Harmon v. Kobrin

¶4BETTY B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

¶5We must decide whether the bankruptcy court was correct to give preclusive effect to an issue raised in a prior state court action. Because we conclude that the state court’s treatment of the issue in question does not satisfy California’s threshold requirements for the application of collateral estoppel, we reverse and remand for a nondischargeability proceeding.

¶6Background

¶7Donald Kobrin, a physician, and Charles Harmon, a pharmacist, worked at the same hospital in Lodi, California. Harmon invested in ostriches through one of his former employees, Rhonda de la Cruz, who, together with John Lucas, operated Lucas Ostrich Industries (Lucas Ostrich), an ostrich ranch. At de la Cruz’s prompting, Harmon spoke to Kobrin about Harmon’s ostrich investments. Kobrin and Harmon formed a partnership, Kimnod Ostriches (Kimnod), and together purchased a number of ostriches and ostrich chicks. The partnership contracted with Lucas Ostrich to board the birds and to represent Kimnod in ostrich sales to third parties.1

¶8Kobrin’s relationship with Harmon and Lucas Ostrich soured. He sued Harmon, Lucas Ostrich, de la Cruz, and Lucas in California Superior Court, alleging, among other things, conversion and contract violations and seeking, in part, recission of contracts involving the Kimnod partnership, restitution, and dissolution of the partnership. All defendants defaulted, and the state court entered judgment against Harmon, Lucas Ostrich, and Lucas. The court ordered, among other things, recission of the contracts and of the Kimnod partnership agreement, and restitution in the amount of $293,456.11, plus interest and costs. The court held all defendants jointly and severally liable for the money judgment.

¶9After the state judgment became final, Harmon filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Kobrin then filed an adversary action, seeking to have the state judgment debt adjudged nondischargeable under the fraud exception, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).2 Harmon filed a motion to dismiss, and Kobrin filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Kobrin based his motion for summary judgment on the ar*1245gument that the state court default judgment was preclusive of the issue of whether Harmon had committed fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A). The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to Kobrin, declaring the debt nondischargeable. Harmon appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment. Harmon now appeals the district court’s order.3

¶10Standard of Review

¶11We review the district court’s decision on appeal from the bankruptcy court de novo, without giving deference to the district court’s conclusions. Preblich v. Battley, 181 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir.1999). We review the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Id.In reviewing the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment, we must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the bankruptcy court correctly applied the substantive law. Parker v. Community First Bank (In re Bakersfield Westar Ambulance, Inc.), 123 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir.1997). No questions of fact are at issue in this appeal; the parties disagree only about whether the bankruptcy court correctly applied California preclusion law. Thus, our review is entirely de novo.

¶12Discussion

¶13Principles of collateral estoppel apply to proceedings seeking exceptions from discharge brought under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n. 11, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991). Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding is determined by the preclusion law of the state in which the judgment was issued. Gayden v. Nourbakhsh (In re Nourbakhsh), 67 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Marrese v. Am. Acad, of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985)).

¶14In California, “[collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.” Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1990) (in bank). California courts will apply collateral estoppel only if certain threshold requirements are met, and then only if application of preclusion furthers the public policies underlying the doctrine. See id. at 1225, 1226. There are five threshold requirements:

First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.

¶15Id. at 1225. “The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements.” Id.

¶16There is no dispute concerning the fourth and fifth requirements. Harmon was a defendant in Kobrin’s state court action, and, because Harmon failed to file a *1246timely appeal, the state trial court’s judgment was final before Kobrin brought his nondischargeability action.

¶17In addition, the issue in the bankruptcy litigation was identical to at least one issue raised in the state court proceeding. In order to establish that a debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A), a creditor must establish five elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) misrepresentation, fraudulent omission or deceptive conduct by the debtor; (2) knowledge of the falsity or deceptiveness of his statement or conduct; (3) an intent to deceive; (4) justifiable reliance by the creditor on the debtor’s statement or conduct; and (5) damage to the creditor proximately caused by its reliance on the debtor’s statement or conduct.

¶18Turtle Rock Meadows Homeowners Ass’n v. Slyman (In re Slyman), 234 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir.2000). In his state court complaint, Kobrin adequately alleged facts that would satisfy the five elements under § 523(a)(2)(A). Kobrin requested dissolution of the partnership agreement in part because: Harmon was under a fiduciary duty and a duty of trust and good faith to Kobrin; Harmon “failed to disclose material facts with the intent to deceive Kobrin so as to induce him to invest substantial monies and to forbear from suit”; Kobrin justifiably relied on Harmon’s “representations”; and Kobrin suffered actual damages “as a direct and proximate result of’ Harmon’s failure to disclose.4

¶19The critical questions, therefore, are whether Kobrin has established that the issue of Harmon’s allegedly fraudulent conduct was “actually litigated” in the state court proceeding and whether its resolution was “necessary” for the state court’s judgment. After careful review of the record, we conclude that under California law, the issue was not “necessarily decided” in the state court litigation. Neither was the issue “actually litigated.” For these reasons, the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment was in error.

¶20The mere fact that Kobrin obtained a judgment by default does not, in itself, foreclose the possibility that the resolution of some issues in the litigation would later have preclusive effect. In Williams v. Williams (In re Williams’ Estate), 36 Cal.2d 289, 223 P.2d 248 (1950) (in bank), the California Supreme Court held that “[t]he fact that [a] judgment was secured by default does not warrant the application of a special rule. ‘A default judgment is an estoppel as to all issues necessarily litigated therein and determined thereby exactly like any other judgment.’ ” Id. at 252 (quoting Horton v. Horton, 18 Cal.2d 579, 116 P.2d 605, 608 (1941) (in bank)).5

¶21*1247However, the Williams’ Estate Court placed two limitations on this rule. Reviewing past cases, the court first noted that the rationale behind finding defendants estopped by default judgments is that a defendant who is served with a summons and complaint but who fails to respond “ ‘is presumed to admit all the facts which are well pleaded in the complaint.’ ” Id. at 252 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 1, 147 P. 1168, 1170 (1915)). The court noted, however, that this rationale is inapplicable in cases in which the defendant is unaware of the litigation: “Where there is a complete lack of knowledge on the part of a defendant of the action, it would be unreasonable to hold that the judgment ‘... becomes, in effect, a contract between the parties that the judgment shall be final with respect to everything properly embraced within the allegations of the complaint and in the prayer for relief.’” Id. at 253 (quoting Brown, 147 P. at 1170). Thus, the court held that a defendant may be precluded from relitigating issues raised in a complaint on which a default judgment was granted only if the defendant “has been personally served with summons or has actual knowledge of the existence of the litigation.”6Id. at 254.

¶22The second limitation concerns which issues are “actually litigated” in actions resulting in default judgments. The Williams’ Estate Court limited the principle that a defaulting defendant “ ‘is presumed to admit all the facts which are well pleaded in the complaint’ ” by allowing an issue to have preclusive effect “only where the record shows an express finding upon the allegation” for which preclusion is sought. Id. at 252 (quoting Brown, 147 P. at 1170), 254. Thus, a court’s silence concerning a pleaded allegation does not constitute adjudication of the issue. See id. at 253 (“[W]here the complaint [in a divorce action] alleges certain property to belong to the community, the court’s silence cannot ‘... be construed as an adjudication that the property was community.’ ” (quoting Paduveris v. Paris, 213 Cal. 169, 1 P.2d 986, 988 (1931))); see also People v. Sims, 32 Cal.3d 468, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321, 331 (1982) (stating that an issue is “actually litigated” when it is properly raised by a party’s pleadings or otherwise, when it is submitted to the court for determination, and when the court actually determines the issue).

¶23In this case, while Harmon was not personally served in the state court action, he had actual knowledge of the litigation.7 However, the state court made *1248no express finding concerning Harmon’s allegedly fraudulent actions.8Cf. In re Williams’ Estate, 223 P.2d at 254 (noting prior case in which default judgment was preclusive of issues raised in complaint where court granting default judgment found that “ ‘all the allegations of the complaint are true, and that they are sustained by testimony free from all legal exceptions’ ” (quoting Maxwell v. Maxwell, 66 Cal.App.2d 549, 152 P.2d 530, 531 (1944))). Because there was no express finding in respect to fraud (or anything else for that matter), we cannot conclude that the state court considered and decided the issue. Under Williams’ Estate, then, we cannot conclude that the issue was actually litigated.

¶24Williams’ Estate imposed the express finding requirement in order to ensure that the court in the prior litigation actually decided the issue. However, the express finding requirement can be waived if the court in the prior proceeding necessarily decided the issue: As a conceptual matter, if an issue was necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, it was actually litigated.9 However, in this case, the state court could have entered a default judgment against Harmon without finding that he had committed fraud.10 Thus, the issue *1249was not necessarily decided by the prior proceeding. Cf. Baldwin v. Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 249 F.3d 912 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that although the state court did not make an express finding on an issue in an action which resulted in a default judgment, the issue was “actually litigated” because it was “necessarily decided”).

¶25The issue of whether Harmon committed fraud was neither actually litigated nor necessarily decided in the state court action. The state default judgment therefore cannot be used to preclude the issue of fraud in subsequent proceedings. The bankruptcy court was wrong to conclude that the issue of whether Harmon committed fraud within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(A) was precluded by the state court judgment.11

¶26CONCLUSION

¶27The issue of whether Harmon committed fraud against Kobrin within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) was neither “necessarily decided” by nor “actually litigated” in the state court proceeding. Under California law, Harmon is not precluded from contesting the issue in Kobrin’s adversary action. We therefore reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court for a nondischargeability hearing on Kobrin’s claim.

¶28Reversed and Remanded.