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← 248 F.3d 677 - United States v. Rivera

United States v. Rivera’s Empirical Analysis

248 F.3d 677 · 2001

Citation profile

30
cited by 30 later decisions
2
states following
August 2018
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Payton v. New York · Mincey v. Arizona · United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan · United States v. Saadeh · United States v. Ramsey

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[Warrantless] searches are constitutionally permissible ... where there is probable cause and exigent circumstances create a compelling need for official action and Insufficient time to secure a warrant. United States v. Marshall, 157 F.3d 477 , 481-82 (7th Cir.1998). The government has the burden of proving that its officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing such exigent circumstances existed at the time of the warrantless entry. Id. at 482 . Exigent circumstances have been found where officers had an objectively reasonable fear that evidence was about to be destroyed or removed. Id.; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 394, 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). The relevant focus is whether the facts, as they appeared at the moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced agent to believe that evidence might be destroyed or removed before a warrant could be secured. Marshall, 157 F.3d at 482 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Essentially, [defendant] asks us to adopt a rule that exigent circumstances do not exist until a substantial portion of the evidence is in danger of being removed or destroyed. We decline that invitation. First, it is a completely unworkable standard. In determining whether exigent circumstances exist, we analyze the situation from the perspective of the officers at the scene [ ], and it is virtually impossible for officers to make the type of proportionality analysis recommended by [defendant]. Officers should not have to engage in a guessing game as to how much evidence has been removed or how much remains, before they can bring depletion to a halt. Moreover, even the destruction or removal of a relatively small amount of evidence can have significant consequences at sentencing, where the drug quantity impacts the sentence. .... If we were to define exigent circumstances as requiring that a certain quantum of evidence is in danger of destruction or removal—a magic number that must be reached before they can end the depletion—we would be imposing an unworkable standard on law enforcement officers who must make quick decisions at the site.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “where there is probable cause and exigent circumstances create a compelling need for official action and insufficient time to secure a warrant”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 923 , 122 S.Ct. 277 , 151 L.Ed.2d 203 (2001); United States v. Marshall, 157 F.3d 477 , 481 (7th Cir.) (holding that a warrantless search and seizure inside a home is permitted”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.