Mark v. Mark’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

43 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““. . . it is not to be overlooked that the subsequent remarriage of a divorced husband, as his own voluntary act, is not of itself a circumstance which justifies a revision of alimony. Despite many sweeping statements to the contrary a trial court obviously does not, and cannot, wholly ignore the needs of innocent children who are born of a divorced husband’s remarriage. Their needs, especially where the children of the prior marriage have become self-sustaining and the divorced wife is capable of pursuing gainful employment, is a circumstance which may indirectly bear upon the propriety of a revision in alimony despite the fact that the father himself, by his voluntary act in begetting another family, is usually entitled to little judicial consideration when he seeks relief from the burdens of his former marriage. A trial court’s sound discretion in solving marital problems should not be shackled by rigid rules which prevent a recognition of the needs of innocent children whether they be born of a first or of a second marriage. Children born of the second marriage, like the children of the first, are not responsible for their existence and are equally dependent upon their father for support. . . . Consideration of the needs of such children does not mean that the necessities or wants of the first wife will be unreasonably curtailed or ignored. Several other c arts have been realistic enough likewise to recognize íe rights of second-marriage children, as innocent thir . parti”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 89 Wis. 2d 509 - Besaw v. Besaw · Valento v. Swenson

2. “Although the fact that the court in its final decree adopted the [maintenance] provisions of a stipulation entered into by the parties pending the action is entitled to considerable evidentiary weight in passing upon an application for [maintenance] revision, the stipulation is, nevertheless, purely advisory to the court and does not limit or deprive it of its discretionary power of determining whether a future change of circumstances warrants revision. A court-adopted stipulation is to be given such evidentiary weight as will make the court more reluctant, than it would otherwise be, to modify the original [maintenance] provisions. Stipulations of this kind are deemed to have been entered into in view of the authority conferred upon the court by the statute and are merged in the judgment, and are not so far contracts as to be controlling upon the court or as to preclude subsequent change, in a proper case, of the original final decree. It follows that the parties cannot by their stipulation bind the court as to what change of circumstance shall or shall not justify a change in [maintenance].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Marriage of Karon v. Karon