if I (we) get the one hundred and fifty dollars insurance that is coming to us, I don't give a damn what becomes of us."

We find nothing in the testimony, either on behalf of the state or the appellant, tending, even remotely, to connect Dr. A. W. Bell with the conspiracy to bring about the death of Henderson.

If there was any connection between Cecil Bell, his nephew, and Dr. A. W. Bell, of any sort, other than that of the blood relation mentioned, there is no evidence of that fact.

In this state of the record, we are unable to see the relevancy of the testimony of Judge Wilkinson, to the effect that there were certain insurance policies on the life of Boss Henderson, in which Dr. A. W. Bell was named as beneficiary, etc. 30 C. J. 188, § 415; Barry v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 302,39 S.W. 692.

We pretermit, as being unnecessary in the view we hold, that such testimony was irrelevant, treatment of the question as to whether or not it was necessary to show the loss, etc., of the policies mentioned, or whether such loss, etc., was sufficiently shown to authorize the introduction of parol testimony as to their contents, etc., as not being in violation of the "best evidence" rule, etc.

As we see it, the bare fact that Cecil Bell, alleged to be the coconspirator of appellant, was the "nephew" of Dr. A. W. Bell, did not warrant the introduction of the testimony under consideration, the only effect of which *Page 23 could have been to show a motive on the part of Dr. A. W. Bell to desire the death of Boss Henderson. Without something other being shown by the testimony than the mere fact that one whose motive, if he had any, could be charged to appellant, as Cecil Bell in this case was the "nephew" of the man shown to have such "motive," it seems to us not to follow logically, and hence not legally, that evidence of motive on the part of the uncle could be attributed to the "nephew."

We therefore hold that it was error, and manifestly prejudicial, to allow, over appellant's timely objection and exception, the testimony of Judge Wilkinson to the effect we have indicated hereinabove.

There are a few other questions apparent, but they involve rulings of no great difficulty nor importance in the case, and will almost certainly not arise in their present form on another trial.

Inasmuch as the judgment of conviction must be reversed because of the error or errors hereinabove pointed out, we will omit a treatment of the other questions mentioned.

Reversed and remanded.

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