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25 Mass. 360

Lowry v. Junior

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided September 17, 1829

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1829-09-17

<p>By a bill of lading expressing that goods are to be carried from one port to another, a direct voyage is primd facie intended ; but this presumption may be controlled by a usage to stop at intermediate ports, or by personal knowledge on the part of the shipper, that such a course is to be pursued.</p>

Decided 1829-09-17

Per Curiam.

¶1The bill of lading, like other contracts, is to be construed according to the intention of the parties. Usage of trade is always presumed to be within the knowledge of the parties, and these contracts are supposed to be made with reference to it. There is nothing in the evidence in the present case, contradicting the express terms of the bill of lading, which are that the goods shall be carried from New York to Georgetown. A direct voyage is prima facie intended, but this may be controlled by usage, or by personal knowledge of the shipper. There was competent evidence of the usage in relation to vessels like this ; and there was also evidence that this voyage was known to be by the way of Norfolk. The plaintiff’s agent knew of it, and his knowledge must be imputed to the plaintiff himself.1

¶2 Judgment according to verdict.

¶3 See Story’s Comm, on Agency, 131,132.

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