Skinner Eddy Corporation v. United States’s Empirical Analysis
249 U.S. 557 · 1919
Citation profile
125 federal appellate · 87 district · 30 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 462 later decisions (69 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2019 · most notably Toilet Goods Association v. Wga Rdner (1967), Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. (1922)
125 federal appellate · 87 district · 30 state decisions — followed in 10 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Simpson v. Shepard · Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad · Houston East West Texas Railway Company v. United States · Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific Railroad
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 462 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“But plaintiff does not contend that 75 cents is an unreasonably high rate, or that it is discriminatory, or that there was mere error in the action of the commission. The contention is that the commission has exceeded its statutory powers; and that, hence, the order is void. In such a case the courts have jurisdiction of suits to enjoin the enforcement of an order, even if the plaintiff has not attempted to secure redress in a proceeding before the commission.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“In construing this provision it is important to bear in mind the limits of the commission's control over rates. Neither the Act to Regulate Commerce nor any amendment thereof has taken from the carriers the power which they originally possessed, to initiate rates; that is, the power, in the first instance, to fix rates or to increase or to reduce them.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““First. The defendants contend that the District Court did not have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this suit, because orders entered in a fourth section proceeding cannot be assailed in the courts, at least, not until after a remedy has been sought under sections 13 and 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce. This contention proceeds apparently upon a misapprehension of plaintiff’s position. If plaintiff had sought relief against a rate or practice alleged to be unjust because unreasonably high or discriminatory, the remedy must have been sought primarily by proceedings before the Commission [citing cases]; and the finding thereon would have been conclusive, unless there was lack of substantial evidence, some irregularity in the proceedings, or some error in the application of rules of law [citing cases]. But plaintiff does not contend that 76 cents is an unreasonably high rate or' that it is discriminatory of that there was mere error in the action of the Commission. The contention is that the Commission has exceeded its statutory powers, and that hence the order is void. In such a ease the courts have jurisdiction of suits to enjoin the enforcement of an order, even if the plaintiff has not attempted to secure redress in a proceeding before the Commission.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.