¶1delivered the opinion of the Court.
¶2This is an original suit in this court, in which the State of Texas, claiming certain bonds of the .United States as her property, asks an injunction to restrain the defendants from receiving payment from the ¡National Government, and to compel the surrender of the bonds to the State.
¶3It appears from the bill, answers, and proofs, that the United States, by act of September 9, 1850, offered to the State of Texas, in compensation for her claims connected with the settlement of her boundary, $10,000,000 in five per cent, bonds, each for the sum of $1,000, and that this offer was accepted by Texas.”
¶4*592One-half of these bonds were retained for certain purposes in the National Treasury, and the other half were delivered to the State.
¶5The bonds thus delivered were dated January 1, 1851, and were all made payable to the State of Texas, or bearer, and redeemable after the 31st day of December, 1864.
¶6They were received, in behalf of^the State, by the comptroller of public accounts, under authority of an act of the legislature, which, besides giving that authority, provided that no bond should be available in the hands of any holder until after indorsement by the governor of the State.
¶7After the breaking out of the rebellion, the insurgent legislature of Texas, on the 11th of January, 1862, repealed the act requiring the indorsement of the governor, (Acts Tex., 1862, p. 45; Paschal’s Dig., Art. 5322,) and on the same day provided for the organization of a military board, composed of the governor, comptroller, and treasurer, and authorized a majority of that board to provide for the defense of the State by means of any bonds in the treasury, upon any account, to the extent of $1,000,000. (Tex. Laws 1862, p. 55.)
¶8The defense contemplated by the act was to be made against the United States by war.
¶9Under this authority, the military board entered into an agreement with George W. White and John Chiles, two of the defendants, for the sale to them of one hundred and thirty-five of these bonds, then in the treasury of the State, and seventy-six more, then deposited with Droege & Co., in England, in payment for which they engaged to deliver to the board a large quantity of cotton-cards and medicines. This agreement was made on the 12th of January, 1865.
¶10On the 12th of March, 1865, White & Chiles received from the military board one hundred and thirty-five of these bonds, none of which were endorsed by any governor of Texas.
¶11Afterward, in the course -of the years 1865 and 1866, *593some of the same bonds came into the possession of others of the defendants, by purchase or as security for advances of money.
¶12Such is a brief outline of the case. It will be necessary hereafter to refer more in detail to some particular circumstances of it.
¶13The first inquiries to which our attention was directed by counsel arose upon the allegations of the answer of Chiles, (1,) that no sufficient authority is shown for the prosecution of the suit in the name and on the behalf of the State of Texas; and (2) that the State, having severed her relations with a majority of the States of the Union, and having by her ordinance of secession attempted to throw off her allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the United States, has so far changed her status as to be disabled from prosecuting suits in the national courts.
¶14The first of these allegations is disproved by the evidence. A letter of authority, the authenticity of which is not disputed, has been produced, in which J. W. Throckmorton, elected governor under the constitution adopted in 1866, and proceeding under an act of the State legislature relating to these bonds, expressly ratifies and confirms the action of the solicitors who filed the bill, and empowers them to prosecute this suit; and it is further proved by the affidavit of Mr. Paschal, counsel for the complainant, that he was duly appointed by Andrew J. Hamilton, while provisional governor of Texas, to represent the State of Texas in reference to the bonds in controversy, and that his appointment has been renewed by E. M. Pease, the acting governor. If Texas was a State of the Union at the time of these acts, and these persons, or either of them, were competent to represent the State, this proof leaves no doubt upon the question of authority.
¶15The other allegation presents a question of jurisdiction. It is not to be questioned that this court has original *594jurisdiction of suits by States against citizens of other States, or that the States entitled to invoke this jurisdiction must be States of the Union. But it is equally clear that no such jurisdiction has been conferred upon this court of suits by' any other political communities than such States.
¶16If, therefore, it is true that the State of Texas was not, at the time of filing this bill, or is not now, one of the United States, we have no jurisdiction of this suit, and it is our duty to dismiss it.
¶17We are very sensible of the magnitude and importance of this question, of the interest it excites, and of the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of so disposing of it as to satisfy the conflicting judgments of men equally enlightened, equally upright, and equally patriotic. But we meet it in the case, and we must determine it, in the exercise of our best judgment, under the guidance of the Constitution alone.
¶18Some not unimportant aid, however, in ascertaining the true sense of the Constitution, may be derived from considering what is the correct idea of a State, apart from any union or confederation with other States. The poverty of language often compels the employment of terms in quite different significations, and of this hardly any example more signal is to be found than in the use of the word we are now considering. It would serve no useful purpose to attempt an enumeration of all the various senses in which it is used. A few only need be noticed.
¶19It describes sometimes a people or community of individuals united more or less closely in political relations, inhabiting temporarily or permanently the same country; often it denotes only the country, or territorial region, inhabited by such a community; not unfrequently it is applied to the government under which the people live; at other times it represents the combined idea of people, territory, and government.
¶20*595It is not difficult to see that in all these senses the primary conception is that of a people or community. The people, in whatever territory dwelling, either temporarily or permanently, and whether organized under a regular government, or united by looser and less definite relations, constitute the State.
¶21This is undoubtedly the fundamental idea upon which the republican institutions of our own country are established. It was stated very clearly by an eminent judge (Mr. Justice Patterson, in Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators, 3 Dall., 93) in one of the earliest cases adjudicated by this court, and we are not aware- of anything in any subsequent decision of a different tenor:
¶22“ In the Constitution, the term ’ State most frequently expresses the combined idea just noticed, of people, territory, and government. A State, in the ordinary sense of the Constitution, is a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and established by the consent of the governed. It is the union of such States under a common constitution which forms the distinct and greater political unit which that Constitution designates as the United States, and makes of the people and States which compose it one people and one country.”
¶23The use of the word in this sense hardly requires further remark. In the clauses which impose prohibitions upon the States in respect to the making of treaties, emitting of bills of credit, laying duties of tonnage, and which guarantee to the States representation in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, are found some instances of this use in the Constitution. Others will occur to every mind.
¶24But it is also used in its geographical sense, as in the clauses which require that a representative in Congress shall be an inhabitant of the State in which he shall be *596chosen, and that the trial of crimes shall be held within the State where committed.
¶25And there are instances in which the principal sense of the word seems to be that primary one to which we have adverted, of a people or political community, as distinguished from a government.
¶26In this latter sense the word seems to be used in the clause which provides that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion.
¶27In this clause a plain distinction is made between a State and the government of a State.
¶28Having thus ascertained the senses in which the word “State” is employed in the Constitution, we will proceed to consider the proper application of what has been said.
¶29The republic of Texas was admitted into the Union as a State on the 27th of December, 1845. By this act the new State, and the people of the new State, were invested with all the rights, and became subject to all the responsibilities and duties, of the original States under the Constitution.
¶30From the date of admission until 1861 the State was represented in the Congress of the United States by her Senators and Representatives, and her relations as a member of the Union remained unimpaired. In that year, acting upon the theory that the rights of a State under the Constitution might be renounced, and her obligations thrown off at pleasure, Texas undertook to sever the bond thus formed, and to break up her constitutional relations with the United States.
¶31On the 1st of February (Paschal’s Dig., p. 78) a convention, called without authority, but subsequently sanctioned by the legislature regularly elected, adopted an ordinance to dissolve the un-ion between the State of Texas and the other States under the Constitution of the *597United States, whereby Texas was declared to be “a separate and sovereign State,” and “her people and citizens,” to be “ absolved from all allegiance to the United States, or the Government thereof.”
¶32It was ordered, by a vote of the convention, (Paschal’s Dig., p. 80) and by an act of the legislature, (Laws of Tex., 1859-61, p. 11,) that this ordinance should be submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, on the 23d of February, 1861. .
¶33Without awaiting, however, the decision thus invoked, the convention, on the 4th of February, adopted a resolution designating seven delegates to represent the State in the convention of seceding States at Montgomery, “in order,” as the resolution declared, “that the wishes and interests of the people of Texas may be consulted in reference to the constitution and provisional government that may be established by said convention.”
¶34Before the passage of this resolution the convention had appointed a committee of public safely, and adopted an ordinance, giving authority to that committee to take measures for obtaining possession of the property of the United States in Texas and for removing the national troops from her limits. The members of the committee, and all officers and agents appointed or employed by it, were sworn to secrecy and to allegiance to the State. (Paschal’s Dig., 80.) Commissioners were at once appointed, with instructions to repair to the headquarters of General Twiggs, then representing the United States, in command of the department, and to make the demands necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes of the committee. A military force was organized in support of these demands, and an arrangement was effected with the commanding general, by "which the United States troops were engaged to leave the State, and the forts and all the public property, not ■ necessary to the removal of the troops, were surrendered to the commissioners. (Tex. Rep. Com., Lib. of Con., 45.)
¶35*598These transactions took place between the 2d and the 18th February, and it was under these circumstances that the vote upon the ratification or rejection of the ordinance of secession was taken on the 23d of February. It was ratified by a majority of the voters of the State.
¶36The convention, which had adjourned before the vote was taken, reassembled on the 2d of March, and instructed the delegates, already sent to the Congress of the seceding States, to apply for admission into the confederation, and to give the adhesion of Texas to its provisional constitution.
¶37It proceeded, also, to make the changes in the State constitution which this adhesion made necessary. The words “United States” were stricken out wherever they occurred, and the words “ Confederate States” substituted, and the members of the legislature, and all officers of the State, were required by the new constitution to take an oath of fidelity to the • constitution and laws of the new confederacy.
¶38Before, indeed, these changes in the constitution had been completed, the officers of the State had been required to appear before the committee and take an oath of allegiance to the Confederate States.
¶39• The governor and secretary of state, refusing to comply, were summarily ejected from office.
¶40The members of the legislature, which had also adjourned and reassembled on the 18th of March, were more compliant. They took the oath, and proceeded, on the 8th of April, to provide by law for the choice of electors of president and vice president óf the Confederate States.
¶41The representatives of the State in the Congress of the United States were withdrawn, and, as soon as the seceded States became organized under- a constitution, Texas sent senators and representatives to the confederate congress.
¶42In all respects, so far as the object could be accomplished by ordinances of the convention, by acts of the legislature, and by votes of the citizens, the relations of *599Texas to the Union were broken up, and new relations to a new government were established for them.
¶43The position thus assumed could only be maintained by arms, and Texas accordingly took part, with the other Confederate States, in the war of the rebellion, which these events made inevitable. During the whole of that war there was no governor, or judge, or any other State officer in Texas, who recognized the national authority. Uor was any officer of the Unite!! States permitted to exercise any authority whatever under the Uational Government within the limits of the State, except under the immediate protection of the national military forces.
¶44Did Texas, in consequence of these acts, cease to be a State? Or, if not, did the State cease to be a member of the Union ?
¶45It is needless to discuss at length the question whether the right of a State to 'withdraw from the Union for any cause, regarded by herself as sufficient, is consistent with the Constitution of the United States.
¶46The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It began among the colonies, and grew out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests, and geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form and character and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly declared to “be perpetual.” And, when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the constitution was ordained il to form a more perfect union.” It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words. What can be indissoluble, if a perpetual union, made more.perfect, is not?
¶47But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-government, by the States. *600Under the Articles of Confederation, each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and independence,- and every power, jurisdiction, and right, not expressly delegated to the United States. Under the Constitution, though the powers of the States were much restricted, still, all powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. And we have already had occasion to remark at this term, that “ tie people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence,” and that, “without the States in union, there could be no such political body as the United States.” (County of Lane v. The State of Oregon.) Not only, therefore, can there be no loss-of separate and independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said, that the preservation of the States and the maintenance of their governments are as much within the design and care of the Constitution, as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National Government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.
¶48When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, it entered into an indissoluble relation.r All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guaranties of republican government in the Union, attached at once to the State. The act which consummated its admission into the Union was*something more than a compact, it was the.incorporation of a new member into the political body, and it was final. The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble, as the union between the original States. There was no place for reconsideration or revocation, except through revolution, or through consent of the States.
¶49Considered, therefore, as transactions under the Consti*601tution, the ordinance of secession adopted by the convention, and ratified by a majority of the citizens of Texas, and all the acts of its legislature, intended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly without operation in law. The obligations of the State, as -a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the State, as a citizen of the United States, remained perfect and unimpaired. It certainly follows, that the State did not cease to be a State, nor its citizens to be citizens, of the Union. If this were otherwise, the State must have become foreign, and its citizens foreigners. The war must have ceased to be a war for the suppression of rebellion, and must have become a war for conquest and subjugation.
¶50Our conclusion, therefore, is, that Texas continued to be a State, and' a State of the Union, notwithstanding the transactions to which we have referred. And this conclusion, in our judgment, is not in conflict with any act or declaration of any department of the National Government, but entirely in accordance with the whole series of such acts and declarations since the first outbreak of the rebellion.
¶51But, in order to the exercise, by a State, of the right to sue in this court, there needs to be a State government, competent to represent the State, in its relations with the National Government, so far, at least, as the institution and prosecution of a suit is concerned.
¶52And it is by no means a logical conclusion, from the premises which we have endeavored to establish, that the governmental relations of Texas to the Union remained unaltered. Obligations often remain unimpaired, while relations are greatly changed. The obligations of allegiance to the State, and of obedience to its laws, subject to the Constitution of the United States, are binding upon all citizens, whether faithful or unfaithful to them; but the relations which subsist while these obligations are per*602formed are essentially different from those which arise when they are disregarded and set at nought. And the same must necessarily he true of the obligations and .relations of States and citizens1 to the Union. Ro one has been bold enough to contend that, while Texas' was controlled by a government hostile to the United States, and, in affiliation with a hostile confederation, waging war upon the United States, Senators chosen by its legislature, or Representatives elected by its citizens, were entitled to seats in Congress; or that any suit, instituted in its name, could be entertained in this court. All admit that, during this condition of civil war, the rights of the State, as a member, and of its people, as citizens of the Union, were suspended. The government, and the citizens of the State, refusing to recognize their constitutional obligations, assumed the character of enemies, and incurred the consequences of rebellion.
¶53These new relations imposed new duties upon the United States. The first was that of suppressing the rebellion. The next was that of re-establishing the broken relations of the- State with the Union. The first of these duties having been performed, the next necessarily engaged the attention of the Rational Government.
¶54The authority for the performance of the first had been found in the power to suppress insurrection and carry on war; for the performance of the second, authority was derived from the obligation of the United States to guarantee to- every State in the Union a republican form of government. The latter, indeed, in the case of a rebellion, which involves the government of a State, and, for the time., excludes the national authority from its limits, seems to be a necessary complement to the former.
¶55Of this, the case of Texas furnishes a striking illustration. • When the war closed, there was no government in the State except that which had been organized for the purpose of waging war against the United States. That *603government immediately disappeared. The chief functionaries left the State. Many of the - subordinate officials followed their example. Legal responsibilities were annulled or -greatly impaired. It was inevitable that great confusion would prevail. If order was maintained, it was where the good sense and virtue of the citizens gave support to local acting magistrates, or supplied more directly the needful restraints.
¶56A great social change increased the difficulty of the situation. Slaves, in the insurgent States, with certain local exceptions, had been declared free by the proclamation of emancipation, and whatever questions might be made as to the effect of that act, under the Constitution, it was clear from the beginning that its practical operation, in connection with legislative acts of like tendency, must be complete enfranchisement. Wherever the national forces obtained control the slaves became freemen. Support to the acts of Congress and the proclamation of the President concerning slaves was made a condition of amnesty, (13 U. S. Stats., 737,) by President Lincoln, in December, 1863, and by President Johnson, in May, 1865. (13 U. S. Stats., 758.) And emancipation was confirmed, rather than ordained, in the insurgent States, by the amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting slavery throughout the Union, which was proposed by Congress in February, 1865, and ratified, before the close of the following autumn, by the requisite three-fourths of the States. (13 U. S. Stats., 774-5.) [Paschal’s Anhot. Const., p. 271, Art. 13, fifote 274.]
¶57The new freemen necessarily became part of the people, and the people still constituted the State; for States, like individuals, retain their identity, though changed, to some extent, in their constituent elements. And it was the State thus constituted which was now entitled to the benefit of the constitutional guaranty.
¶58There being, then, no government in Texas, in constitutional relations with the Union, it became the duty of *604the United States to provide for the restoration of such a government. But the restoration of the government which existed before the rebellion, without a new election of officers, was obviously impossible; and, before any such election could be properly held, it was necessary that the old constitution should receive such amendments as would conform its provisions to the new conditions created by emancipation, and afford adequate security to the people of the State.
¶59In the exercise of the power conferred by the guaranty clause, as' in the exercise of every other constitutional power, a discretion in the choice of means is necessarily allowed. It is essential only that the means must be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the power conferred, through the restoration of the State to its constitutional relations, under a republican form of government, and that no acts be done, and no authority exerted, which is either prohibited or unsanctioned by the Constitution.
¶60It is not important to review at length the measures which have been taken, under this power, by the executive and legislative departments of the National Government. It is proper, however to observe, that almost immediately after the cessation of organized hostilities, and while the war yet smouldered in Texas, the President of the United States issued his proclamation, appointing a provisional governor for the State, and providing for the assembling of a convention, with a view to the re-establishment of a republican government, under an amended constitution, and to the restoration of the State to her proper constitutional relations. A convention was accordingly assembled, the constitution amended, elections held, and a State government, acknowledging its obligations to the Union, established.
¶61Whether the action then taken was in all respects warranted by the Constitution it is not now necessary to *605determine. The power exercised by the President was supposed, doubtless, to be derived from his constitutional functions as commander-in-chief; and, so long as the war continued, it cannot be denied that he might institute temporary government within insurgent districts occupied by the national forces, or take measures in any State for the restoration of State government faithful to the Union, employing, however, in such efforts, only such means and agents as were authorized by constitutional laws.
¶62But the power to carry into effect the clause of guaranty is primarily a legislative power, and resides in Congress. “Under the fourth article of the Constitution, it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State. For, as the United States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State, before it can determine whether it is republican or not.”
¶63This is the language of the late chief justice, speaking for this court in a case from Ehode Island, (Luther v. Borden, 7 How., 42,) arising from the organization of opposing governments in that State. And we think that the principle sanctioned by it may be applied, with even more propriety, to the case of a State deprived of all rightful government by revolutionary violence, though necessarily limited to cases where the rightful government is thus subverted, or in imminent danger of being overthrown by an opposing government set up by force within the State.
¶64The action of the President must, therefore, be considered as provisional, and in that light it seems to have been regarded by Congress. It was taken after the term of the Thirty-Eighth Congress had expired. The Thirty-Ninth Congress, which assembled in December, 1865, followed by the Fortieth Congress, which met in March, 1867, proceeded, after long deliberation, to adopt various measures for reorganization and restoration. These measures were embodied in proposed amendments to the Constitution, *606and in the acts known as the reconstruction acts, which have been so far carried into effect, that a majority of the States which were engaged in the rebellion have been restored to their constitutional relations, under' forms of government adjudged to be republican by Congress, through the admission of their “ Senators and Representa-' tives into the councils of the Union.”
¶65Nothing in the case before us requires, the court to pronounce judgment upon the constitutionality of any particular provision of these acts.
¶66But it is important to observe, that these acts themselves show that the governments which had been established, and had been in actual operation under executive direction, were recognized by Congress as provisional, as existing, and as capable of continuance.
¶67By the act of March 2, 1867, (U. S. Stats., 428,) the first of the series, these governments were, indeed, pronounced illegal, and were subjected to military control, and were declared to be provisional only; and, by the supplementary act of July 19, 1867, the third of the series, it was further declared that it was the true intent and meaning of the act of March 2, that the governments then existing were not legal State governments, and, if continued, were to be continued subject to the military commanders of the respective districts, and to the paramount authority of Congress. We do not inquire here into the constitutionality of this legislation, so far as it relates to military authority, or to the paramount authority of Congress. It suffices to say, that the terms of the acts necessarily imply recognition of actually existing governments, and that, in point of fact, the governments thus recognized, in some important respects, still exist.
¶68What has thus been said generally describes, with sufficient accuracy, the situation of Texas. A provisional governor of the State was appointed by the President in 1865; in 1866 a governor was elected by the people, under the *607constitution of that year; at a subsequent date a governor was appointed by the commander of the district. Each of the three exercised executive functions, and actually represented the State in' the executive department.
¶69In the case before us, each has given his sanction to the prosecution of the suit, and we find no difficulty, without investigating the legal title of either to the executive office, in holding that the sanction thus given sufficiently warranted the action of the solicitor and counsel in behalf of the State. The necessary conclusion is, that the suit was instituted and is prosecuted by competent authority.
¶70The question of jurisdiction being thus disposed of, we proceed to the consideration of the merits, as presented by the pleadings and the evidence.
¶71And the first question to be answered is, whether or not ,the title of the State to the bonds in controversy was divested by the contract of the military board with White & Chiles?
¶72That the bonds were the property of the State of Texas, on the 11th of January, 1862, when the act prohibiting alienation, without the indorsement of the governor, was repealed, admits of no question, and is not denied. They came into its possession and ownership through public acts of the General Government and of the State, which gave notice to all the world of the transaction consummated by them. And we think it clear that, if a State, by a public act of her legislature, imposes restrictions upon the alienation of her property, every person who takes a transfer of such property must be held affected by notice of them. Alienation in disregard of such restrictions can convey no title.
¶73In this case, however, it is said, that the restriction imposed by the act of 1851 was repealed by the act of 1862. And this is true, if the act of 1862 can be regarded as valid. [Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 5320, 5322.] But was it valid?
¶74The legislature of Texas, at the time of the repeal, con*608stituted one of the departments of a State government established in hostility to the Constitution of the United States. It cannot he regarded, therefore, in the courts of the United States, as a lawful legislature, or its acts as lawful acts. And yet, it is a historical fact that the government of Texas, then in full control of the State, was its only actual government; and, certainly, if Texas had been a separate State, and not one of the United States, the new government, having displaced the regular authority, and having established itself in the customary seats of power, and in the exercise of the ordinary functions of administration, would have constituted, in the strictest sense of the words, a de facto government, and its acts, during the period of its existence as such, would be effectual, and, in almost all respects, valid. And to some extent this is true of the actual government of Texas, though unlawful and revolutionary as to the United States.
¶75It is not necessary to attempt any exact definitions, within which the acts of such a State government must be treated as valid or invalid. It may be said, perhaps with sufficient accuracy, that acts necessary to peace and good order among^ citizens, such, for example, as acts sanctioning and protecting marriage and the domestic relations, governing the course of descents, regulating the conveyance and transfer of property, real and personal, and providing remedies for injuries to person and estate, and other similar acts, which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded in general as valid when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful government; and that acts in furtherance or support of rebellion against the United States, or intended to defeat the just rights of citizens, and other acts of like nature, must, in general, be regarded as invalid and void.
¶76Wliat, then, tried by these general tests, was the character of the contract of the military board with White & Chiles?
¶77*609That hoard, as we have seen, was organized, not for the defense of the State against a foreign invasion, or for its protection against domestic violence, within the meaning of these words as used in the ¡National Constitution, but for the purpose, under the name of defense, of levying war against the United States. This purpose was undoubtedly unlawful, for the acts which it contemplated are, within the express definition of the Constitution, treasonable.
¶78It is true that the military board was subsequently reorganized. It consisted thereafter of the governor and two other members, appointed and removable by him, and was, therefore, entirely subordinate to executive control. Its general object remained without change, but its powers were “ extended to the control of all public works and supplies, and to the aid of producing within the State, by the importation of articles, necessary and proper for such aid.”
¶79And it was insisted, in argument on behalf "of some of the defendants, that the contract with White & Chiles, being for the purchase of cotton-cards and medicines, was not a contract in aid of the rebellion, but for obtaining goods capable of use entirely legitimate and innocent, and, therefore, that payment for those goods by the transfer of any property of the State was not unlawful. We cannot adopt this view. Without entering, at this time, upon the inquiry whether any contract made by such a board can be sustained, we are obliged to say that the enlarged powers of the board appear to us to have been conferred in furtherance of its main purpose, of war against the United States, and that the contract under consideration, even if made in the execution of these enlarged powers, was still a contract in aid of the rebellion, and, therefore, void. And we cannot shut our eyes to the evidence which proves that the act of repeal was intended to aid rebellion, by facilitating the transfer of these bonds. It was supposed, doubtless, that negotiation of them would be less difficult if they bore upon their face no direct evidence of having *610come from the possession of any insurgent State government. We can give no effect, therefore, to this repealing act.
¶80It follows, that the title of the State was not divested by the act of the insurgent government in entering into this contract.
¶81But it was insisted further, in behalf of those defendants who claim certain of these bonds by purchase or as collateral security, that however unlawful may have been the means by which White & Chiles obtained possession of the bonds, they are innocent holders, without notice, and entitled to protection as such under the rules which apply to securities which pass by delivery. These rules were fully discussed in Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall., 118. We held in that case that the purchase of coupon bonds, before due, without notice and in good faith, is unaffected by want of title in the seller, and that the burden of proof in respect to notice and want of good faith is on the claimant of the bonds as against the purchaser. We are entirely satisfied with this doctrine.
¶82Does the State, then, show affirmatively notice to these defendants of want of title to the bonds in White & Chiles ?
¶83It would be difficult to. give a negative answer to this question, if there were no other proof than the legislative acts of Texas. But there is other evidence which might fairly be held to be sufficient proof of notice, if the rule to which we have adverted could be properly applied to this case.
¶84But these rules have never been applied- to matured obligations. Purchasers of notes or bonds past due take nothing but the actual right and title of the vendors. (Brown v. Davis, 37 R., 80; Goodman v. Symonds, 20 How., 366.)
¶85The bonds in question were dated January 1, 1851, and were redeemable after the -31st of December, 1864. In strictness, it is true they were not payable on the day when *611they became redeemable, but* the known usage of the United States to pay all bonds as soon as the right of payment accrues, except where a distinction between redeem- . ability and payability is made by law, and shown on the face of the bonds, requires the application of the rule respecting over-due obligations to bonds of the United States which have become redeemable, and in respect to which no such distinction has been made.
¶86Now, all the bonds in controversy had become redeem-. able before the date of the contract with White & Chiles, and all bonds of the same issue which have the indorsement of a governor of Texas, made before the date of the secession ordinance, (and there were no others indorsed by any governor,) had been paid in coin on presentation at the Treasury Department; while, on the contrary, applications for the payment of bonds without the required indorsement, and of coupons detached from such bonds, made to that department, had been denied.
¶87As a necessary consequence, the negotiation of these bonds became difficult. They sold much below the rates they would have commanded had the title to them been unquestioned. They were bought in fact, and under the circumstances could only have been bought, upon speculation. The purchasers took the risk of a bad title, hoping, doubtless, that through the action of the National Government or of the government of Texas, it might be converted • into a good one.
¶88And it is true, that the first provisional governor of Texas encouraged the expectation that these bonds would be ultimately paid to the holders. But he was not authorized to make any engagement in behalf of the State, and in fact made none. It is true, also, that the Treasury Department, influenced perhaps by these representations, departed, to some extent, from its original rule, and paid bonds held by some of the defendants without the required ■ indorsement. But it is clear that this change in the action *612of the department could not affect the rights of Texas as a State of the Union, having a government acknowledging her obligations to the National Constitution.
¶89It is impossible, upon this evidence, to hold the defendants protected by absence of notice of the want of title in White & Chiles. As these persons acquired no right to payment of these bonds as against the State, purchasers could acquire none through them.
¶90On the whole case, therefore, our conclusion is, that the State* of Texas is entitled to the relief sought by her bill, and a decree must be made accordingly.
¶91dissenting, delivered the following opinion:
¶92I regret that I am compelled to dissent from the opinion of the majority of the court on all the points raised and decided in this case.
¶93The first question in order is- the jurisdiction of the court to entertain this bill in behalf of the State of Texas.
¶94The original jurisdiction of this court can be invoked only by one of the United States. The Territories have no such right conferred on them by the Constitution, nor have the Indian tribes, who are under the protection of the military authorities of the Gbvernment.
¶95Is Texas one of the United States? Or was she such at the time this bill was filed, or since?
¶96This is to be decided as a political fact, not as a legal fiction. This court is bound to know and notice the public history of the nation.
¶97IfT regard the truth of history for the last eight years, I cannot discover the State of Teaxs as one of these United States. I do not think it necessary to notice any of the very astute arguments which have been advanced by the learned counsel in this case, to find the definition of a State, when we have the subject treated in a clear and common-sense manner, and without any astute judicial *613abstractions, by Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of Hepburn & Dundass v. Elzey, 2 Cr., 452. As the case is short and clear, I hope to be excused for a full report of it, as stated and decided by the court. “The question,” says Marshall, C. J., “is whether the plaintiffs, as residents of the District of Columbia, can maintain an action in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Virginia. This depends on the act of Congress describing the jurisdiction of that court. The act gives jurisdiction to the circuit courts in cases between a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another State. To support the jurisdiction in this case, it must appear that Columbia is a State. On the part of the plaintiff, it has been urged that Columbia is a distinct political society, and is, therefore, a ‘State’ according to the definition of writers on general law. This is true; but, as the act of Congress obviously uses the word ‘State’ in reference to that term as used in the Constitution, it becomes necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a State in the sense of that instrument. The result of that examination is a conviction that the members of the American confederacy only are the States contemplated in the Constitution. The House of Representatives is to be composed of members chosen by the people of the several States, and each State shall have at least one Representative. ‘ The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State.’ Each State shall appoint, for the election of the Executive, a number of electors equal to its whole number of Senators and Representatives. These clauses show that the word ‘State’ is used in the Constitution as designating a member of the Union, and excludes from the term the signification attached to it by writers on the law of nations.”
¶98How, we have here a clear and well-defined test by which we may arrive at a conclusion with regard to the questions of fact now to be decided.
¶99*614Is Texas a State, now represented by members chosen by the people of that State and received on the floor of Congress? Has she two Senators to represent her as a State in the Senate of the United States? Has her voice been heard in the late election of President? Is she not now held and governed as a conquered province hy military force? The act of Congress of March 28,1867, declares Texas to be a “rebel State,” and provides for its .government until a legal and republican State government could be legally established. It constituted Louisiana and Texas the fifth military district, and made it subject, not to the • civil authority, but to the “ military authorities of the United States.”
¶100It is true, that no organized rebellion now exists there, and the courts of the United States now exercise jurisdiction over the people of that province. But this is no test of the State’s being in the Union; Dacotah is no State, and yet the courts of the United States administer justice there as they do in Texas. The Indian tribes, who are governed by military force, cannot claim to be States of the Union. Wherein- does the condition of Texas differ from theirs?
¶101How, by assuming or admitting, as a fact, the present status of Texas as a State not in the Union politically, I beg leave to protest against any charge of inconsistency as to judicial opinions heretofore expressed as a member of this court, or silently assented to. I do not consider myself bound to express any opinion judicially as to the constitutional right of Texas to exercise the rights and privileges of a State of this Union, or the power of Congress to govern her as a conquered province, to subject her to military domination, and keep her in pupilage. I can only submit to the fact, as decided by the political position of the government; and I am not disposed to join in an essay of judicial subtlety to prove Texas to be a State of the Union, when Congress has decided that she is not. It is a question of fact, I repeat; and of fact only. Politically, *615Texas is not a State in this Union. Whether rightfully out of it or not is a question not before the court, and I am not called on to refute a fact with syllogisms.
¶102But, conceding now the fact to be as judicially assumed by my brethren, the next question is, whether she has a right to repudiate her contracts? Before proceeding to answer this question, we must notice a fact in this case that was forgotten in the argument. I mean that the United States are no party to this suit, and refusing to pay the bonds because the money paid would be used to advance the interests of the rebellion. It is a matter of utter insignificance to the Government of the United States to whom she “makes the payment of these bonds. They, are payable to the bearer. The Government is not bound to inquire into the bona jides of the holder, nor whether the State of Texas has parted with the bonds wisely or foolishly. And although by the reconstruction acts she is required to repudiate all debts contracted for the purposes of the rebellion, tlSs does not annul all acts of the State government during the rebellion or contracts for other purposes, nor authorize the State to repudiate them.
¶103How, whether we assume the State of Texas to be judicially in the Union (though actually out of it) or not, it will not alter the case. The contest now is between the State of Texas and her own citizens. She seeks to annul a contract with the respondents, based on the allegation that there was no authority in Texas competent to enter into an agreement during the rebellion. Having relied upon one judicial fiction, namely, that she'is a State in the Union, she now relies upon a second one, which she wishes this court to adopt, that she was not a State at all during the five years that she was in rebellion. She now sets up the plea of insanity, and asks the court to treat all her acts made during the disease as void.
¶104We have had some very astute logic to prove that judicially she was not a State at all, although governed byther *616own legislature and executive as “a distinct political "body.”
¶105The ordinance of secession was adopted by the convention on the 18th February, 1861, submitted to a vote of the people, and ratified by an overwhelming majority.
¶106I admit that this was a very ill-advised measure. Still, it was the sovereign act of a sovereign State, and the verdict, on the trial of this question “by battle,” (Prize Cases, 2 Black, 673,) as to her right to secede, has been against her. But that verdict did not settle any question not involved in the case. It did not settle the question of her right to plead insanity and set aside all her contracts, made during the pendency of the, trial, with her own citizens, for food, clothing, or medicines. The same “ organized political body,” exercising the sovereign power of the State, which required the indorsement of these bonds by the governor, also passed the laws authorizing the disposal of them without such indorsement. She cannot, like the chameleon, assume the color of the Object to which she adheres, and ask this court to involve itself in the contradictory positions that she is a State in the Union, and was never out 'of it, and yet not a State at all for four years, during which she acted and claims to be “an organized political body,” exercising all the powers and functions of an independent sovereign State. Whether a State defacto or de jure, she is estopped from denying her identity in disputes with her own citizens. If they have not fulfilled their contract, she can have her legal remedy for the breach of it in her own courts.
¶107But the case of Hardenberg differs from that of the other defendants. He purchased the bonds in open market, bona fide, and for a full consideration. How, it is to be observed that these bonds are payable to bearer, and that tins court is appealed to as a court of equity. The argument to justify a decree in favor of the Commonwealth of Texas, as against Hardenberg, is simply this: These bonds, though *617payable to bearer, are redeemable fourteen years from date. The government has exercised her privilege of paying the interest for a term without redeeming the principal, which gives an additional value to the bonds. Ergo, the bonds are dishonored. E-go, the former owner has a right to resume possession of them, and reclaim them from a bona fide owner by a decree of a court of equity.
¶108This is the legal argument, when put in the form of a logical sorites, by which Texas invokes our aid to assist her in the perpetration of this great wrong.
¶109A court of chancery is said to be a court of conscience; and however astute may be the argument introduced to defend this decree, I can only say that neither my reason nor my conscience can give assent to it. Of course, I am justly convicted by my brethren of an erroneous use of both; but I hope I may say without offense, that I am not convinced of it.
¶110delivered the following opinion:
¶111I concur with my brother Grier as to the incapacity of the State of Texas, in her present condition, to maintain an original suit in this court. The question, in my judgment, is one in relation to which this court is bound by the action of the legislative department of the government.
¶112Upon the merits of the case, I agree with the majority of my brethren.
¶113I am authorized to say, that my brother Miller unites with me in these views.
¶114IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
¶115The State of Texas •v.
¶116George W. White, John Chiles, John A. Hardehberg, Weston F. Birch, Bybon Murray, jr., George W. Stewart, and Charles P. Shaw.
¶117In equity, No. 6.—Original.
¶118This cause being set for hearing, in conformity to the order therein passed on the 17th day of February, A. D. *6181868, the counsel of the parties were heard, to wit, the State of Texas by George W. Paschal and Richard T. Merrick, her duly authorized attorneys and solicitors in that behalf; and the defendant, George W. White, by his solicitor P. Phillips; the defendant, John Chiles, by his solicitor Albert Pike; the defendant, John A. Hardenberg, by his solicitor James M. Carlisle; the defendants, Weston F. Birch and Byron Murray, jr., partners, by the name of Birch, Murray & Co., by their solicitor James W. Moore; and the bill having been heretofore taken pro confesso against the said Charles P. Shaw and George W. Stewart, by order of this court, for want of appearance, and the pleadings and proofs iaving been read and considered, it is therefore adjudged, ordered, and decreed, as follows:
¶119That the objection interposed by way of plea, in the •answer of defendants, to the authority of the solicitors of the complainant to institute this suit, and to the right of complainant, as one of the States of the Rational Union, to bring a bill of complaint in this court, be, and the same is hereby, overruled.
¶120That the contract, bearing da3e the 12th January, 1865, purporting to have been executed between the military board of the State of Texas and George W. White and ■ John Chiles, and signed by said White & Chiles and by P. Murrah, I. S. Holman, and R. B. Pearce, members of the said military bdard, and which said contract is set forth as exhibit “A”'to the complainant’s bill of complaint, is null, void, and of no effect, and that the said White & Chiles, their agents and attorneys, and all others claiming to act in their behalf, be perpetually enjoined .from asserting any right or claim under the same; and that the complainant is entitled to recover and receive the bonds and coupons mentioned in said contract, as having been transferred or sold' to the said White & Chiles, which at the several times of service of process in this suit were in .the possession or under the control of the defendants respect*619ively, and any proceeds thereof which have come into such possession or control with notice of the equity, of the complainant.
¶121That George W. White, John Chiles, John A. Hardenherg, Weston F. Birch, Byron Murray, jr., George W. Stewart, and Charles P. Shaw, and each of them, he hereby perpetually enjoined from setting up any claim or title to any of the bonds and coupons attached, which are described in the first article of said contract, filed as exhibit “A” to the bill of complaint, and that the above complainant is entitled to restitution of such of the bonds and coupons and proceeds as have come into the possession or control of the said defendants respectively and as aforesaid.
¶122And the court, proceeding to determine upon the pleadings and proofs in this cause for which and how many of said bonds the said defendants respectively are accountable to the complainant to make restitution thereof, or make good the proceeds thereof, doth order, adjudge, and decree, that the defendants, Weston F. Birch and Byron Murray, jr., are so accountable to the complainant for and in respect of eight of said United States Texan indemnity bonds, numbered from 4916 to 4923 inclusive, with coupons attached, and the defendant, George W. Stewart, is so accountable to the complainant for and in respect of four others of said United States Texan indemnity bonds, numbered 4230, 4231, 4235, and 4236, with coupons attached; and accordingly it is ordered and adjudged and decreed, that the said defendants Birch and Murray do forthwith surrender and deliver to the complainant the said bonds, numbered from 4916 to 4923 inclusive, with coupons attached, and for that purpose shall make all necessary. and proper transfers and assignments, and execute all necessary instruments and powers; and that payment of said bonds, or any of them, by the Secretary of the Treasury to the said complainant shall be an acquittance of said Birch and Murray to that extent under this decree, and for such *620payment this decree shall he sufficient warrant to the said Secretary.
¶123And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the said defendant George W. Stewart do forthwith surrender and deliver to the complainant the said bonds numbered 4230, 4231, 4235, 4236, with coupons attached, and for that purpose shall make all necessary and proper transfers and assignments, and execute all necessary instruments and powers, and that payment of said bonds or any of them by the Secretary of the Treasury to said complainant shall be an acquittance of said defendant Stewart to that extent under this decree, and for such payment this decree shall be sufficient warrant to the said Secretary.
¶124And it appearing upon the pleadings and proofs in this cause that, before the filing of the bill in this cause, the said defendants Weston F. Birch and Byron Murray, Jr. had received and collected from the United States the full amount of four others of said United States' Texan indemnity bonds, numbered 4897, 4898, 4914, and 4915, and that the defendant John A. Hardenberg, before the commencement of this suit, deposited thirty-four of said United States Texan indemnity bonds, numbered 4777, and from 4237 to 4248 inclusive, and from 4930 to 4947 inclusive, and from 4232 to 4234 inclusive, in the Department of the Treasury of the United States, for redemption thereof according to their tenor, of which bonds the said Harden-berg claims to have received payment from the Secretary of the Treasury before the service of process upon him in this suit, in respect to which payments and the effect thereof the counsel for the said Birch and Murray and for the said Hardenberg respectively desiring to be heard, it is ordered, that time for said hearing be given to said parties on the first Friday of October next, or some convenient day thereafter.
¶125And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the complainant and the defendants respectively be at *621liberty to apply to the court at the foot of this decree for further directions in respect to the execution of the same, if they shall be so advised.
¶126And it is further ordered, that the complainant shall recover from the defendants its costs, to be taxed by the clerk of this court.
¶12712 April, 1869.
¶128I, D. W. Middleton, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, do hereby certify, that the annexed and foregoing (6) six manuscript pages contain a true copy of the decree of the said Supreme Court, entered on the 12th day of April, A. D. 1869, in the ease of the State of Texas, Complainant, v. George W. White, John Chiles et al., Uo. 6, original, of December term, 1868, as fully as the same remains upon the official records of the said court.
¶129In testimony whereof, I hereunto subscribe my name and affix the seal of the said Supreme Court of [l. s.] the United States, at the city of Washington, this 19th day of April, A. D. 1869.
¶130[Stamp.]
¶131D. W. Middleton,
¶132Clerk Supreme Court United States.