25 Cal. 3d 522 - People v. Eric J.’s Empirical Analysis
1979
Citation profile
8 federal appellate · 736 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 747 later decisions — most recently March 2020 · most notably 52 Cal. 3d 1142 - Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991), 29 Cal. 4th 228 - Cooley v. Superior Court (2003)
8 federal appellate · 736 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 5037
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Wisconsin v. Yoder · Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts · Ginsberg v. New York · Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 747 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.”
12 later decisions quote this exact passage“[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States nor the California Constitution [citations] precludes classification by the Legislature or requires uniform operation of the law with respect to persons who are different.... `The concept of equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.' [Citations.]”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage““[Accordingly,] [ajlthough the Legislature clearly indicated its intent that the aggregation provisions of Penal Code section 1170.1, which limit consecutive terms to one-third of the middle determinate term, apply only in imposing sentence for felonies, we are not persuaded that the Legislature intended that this distinction apply in determining the maximum period of confinement for minors committed by the juvenile court. The limitation of section 1170.1 reflects a legislative recognition that misdemeanor terms, unless imposed concurrently with a felony term, are served in local detention facilities and are not part of a continuous period of imprisonment under the supervision of the same correctional officials. The judge who orders that a misdemeanor term be served consecutively to a previously imposed felony term thus retains discretion as to the length of the misdemeanor term and the power to maintain supervision over the defendant through probation by suspension of execution of the term for an appropriate period. The latter option would in many cases be foreclosed were the term limited to one-third of the maximum term since no realistic sanction for violation of probation would be available.” (Eric J., supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 537-538, italics added.)”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.