Parker v. Riley’s Empirical Analysis
250 U.S. 66 · 1919
Citation profile
23 federal appellate · 10 district · 32 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 82 later decisions (8 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 1963 · most notably Carpenter v. Shaw (1930), Privett v. United States (1921)
23 federal appellate · 10 district · 32 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Appellate journey
reviewedParker v. Riley (from Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals)
Relationships
Relies on Stewart v. Tennant · Wilson v. Youst · Eakin v. Hawkins · Parker v. Riley
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 82 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““That if any member of the Five Civilized Tribes of one-half or more Indian blood shall die leaving issue surviving, bom since March 4, 1906, the homestead of such deceased allottee shall remain inalienable, unless restrictions against alienation are removed therefrom by the Secretary of the Interior in the manner provided in section one hereof, for the use and support of such issue, during their life or lives, until April 26, 1931; but if no such issue survive, then such allottee, if an adult, may dispose of his homestead by will free from all restrictions; if this be not done, or in the event the issue hereinbefore provided for die before April 26, 1931, the land shall then descend to the heirs, according to the laws of descent and distribution of the State of Oklahoma, free from all restrictions.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Under the act of 1908, as already shown, leases of ‘restricted lands’ for oil and gas mining may he made with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, under regulations prescribed by him, ‘and not otherwise.’ The present lease was made 'and approved under that provision. The land was then restricted and the restrictions have not since been removed. Thus the event which tire regulations and the lease declare shall terminate the supervision by the Secretary of the Interior of the collection, care, and disbursement of the royalties has not occurred. Nor has the occasion for some supervision disappeared. The heir is a full-blood Indian, as was the allottee, and is regarded by the act as in need of protection, as was the allottee. In the absence of some provision to the contrary, the supervision naturally falls to the Secretary of the Interior. * • * * There is nothing tp the contrary in the leasing provision, or in any other of.which we are aware. True, it is possible under the proviso, in section 9 for the heir, if the court approves, to sell and convey his interest in the land; but that has not been done, and it well may be that the heir will remain the owner until the restrictions expire in regular course— April 26, 1931. There is nothing in the proviso indicating that it is intended in the ^meantime to take from the Secretary or to commit to the cotirt the supervision of matters pertaining to the lease or the royalties. A purpose to do that doubtless would be plainly e”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Rogers v. Rogers““These minerals were part of the homestead, and the lease was to operate as a sale of them as and when they were extracted. In that sense the heirs were exchanging a part of the homestead for the money paid as royalties, but no heir was surrendering any right to the others. Thus the rights of all in the royalties were the same as in the homestead. Nothing in the Act of May 27, 1908, makes to the contrary. Under the provision in section 9 specially providing for issue born after March 4, 1906, Julia was entitled for her support to the exclusive use of the entire homestead while she lived, but not beyond April 26, 1931, and those who took the fee took it subject to that right. The rights of all in the royalties must, as we think, be measured by that standard. In this view Julia is entitled to the use of the royalties, that is to say, the interest or income which may be obtained by properly investing them, during the same period, leaving the principal, like the homestead, to go to the heirs in general on the termination of her special right.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.