State v. Dixon’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

61 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““K.S.A. 22-3410 sets forth specific grounds upon which a party may challenge a prospective juror. Dixon relies upon K.S.A. 22-3410(2), which provides: ‘A juror may be challenged for cause on any of the following grounds: ‘(i) His state of mind with reference to the case or any of the parties is such that the court determines there is doubt that he can act impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.’ “Challenges for cause are tried to the district court and decided in its discretion. State v. Case, 228 Kan. 733, 737 , 620 P.2d 821 (1980). We have consistently held that the trial court is in a better position than this court to view the demeanor of prospective jurors as they are questioned. State v. Mahkuk, 220 Kan. 74, 76 , 551 P.2d 869 (1976); State v. Carpenter, 215 Kan. 573, 577 , 527 P.2d 1333 (1974). Thus, the trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Sanders, 223 Kan. 273, 274 , 574 P.2d 559 (1977). “Dixon first contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sustain a challenge for cause of Ms. Slaymaker. Ms. Slaymaker stated she might have trouble being impartial in light of evidence of a prior similar crime. Ms. Slay-maker also stated during voir dire that she might give more credibility to the children’s testimony when compared to the defendant’s. “Dixon’s argument of abuse has no merit. Ms. Slaymaker was removed from the v”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Crawford

2. ““[W]e have adopted a two-prong test to determine whether a particular offense is a lesser included offense [under K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d)] which requires a jury instruction thereon. [Citation omitted.] First, the court must determine whether all the statutory elements of the alleged lesser included offense are required to prove the greater crime charged. [Citation omitted.] A jury instruction on a particular lesser offense is required whenever all of its statutory elements will be proved if the State establishes the elements of the crime charged. [Citation omitted.] .... “If a comparison of the lesser offense and greater offense fails to disclose an ‘identity of the elements,’ the court must apply the second prong of the test. This analysis requires the trial court to examine the crime charged and determine if proof of the crime charged also proves a lesser crime. If so, an instruction on the lesser crime is required. [Citation omitted.] “. . . [U]nder the two-part analysis set forth in [State v. Adams, 242 Kan. 20 , 744 P.2d 833 (1987),] and [State v. Fike, 243 Kan. 365 , 757 P.2d 724 (1988)], a lesser crime may become a lesser included offense of a greater offense if the information actually alleges a lesser crime and the evidence which must be established to prove the crime charged also proves the lesser crime.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Rush

3. ““Dixon’s argument misinterprets the second prong of the test to determine whether an offense is a lesser included offense of a particular crime charged. Under the two-part analysis set forth in [State v.] Adams[, 242 Kan. 20 , 744 P.2d 833 (1987),] and Fike , a lesser crime may become a lesser included offense of a greater offense if the information actually alleges a lesser crime and the evidence which must be established to prove the crime charged also proves the lesser crime. In this case it was not necessary to prove [the victim] was actually shot to establish the elements of attempted first-degree murder. The State was required to prove only that Dixon committed an overt act towards the perpetration of first-degree murder. “Dixon’s argument fails to distinguish between what the State may prove and what the State is required to prove. [Citation omitted.]” 248 Kan. at 784.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 23 Kan. App. 2d 847 - State v. Rodriquez-Garcia