[Cite as State v. Costilla,
2024-Ohio-3221.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio/City of Toledo Court of Appeals No. L-23-1122
Appellee Trial Court No. CRB-23-2973
v.
Antonio Milo Costilla DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: August 23, 2024
…
Rebecca Facey, City of Toledo Prosecuting Attorney, and
Jimmie Jones, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Tyler Naud Jechura, for appellant.
…
ZMUDA, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} This matter is before the court on appeal of the judgment of the Toledo
Municipal Court, sentencing appellant to 180 days in jail, with 150 days suspended, and
placing appellant on probation for one year, following a trial to the court and guilty
verdict on one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) and one count
of assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13, each a misdemeanor of the first degree. Finding
no error, we affirm.
II. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On March 29, 2023, Toledo Police received two 911 calls regarding a
disturbance at a home on Willard Street. Each call was brief, with the second call
received around the time the first call disconnected.
{¶ 3} The first caller gave her name and address and requested help removing
someone from her home. The caller then exclaimed, “He’s exposing his privates and
everything.” When asked who the caller is referencing, she identifies him as her “kid’s
dad.” The caller then says, “I just want him to leave” and states, “He’s trying to push me
out of my own house” and “He’s dumping beer and he’s all drunk.” She adds, “He’s an
alcoholic” and “He’s wrecking all my stuff.” As the caller starts to say, “My daughter is
freaking the fuck-,” she stops talking to the 911 operator and another female voice is
heard screaming, “He’s going to fucking kill you” as the operator asks, “what’s his name,
what’s his name,” before the call disconnects.
{¶ 4} A second 911 call is received, and immediately the caller is heard screaming,
“Stop. Mom, he’s going to fucking kill you.” The caller then speaks to the 911 operator
and asks for police to come to the address, providing the street and address. The 911
operator informs the caller that 911 received a call already and police are en route to that
address. The caller never provides her name to the 911 operator, but continues to scream,
“Stop, please send somebody, hurry, please, please, please.” From this point, the caller
stops speaking to the 911 operator, but can be heard yelling and screaming at a distance
from the phone. The recording also includes a man’s voice, saying, “Don’t touch me” and
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“Why are you so loud?” The recording then includes three voices arguing. Finally, the
caller says, “Please mom, please get out.” As the 911 operator asks if there are weapons
or if anyone needs medical attention, the call disconnects.
{¶ 5} Police arrived around 11:40 a.m. to the address, and proceeded toward the
home, the upper unit of a duplex. Police first encountered the victim’s daughter on the
front porch, and the daughter told officers that appellant was in the home, breaking
everything, and he had stabbed her mother in the face. As police climbed the stairs to the
upstairs unit, they encountered the victim at the door to the residence, trying to get inside.
The victim identified herself, and she had visible injuries and blood on her face and head.
Both the victim and her daughter gave appellant’s name to the officers, and the victim
told officers that appellant “was just beating the fuck out of me,” and that he did not live
there.
{¶ 6} Officers asked appellant to open the door, but he refused and remained
barricaded in the home. Police forced their way into the residence and took appellant into
custody in the living room, just inside the front door. The home was in disarray, with
belongings broken and strewn all over the floor. Appellant was combative and appeared
inebriated. As police instructed him to stop resisting, appellant claimed he was not
resisting, and stated, “No, that’s my lady, bitch, she’s tripping, bro.” Police cleared the
home as officers placed appellant in the back of a cruiser for transport downtown.
3.
{¶ 7} On March 29, 2023, appellant was charged with one count of domestic
violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree, and one
count of assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13, a misdemeanor of the first degree.
{¶ 8} On May 3, 2023, the matter proceeded to a bench trial.
{¶ 9} At trial, the city had only one witness, Officer Kevin Gracely. After
establishing Officer Gracely’s background, the city immediately sought to introduce the
prosecution’s composite Exhibit A, identified as a 911 call. The defense objected “until
there’s more foundation laid.” The city identified the exhibit as a 911 call, with a
certificate of authenticity, a “self-authenticated document,” and indicated the call was
part of the discovery exchanged with the defense. The trial court permitted the city to
play the 911 audio. After playing audio, the trial court admitted composite Exhibit A
without objection.
{¶ 10} Officer Gracely then testified that he was dispatched to the Willard Street
residence on March 29, 2023, in the morning. He was wearing a body camera and
testified that he reviewed the video recorded on that date. The city then played Officer
Gracely’s body camera footage identified as Exhibit B, without objection, stopping at
intervals to ask Gracely questions.
{¶ 11} Referring to the video, Gracely identified the young woman he first
encountered as the victim’s daughter. Police were responding to a possible domestic
violence situation, and Gracely asked the daughter the name of the man in the residence.
She told him, “Antonio.” He then encountered the victim as she came down the steps, and
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noted a cut under her left eye that was bleeding and swollen. After he helped take
appellant into custody in the home, other officers secured the home. Nobody else was
present besides appellant, the victim, and the victim’s daughter.
{¶ 12} The city then presented Exhibit C, a group of photographs of the victim’s
head and face, showing injury and blood, and pictures of the home, showing property
damage. Officer Gracely testified that the victim’s injuries were recent, based on the
redness and swelling and active bleeding. The trial court admitted the photographs
comprising Exhibit C without objection. The city then introduced Exhibits D and E, birth
certificates for two children sharing appellant’s surname, born to the victim and appellant,
with only one of the birth certificates listing appellant as father. The trial court admitted
Exhibits D and E without objection.
{¶ 13} On cross examination, Officer Gracely admitted that the victim’s daughter
told him that she did not witness anything but arrived after the altercation and destruction
in the home. Gracely also testified that he did not take the photographs that were
admitted, depicting the injury and damage, and no weapon was taken from the scene.
{¶ 14} At the close of testimony, defense counsel moved for acquittal, for the first
time challenging “some statements from a video from someone who’s not subject to cross
examination in this case.” Counsel argued that appellant’s name was not mentioned on
the 911 call, sufficient to connect the injuries to appellant. In response, the prosecution
argued that there was the 911 call, body cam video, documents establishing a relationship
between victim and appellant, and the visible injuries sustained by the victim. The city
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argued that, although the evidence is circumstantial, it is probative and “one can deduce
that this is exactly what happened.”
{¶ 15} The trial court found the prosecution met its burden of producing evidence
to support the elements for the charged offenses and denied the motion for acquittal.
{¶ 16} The defense rested without calling any witnesses and renewed the motion
for acquittal. After the trial court re-watched the body cam video and played the 911
audio again, the trial court denied the motion and the parties proceeded to closing
argument.
{¶ 17} The city argued that the 911 audio demonstrated the victim and her
daughter were in fear and appellant’s presence was not welcome. The city also argued
that the body cam video showed the victim with a “fresh cut below her eye that was
bleeding” and the testimony established that nobody else besides the victim, her daughter,
and appellant were present. While no direct evidence was introduced to demonstrate that
appellant assaulted the mother of his children in the commission of domestic violence,
the city argued that the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated the
elements of the offenses.
{¶ 18} In response, appellant’s trial counsel argued that there was no evidence to
connect appellant to the offenses. The victim did not identify appellant by name in the
911 call, and because the victim did not testify, appellant was not identified as the male
voice on the 911 audio. The victim’s daughter admitted to arriving after the altercation,
6.
and without the victim’s testimony, counsel argued the city failed to meet its burden of
proof.
{¶ 19} The city, in reply, argued the victim’s statements on the 911 call occurred
during a commotion in the home and therefore constituted excited utterances, and the
victim identified her assailant as “her kids’ dad.” With evidence demonstrating appellant
is father of two of the victim’s children, the city argued the 911 audio identified appellant,
appellant was present in the victim’s home when police arrived, and the victim had
visible, fresh injuries.
{¶ 20} In entering judgment, the trial court noted the contemporaneous statements
on the 911 audio, indicating “He’s my kids’ dad” and the daughter’s voice saying, “he’s
going to fucking kill you.” The trial court noted the sound of a commotion, “a disturbing
one at that.” The trial court also considered the statements made when police first arrived
to be excited utterance, considering the ongoing situation with appellant barricaded in the
home. The trial court noted statements made on the body camera video, including, “‘he
stabbed my mom in the face,” “He’s beating – he beat the fuck out of me,” “He punched
me,” and the identification of appellant by name. The trial court further noted that, after
entering the home by kicking the door in, only appellant was present, and appellant
referred to the victim as “my lady.” After considering the totality of the circumstances,
including the officer’s testimony, the body cam video, the 911 audio, the photographs,
and birth certificates, the trial court found appellant guilty of both charges.
7.
{¶ 21} The trial court referred the matter for a presentence investigation report and
scheduled the matter for sentencing. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a jail term of
180 days as to the domestic violence charge, with 150 days suspended, and placed
appellant on active probation for one year, and imposed only a “no fine” sentence as to
the assault charge. Appellant filed a timely appeal from the judgment.
III. Assignments of Error
{¶ 22} In challenging his conviction, appellant asserts the following as error:
1. The conviction of the defendant should be reversed as the city failed to present
sufficient evidence and the conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence that was introduced.
2. The defendant’s 6th Amendment rights were violated during trial as the city used
testimonial evidence of witnesses not present at trial, thereby depriving him of his
right to confront those witnesses and cross-examine them.
IV. Analysis
{¶ 23} Because the argument regarding the confrontation clause issue is
potentially dispositive, we address the assignments of error in reverse.
A. Statements made by the victim and her daughter to the 911 operator and to
Officer Gracely were not testimonial, and therefore admission of those
recorded statements did not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
{¶ 24} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues his right to confront
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated by
admission of hearsay contained within the 911 calls and the body cam video. The
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Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay unless the declarant appears
as a witness at trial or the accused had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). We review the admission of hearsay under
an abuse of discretion standard, but alleged errors involving the Confrontation Clause are
reviewed de novo. State v. McKelton,
2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 97.
{¶ 25} Appellant does not specifically address the hearsay issue and characterizes
all recorded statements as testimonial, without any supporting argument. Appellant’s
reference to the record, moreover, misstates the facts, claiming police found appellant “in
a closet” or that appellant and the victim were married, or that “there was no information
on how the injuries were caused, when they happened, or who caused them.” Finally,
appellant argues that “[t]he only information gathered by Toledo Police came from a
person who was not in the home [at] the time of the disturbance.” Appellant’s argument is
contrary to the record of the case. Appellant and the victim were not married, appellant
was just inside the front door to the home, and the record contains evidence of the source
of the victim’s injury, from the daughter, the victim, and based on the responding officer’s
observation upon arriving on scene.
{¶ 26} Appellant, also, did not object to admission of the 911 audio or the body
cam video during trial, and only raised the issue of his right to confront witnesses within
his closing argument. In asserting a Sixth Amendment violation, appellant does not
identify specific statements that were testimonial, raising only general objections to “both
911 calls and the TPD bodycam” video, admitted as evidence without objection.
9.
Appellant generally argues, “This evidence was clearly testimonial in nature and
[appellant] did not have an opportunity to cross examine them.”
{¶ 27} The city’s Composite Exhibit A was admitted as “911 calls,” but the actual
exhibit in the record on appeal contains audio files for two 911 calls, an incident detail
report, a certificate of authenticity for the 911 calls, and four body cam video files.
However, the trial transcript clearly limits the admission of evidence in Composite
Exhibit A to the two 911 audio recordings. Exhibit B contains Officer Gracely’s body
cam video, which is a duplicate of one of the body cam video files included in Composite
Exhibit A. Again, the trial transcript clearly demonstrates that only Officer Gracely’s
body cam video was played at trial, in conjunction with Gracely’s testimony. Therefore,
based on the record of trial and appellant’s challenge to all statements in the 911 calls and
a singular “bodycam,” we must limit our review to the 911 calls from the Composite
Exhibit A and Officer Gracely’s body cam video from Exhibit B.
{¶ 28} Without identifying any specific statements within these two exhibits,
appellant appears to object to all statements recorded within the 911 calls and Officer
Gracely’s body cam video. We previously considered both 911 calls and body cam video
relative to confrontation issues, applying the “primary-purpose test” set forth in Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) and State v. Jones,
2012-Ohio-5677. Where the
statements were made during the ongoing emergency and prior to securing the assailant,
as in this case, we have determined the statements were nontestimonial. See, e.g., State v.
Schnabel,
2019-Ohio-3024 (6th Dist.); State v. Stevenson,
2023-Ohio-4853 (6th Dist.).
10.
{¶ 29} The “primary-purpose test” is used to distinguish between police
questioning concerning an ongoing emergency and questioning that relates to past
criminal conduct, to differentiate nontestimonial hearsay from testimonial hearsay.
“Because ‘only testimonial hearsay implicates the Confrontation Clause,’ the admission
of nontestimonial statements does not violate the Confrontation Clause.” State v.
Stevenson, 2023-Ohio-4853, ¶ 60 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-
5735, ¶ 185.
{¶ 30} In considering the primary purpose of the statements, “[s]tatements are
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution.” Jones at ¶ 145, quoting Davis at 822.
{¶ 31} In State v. Williams, 2013-Ohio-726 (6th Dist.), we determined that a
neighbor’s 911 call, and a statement that a man was “beating this lady up real good,” and
that there were no weapons, “He’s just beating her,” were nontestimonial because,
“[v]iewed objectively, the primary purpose of the statements by the neighbor in the 911
call was to seek police assistance to aid [the victim] in an ongoing emergency involving
domestic violence.”
Williams at ¶ 9-14. Similarly, in Toledo v. Jenkins,
2015-Ohio-1270
(6th Dist.), we determined the victim’s statements in a 911 call, identifying her attacker
11.
immediately after the assault, were a call for help during an ongoing emergency.
Jenkins
at ¶ 16.
{¶ 32} In State v. Santellana, 2020-Ohio-5041, we considered whether admission
of a 911 call violated the Confrontation Clause, applying the primary-purpose test. In that
case, the trial court admitted the 911 call placed by the victim, stating he had been robbed
at gunpoint by two men who kicked in his door, describing the robbers as Hispanic and
black men wearing masks, brandishing guns. The victim reported the robbers drove away
in a black car, and indicated the direction they fled the scene.
Santellana at ¶ 3. A second
911 call was placed by a bystander, reporting they saw a black vehicle, pursued by police,
toss a gun from the car. Id. at ¶ 6. Based on the ongoing emergency and the purpose of
the statements to assist police in responding to the emergency, we determined the 911
calls were nontestimonial, and therefore did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Id at ¶
23.
{¶ 33} In State v. Schnabel, we considered whether a victim’s statements to a 911
operator were testimonial. In Schnabel, police were called to the scene of a domestic
disturbance at a hotel. The victim’s statements to the 911 operator were made while the
assailant, the victim’s husband, was still in their hotel room. The victim was recorded
yelling at her husband to get away, describing what was done to her and the fact that the
children witnessed the assault. Schnabel at ¶ 16. We determined the 911 recording did not
contain testimonial hearsay, “as it was made in response to an ongoing emergency.” Id. at
¶ 17.
12.
{¶ 34} Moreover, we further found the statements made to the responding officers
were nontestimonial. When police arrived at the hotel room, the victim was still on the
phone with 911, and although the husband was outside the door to the room, he seemed
to be highly intoxicated and the victim and the children were “very upset,” “crying,”
“shaking,” “highly agitated,” and “yelling.” Id. at ¶ 21-22. The victim told officers that
her husband grabbed her by her hair and threw her to the ground, complaining of injury
to her neck. Id. at ¶ 22. We determined the statement by the victim “was to aid in the
emergency and was not testimonial in nature.” Id. at ¶ 23.
{¶ 35} Here, the 911 calls were made in quick succession, and based on the
content of the 911 recordings, occurred during the emergency. Furthermore, the only
question that received a response identified the assailant as the victim’s “kid’s dad.” A
911 call to report an ongoing emergency, with statements made contemporaneously with
the emergency to request police assistance, are not testimonial statements for Sixth
Amendment purposes. Schnabel, 2019-Ohio-3024 at ¶ 14 (6th Dist.), citing Davis,
547
U.S. at 826-827.
{¶ 36} Likewise, the statements made to the responding officers, prior to securing
appellant and the scene, were not testimonial. The victim and her daughter identified
appellant, barricaded in their home, with police questioning limited to appellant’s
location and whether appellant had a gun. The victim’s injuries and demeanor, moreover,
are clear on the video.
13.
{¶ 37} In State v. Stevenson, we addressed the admissibility of body cam video,
noting only testimonial hearsay implicated rights to confrontation. Stevenson at ¶ 60,
citing State v. McKelton,
2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 185. We applied the primary-purpose test to
the statements made to police, recorded on body cam video, and considered whether the
statement was made to assist police in addressing an ongoing emergency.
Stevenson at ¶
61, citing State v. Ford,
2021-Ohio-3058 (6th Dist.), ¶ 22. We focused on whether the
statement was made to assist police in determining what is happening in the present,
rather than “establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later prosecution.”
Stevenson at ¶ 61-62, citing
Ford at ¶ 22, quoting Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 822
(2006).
{¶ 38} In making this determination, we considered the context, such as whether a
weapon is involved, and whether a risk continued to exist for the victims, the public, or
the police. Stevenson at ¶ 62-63. We also considered the manner of the questioning,
noting a more formal interrogation is likely to result in testimonial statements. Id. at ¶ 64.
In applying the primary-purpose test, we determined the recorded statements on body
cam video during an ongoing emergency were nontestimonial, as they were made prior to
apprehending the assailant. (Citations omitted)
Stevenson at ¶ 69-70. In contrast, we have
previously determined that statements made after police have secured the scene and the
emergency has passed are testimonial.
Stevenson at ¶ 68, citing Toledo v. Sailes, 2008-
Ohio-6400, ¶ 17 (6th Dist.); Toledo v. Green,
2015-Ohio-1864, ¶ 21-24 (6th Dist.).
14.
{¶ 39} Similarly, in State v. Sproles, 2023-Ohio-3403 (6th Dist.), we considered
admission of the victim’s statements, recorded on the officers’ body camera, and
concluded the statements were nontestimonial.
Sproles at ¶ 30. At the time of the
statements, the victim was visibly distraught and packing to flee the home before the
assailant returned.
Id. The victim indicated that the assailant was armed and had just
threatened to kill her.
Id. Based on the circumstances, we found the statements “had the
primary purpose to meet an ongoing emergency” and, therefore, were nontestimonial.
Id.
{¶ 40} In this case, police arrived while appellant was barricaded in the victim’s
home, and the victim and her daughter were both visibly upset. The police asked the
women for the name of the assailant and whether there were weapons involved. Without
prompting, the victim’s daughter informed police that appellant had “stabbed” her mother
in the face, and the victim’s injuries were actively bleeding when police first encountered
her. The victim, furthermore, was crying and upset, and told police that appellant “was
just beating the fuck out of me” and indicated the assailant was barricaded inside the
home. After police gained entry, they took appellant into custody and verified there were
no other people inside the home.
{¶ 41} Whether an emergency exists at the time statements are provided is “a
highly context-dependent inquiry.” Stevenson at ¶ 62, quoting Michigan v. Bryant,
562
U.S. 344, 353 (2011). Here, based on the record, at the time of the statements recorded by
the body cam video, the police were clearly trying to assess what was happening, rather
than what had already happened, prior to taking appellant into custody.
Id., citing Davis,
15.
547 U.S. at 830. Furthermore, the victim and her daughter made statements regarding the
origin of the victim’s injuries spontaneously and in a state of distress, and not in response
to interrogation. Finally, police asked for appellant’s name and then used that information
to communicate with appellant through the door, asking him to open the door. Consistent
with our precedent, such statements were nontestimonial. See, e.g,
Stevenson at ¶ 69.
{¶ 42} Accordingly, considering the record in this case, we find the recorded
statements of the victim and the victim’s daughter were not testimonial, and therefore did
not implicate the Confrontation Clause. Appellant’s second assignment of error, therefore,
is not well-taken.
B. The convictions on each charge were supported by the sufficiency and weight
of the evidence.
{¶ 43} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that his convictions were
against the sufficiency and weight of the evidence because the city presented only one
witness, Officer Kevin Gracely, who did not interview any witnesses, conduct his own
investigation, or personally witness any of the events inside the home. Appellant argues
that, without physical evidence from the scene or the testimony of an eyewitness, the city
failed to sustain its burden of sufficiency by producing evidence as to each element of the
offenses or its burden by the weight of the evidence by producing credible evidence to
support the verdict.
16.
{¶ 44} Appellant was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C.
2919.25(A) and assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13. R.C. 2919.25(A) provides, “No
person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household
member.” R.C. 2903.13 provides, “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause
physical harm to another[.]” Appellant argues that, without the testimony of the victim or
testimony of the officer who took photos of the victim’s injury or property damage, the
city failed to introduce sufficient and credible evidence to support conviction.
{¶ 45} Appellant challenges both the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.
“Sufficiency of evidence is a term of art for applying the legal standard to determine
whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law.”
Toledo v. Manning, 2019-Ohio-3405, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio
St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The test for sufficiency is one of adequacy, or “whether the
evidence, if believed, can sustain the verdict as a matter of law.”
Manning at ¶ 12, citing
State v. Myers,
2018-Ohio-1903, ¶ 132. The sufficiency standard applies to the
prosecution’s burden of production at trial. State v. Messenger,
2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26.
{¶ 46} The test of manifest weight of the evidence, on the other hand, applies to
the prosecution’s burden of persuasion. Messenger at ¶ 26. “A challenge to a conviction
based on the manifest weight of the evidence questions whether the trial court could find
a greater amount of credible evidence was admitted at trial to sustain that decision than
not.”
Manning at ¶ 41, citing State v. Montgomery,
2016-Ohio-5487, ¶ 75, citing
Thompkins at 387. In reviewing a verdict against the manifest weight of the evidence, we
17.
give deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and the testimony of a single
witness, if believed, will support a conviction.
Manning at ¶ 41-42, citing Myers, 2018-
Ohio-1903, ¶ 140-141.
{¶ 47} Here, the city presented one witness and admitted several exhibits,
including the 911 recordings and Officer Gracely’s body cam video. This evidence
demonstrated that appellant was the only male present at the scene, the victim and her
daughter identified appellant as the assailant, both on the 911 calls and to Officer Gracely
as he responded to an active scene. Furthermore, the recording showed that the victim
had visible, still-bleeding injuries to her face and head. Finally, while appellant did not
reside with the victim, the evidence showed that appellant and the victim had children
together.
{¶ 48} Thus, the city presented evidence as to each element of the offenses of
domestic violence and assault, as charged, to sustain the city’s burden of production. In
reviewing the entire record, moreover, we do not find that the trial court clearly lost its
way in weighing the evidence and finding appellant guilty as to each offense.
Considering the record, the greater amount of credible evidence supported the trial
court’s verdict as to domestic violence and assault. Based on this record, we find
appellant’s first assignment of error not well-taken.
18.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 49} Having found substantial justice has been done, we affirm the judgment of
the Toledo Municipal Court. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant
to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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