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249 F.2d 410

Docket No. 15190.

Etherton v. United States

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided June 25, 1957.

Writ of Certiorari Denied Jan. 6, 1958.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1957-06-25

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““§ 65-9-11. Contributing to delinquency of child: Suspension of sentence: ‘Delinquency’ defined. Any person who shall commit any act, or omit the performance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends to cause, encourage or contribute to the delinquency of any •child under the age of eighteen years, or who shall by threats, command or persuasion, endeavor to induce any child to do or perform any act or follow any course of conduct which would cause such child to become a delinquent child, or who shall do any act which manifestly tends to cause any child to become a delinquent child, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than two years nor less than one year, or by imprisonment in the federal jail for not more than one year nor less than one month, or by fine of not more than one thousand dollars nor less than one hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Provided, however, that the court may suspend the execution of sentence for a violation of the provisions hereof, and impose conditions as to conduct in the premises of any person so convicted and make suspension depend upon the fulfillment by such person of such conditions and in case of the breach of such conditions, or any thereof, the court may order the defendant arrested and placed in the custody of the marshal as though there had been no suspension. “For the purposes of this Act any child under the age of eighteen”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Anderson v. State

Applies AZ 13 § 13-822

Relies on Etherton v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1957-06-25

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently November 1992

5 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

5019571960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1See 78 S.Ct. 349.

¶2*411Tillman Foster Etherton, in pro. per.

¶3William T. Plummer, U. S. Atty., Lloyd L. Duggar, Asst. U. S. Atty., Anchorage, Alaska, for appellee.

¶4Before STEPHENS, FEE and BARNES, Circuit Judges.

¶5PER CURIAM.

¶6Etherton was convicted after trial before a jury in the Alaska District Court. One indictment was in four counts, each charging a felony, and a second contained two separate felony counts. The charges dealt with contributing to the delinquency of two different minors and sodomy. The trial was on the two indictments consolidated. The verdict was guilty on each of the counts. He was sentenced on March 20, 1951, to twenty years imprisonment. No appeal was taken. A year after sentence, appellant filed a motion to vacate and set aside judgment, which was denied by the District Court. A vast number of motions of all types were filed in the District Court between that time and the present. All have been denied there.

¶7On March 29, 1956, Etherton filed in the District Court an affidavit and motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a motion to vacate and set aside the judgment and sentence and a motion for personal appearance. The District Court denied all these motions.

¶8*412The time for appeal from the original conviction has long since passed, and Etherton cannot use these motions as a writ of error or appeal. Therefore, no consideration is given to the allegations that two indictments were tried without consolidation or the supposed harmful consequences which followed such a trial. The record shows that the indictments were consolidated. The allegation that the same offense was charged in two separate counts is not true and would not be ground for action here in any event.

¶9One indictment charges in one count that Etherton contributed to the delinquency of a minor, Larry Cox, at Anchorage, Alaska, between September, 1949, and June, 1950, and another count charges appellant contributed to the delinquency of the same minor during the same period at Wasilla, Alaska. These two locations are seventy miles apart by road. The statute, A.C.L.A. § 65-9-11, addresses itself to prohibition of an “act or omission.” The counts of the indictment are drawn to accord with this purpose. The acts alleged to contribute to delinquency are not only alleged to be performed at different places, but obviously these must have been at different times. The other indictment is similarly good against such allegations, since it specifically charges in two counts the same offense committed upon one Wiley at different places and within stated separate times. The other two counts charge two different crimes committed on one' Shaw. The separate sentences may therefore be properly cumulated. This Court, cannot go further and review the evidence.

¶10Appellant claims that the territorial act under which punishment was imposed was so vague and uncertain as to be unconstitutional. The statute provides that anyone who performs acts or omissions which contribute to the delinquency of a minor shall be guilty of a felony.1 It thus follows a pattern familiar in the states of this country. The particular portion chosen for attack is the punitive section, which reads in part:

“… shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than two years nor less than one year, or by imprisonment in the federal jail for not more than one year nor less than one month, or by fine of not more than one thousand dollars nor less than one hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” A.C.L.A. § 65-9-11.

¶11There seems to be no difficulty here. The crime is defined as a felony. The judge is given a wide discretion as to W'hat punishment may be applicable. Indeed, as all must recognize, the limits *413must be wide to accommodate the various acts and omissions which may fall within its purview. It obviously makes no difference that a crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary is a felony and that other crimes are misdemeanors, as provided by A.C.L.A. § 65-2-2. That section governs provisions which do not expressly describe the prohibited act as a felony or a misdemeanor, but do provide minimum punishment. Here the statute declares this crime to be a felony. Appellant was given a felony sentence. He cannot complain that some other person may be given a lesser penalty.

¶12Affirmed.

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