanford v. State, 155 Miss. 295 , 124 So. 353 (1929), we stated: The unexplained possession of stolen property shortly after the commission of a larceny is a circumstance from which guilt of the larceny may be inferred, but no inference can be drawn therefrom alone that the one in possession of the property received it from another knowing that it had been stolen. Sartorious v. State, 24 Miss. 602 ; Manning v. State, 129 Miss. 179 , 91 So. 902 . ( 155 Miss. at 297 , 124 So. at 353 ). Again, in Crowell v. State, 195 Miss. 427 , 15 So.2d 508 (1943), we stated: * * * One guilty of larceny or burglary necessarily knows the facts and circumstances connected with the crime, but in a prosecution for receiving stolen property, guilty knowledge is the very gist of the offense. Such knowledge must be both alleged and proved. * * * ( 195 Miss. at 436 , 15 So.2d at 511 ) And, further, in Crowell , while discussing the propriety of an instruction, we said: From the foregoing authorities, we conclude that it is never proper in a case for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen, for the jury to be instructed, in effect, that the unexplained possession alone of such recently stolen property is either a circumstance from which guilt may be inferred or that such possession is a circumstance strongly indicative of guilt which will justify, support, or warrant a verdict for the state, where such possession is unaided by other proof tending to show that the accused received suc”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Perhaps the clearest pronouncement of this Court as to the requirements of proof needed to secure a conviction for violation of § 97-17-69 appears in Johnson v. State, 247 So.2d 697 (Miss.1971). We therefore quote extensively from that opinion: In Sanford v. State, 155 Miss. 295 , 124 So. 353 (1929), we stated: The unexplained possession of stolen property shortly after the commission of a larceny is a circumstance from which guilt of the larceny may be inferred, but no inference can be drawn therefrom alone that the one in possession of the property received it from another knowing that it had been stolen. Sartorious v. State, 24 Miss. 602 ; Manning v. State, 129 Miss. 179 , 91 So. 902 . (155 Miss, at 297, 124 So. at 353 ). Again, in Crowell v. State, 195 Miss. 427 , 15 So.2d 508 (1943), we stated: * * * One guilty of larceny or burglary necessarily knows the facts and circumstances connected with the crime, but in a prosecution for receiving stolen property, guilty knowledge is the very gist of the offense. Such knowledge must be both alleged and proved. * * * (195 Miss, at 436, 15 So.2d at 511 ).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.