Judd v. Haley’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 92 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"[W]e have recognized a distinction between total closures of proceedings, as in Waller , and situations where the courtroom is only partially closed to spectators. See Douglas v. Wainwright , 739 F.2d 531 , 532 (11th Cir. 1984). When access to the courtroom is retained by some spectators (such as representatives of the press or the defendant's family members), we have found that the impact of the closure is not as great, and not as deserving of such a rigorous level of constitutional scrutiny. See id. at 533 ; Aaron v. Capps , 507 F.2d 685 , 688 (5th Cir. 1975). Both partial and total closures burden the defendant's constitutional rights, and before either is undertaken, a court must `hold a hearing and articulate specific findings.' See Douglas , 739 F.2d at 532 . However, in the event of a partial closure, a court need merely find a `substantial' reason for the partial closure, and need not satisfy the elements of the more rigorous Waller test. See id. at 533; United States v. Brazel 102 F.3d 1120 , 1155 (11th Cir. 1997). "We have relatively little precedent on the right to a public trial generally, and have not specifically addressed the question of how to analyze the total clearing of a courtroom during a portion of a criminal trial. However, the precedent that we do have defines `partial closures' as situations in which the public retains some (though not complete) access to a particular proceeding. See Douglas , 739 F.2d at 532 ('The most important distinguishing facto”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 268 Ga. App. 568 - Hunt v. State · Demouey v. State

2. “First, the last state court rendering a judgment in the case must clearly and expressly state that it is relying on state procedural rules to resolve the federal claim without reaching the merits of that claim. Secondly, the state court’s decision must rest solidly on state law grounds, and may not be' intertwined with an interpretation of federal law. Finally, the state rule must be adequate, i.e., it must not be applied in an arbitrary or unprecedented fashion. The state court’s procedural rule cannot be “manifestly unfair” in its treatment of the petitioner’s federal constitutional claim to be considered adequate for the purposes of the procedural default doctrine.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Doorbal v. Department of Corrections · Olin Usher, Jr. v. Calvin Mortin

3. “[A] violation of one's right to a public trial is structural error. [Cits.] Structural error is a `defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.' [Cit.] As such, structural errors are not subject to harmless error analysis. [Cit.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 268 Ga. App. 568 - Hunt v. State · 980 So. 2d 367 - Ex Parte Easterwood