Armstrong v. McCrary’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It is true that the use originated as a permissive right and not upon any consideration, but the length of time which it was used without objection is sufficient to show that use was made of the alley by the owners of adjoining property as a matter of right and not as a matter of permission. In other words, the length of time and the circumstances under which the alley was opened were sufficient to establish an adverse use so as to ripen into title by limitation. It is true that the testimony of McGill establishes the fact that, after he became the owner of the property in 1910, the alley was frequently used, but that there was an embankment at the mouth of the alley, so that it was difficult to use it; and he also testified that one of his neighbors asked permission to dig down the alley and use it for the purpose of hauling manure. He stated that he agreed for his neighbor to so use the alley, but his own testimony shows that the alley was open and plainly marked prior to that time, and was occasionally used. His testimony is not sufficient to show that, prior to that time, during the years that the alley had been open, the use of it had merely been permissive, nor that those who used the alley after he acquired the property did so merely by permission. We give full recognition to the principle of law established by the numerous decisions cited in the brief of appellants, to the effect that a permissive use cannot ripen into a legal right merely by the lapse of time, but we”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Fields v. Ginger

2. ““We are unable to say that the findings of the chancellor are against the preponderance of the evidence. Whether appellee used the driveway and under a claim of right was highly disputed. . . The chancellor elected to give greater credibility to the evidence proffered by appellee and he was in much better position than we are to make the choice. Additionally, the construction of the double garage in 1932 by Snodgrass and Bracy is highly pursuasive. Each had contributed part of the land that went into the project and they endeavored to place the garage astride the common boundary. Entrance to Mr. Bracy’s [McCrary’s] side of the garage from the street could be gained only by traversing the established driveway. The hedge and wrought iron fence on the Bracy property, instead of being straight, curved at the north end so as to permit Mr. Bracy to deviate to the right at the north end of the driveway and enter the garage.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hubbard v. Mckee