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← 250 F.2d 603 - Nellie Mae Marker, Administratrix of the Estate of Donald Orvel Marker, Deceased v. Universal Oil Products Company, a Corporation

Nellie Mae Marker, Administratrix of the Estate of Donald Orvel Marker, Deceased v. Universal Oil Products Company, a Corporation’s Empirical Analysis

250 F.2d 603 · 1957

Citation profile

71
cited by 71 later decisions
12
states following
July 1992
most recently cited

44 federal appellate · 2 district · 14 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 71 later decisions — most recently July 1992 · most notably Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd. (1985), Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (1983)

44 federal appellate · 2 district · 14 state decisions — followed in 12 states

26019571960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on MacPherson v. . Buick Motor Co. · Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop · 10 Ill. App. 2d 494 - Day v. Barber-Colman Co. · Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “the rule is well settled that neither designer nor manufacturer has a legal duty to adopt or produce a process or product incorporating only features representing the ultimate in safety.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"`While a designer or manufacturer may have a duty to warn of a latent limitation in even a perfectly made article, * * * no such duty extends to the potential danger involved in the totally unanticipated misuse of an item.' [Citations omitted] * * * "Certainly, the manufacturer did not warrant the safety of the machine against a blind operation of it; nor was it reasonably foreseeable that the machine would be activated by one fumbling in the dark. * * * While the question of proper use is generally for the jury, there must of course be evidence sufficient to raise the jury question. Surely, the acts of Brown and Gulley, including Brown's directions to Gulley, prove an utter want of compliance with this condition, thereby precluding submission of the issue to the jury. "Contributory negligence need not be considered for two reasons. First, primary negligence has not been established. Secondly, where as here, a consumer uses a product in a manner not intended by the manufacturer and suffers an injury as a result, he may not recover because such misuse is beyond the scope of the warranty. * * *" [at 820]”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “And there was no obligation resting on the defendant manufacturer to adopt every possible new device which might possibly have been conceived or invented, if there were any; it is not of itself negligence to use a particular design or method in the manufacture or handling of a product or doing a job which is reasonably safe and in customary use in the industry, although other possible designs, whether in use in the industry or not, might be conceived which would be safer, and evidence as to what is thought by some to be a safer design or method or product is not admissible.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.