Weidemeyer v. Brekke’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““(a) No mortgage or deed of trust shall be valid except as between the parties thereto, unless there be endorsed thereon an oath or affirmation of the mortgagee or the party secured by a deed of trust that the consideration recited in said mortgage or deed of trust is true and bona fide as therein set forth, (emphasis supplied) “(b) No purchase money deed of trust involving land any part of which is situated in Maryland, shall be valid either as between the parties or as to any third parties unless such deed of trust contains or has endorsed upon it at a time prior to recordation, the oath or affirmation of the party secured by such deed of trust stating that the amount of the loan which said deed of trust has been given to secure was paid over and disbursed by the party secured by the deed of trust to either the borrower or the person responsible for disbursement of funds in the closing transaction or their respective agent at a time no later than the final and complete execution of the deed of trust, provided, however, that this subsection shall not apply where a deed of trust is given to a seller in a transaction in order to secure payment to him of all or part of the purchase price of said property.” (emphasis supplied)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Stack v. Marney · Dryfoos v. Hostetter

2. ““The appellant also cites a line of cases and authorities to the effect that chattel deeds of .trust are ‘in effect a chattel mortgage’ or ‘one of the common forms which a mortgage takes is a deed of trust * * or ‘the conveyance therefore though called a deed is in substance and purpose a mortgage * * *.’ These propositions are true in that with respect to both chattel mortgages and chattel deeds of trust the property is conveyed to secure an indebtedness and in each case upon default by the debtor the property may be sold to satisfy the claim of his creditor. What is overlooked by the appellant are the facts that there is a line of cases in this state going back over one hundred years that distinguish instruments that are in effect mortgages from those that are technical mortgages, and also that the statute involved, Code (1957), Article 21, Section 50 (repealed by Acts of 1963, Chapter 538, Section 1, replaced by Code (1964 Repl. Vol.), Article 95B, Sections 9-101 to 9-507) did not include deeds of trust as instruments requiring an affidavit of consideration.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Billingsley v. Mitchell