Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 248 F.3d 946 - McGregor v. Gibson

McGregor v. Gibson’s Empirical Analysis

248 F.3d 946 · 2001

Citation profile

145
cited by 145 later decisions
10
states following
August 2024
most recently cited

54 federal appellate · 23 district · 15 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 145 later decisions — most recently August 2024 · most notably United States v. Quintieri (2002), Tal

54 federal appellate · 23 district · 15 state decisions — followed in 10 states

870200120102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Williams v. Taylor · Dusky v. United States · Pate v. Robinson · Ake v. Oklahoma · Drope v. Missouri

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 145 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Retrospective competency hearings are generally `disfavored' but are `permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the defendant.' [Citations omitted.] In the context of deciding whether a state court's retrospective determination of a petitioner's competency violated that petitioner's due process rights, we announced factors to be considered in assessing whether a meaningful retrospective determination can be made: (1) [T]he passage of time, (2) the availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, including medical records and prior competency determinations, (3) any statements by the defendant in the trial record, and (4) the availability of individuals and trial witnesses, both experts and non-experts, who were in a position to interact with defendant before and during trial, including the trial judge, counsel for both the government and defendant, and jail officials. [Citation omitted.]"”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[T]o prevail on a procedural competency claim after a trial in which a petitioner was found competent under an unconstitutional burden of proof, the petitioner must establish that a reasonable judge should have had a bona fide doubt as to his competence at the time of trial. We view the evidence in the record objectively, from the standpoint of a reasonable judge presiding over petitioner’s case at the time of trial. A petitioner establishes a bona fide doubt if he shows that a reasonable judge should have doubted whether petitioner had “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and whether petitioner had “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” [Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 , 402, 80 S.Ct. 788 , 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960).] We stress that the due process requirement is continuing; a defendant must be competent throughout the entire trial. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 171-72 , 95 S.Ct. 896 .”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[a] procedural competency claim is based upon a trial court's alleged failure to hold a competency hearing, or an adequate competency hearing”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.