¶1This is an appeal by a member of the Bar from an order adjudicating him in contempt and imposing on him a fine of *656$50.00 or imprisonment for a period of not more than ten days. The incident out of which the alleged contempt arose occurred in open court in the Domestic Relations Branch of the trial court when the attorney attempted to have the court sign what the attorney considered an ex parte order. Unfortunately the proceeding was not stenographically recorded, and we are faced with a statement of proceedings and evidence prepared by the attorney and an “opinion and order” by the trial judge modifying and to some extent contradicting the attorney’s statement. Ignoring much extraneous matter contained in the attorney’s statement, we believe we are able to reconcile sufficiently the versions of the attorney and the judge to enable us to decide the real issue presented.
¶2According to the attorney, when the judge refused to sign the order, holding it was not properly an ex parte matter, the judge then said:
“In my opinion this is a dirty trick on opposing counsel” to try to get this kind of a motion through as a preliminary matter; that “it is a sneaky practice upon fellow members of the Bar” to try to sneak through an ex parte matter in this method.
¶3Also according to the attorney, the judge after making those remarks stated he wished to hear nothing further. When the attorney replied, “Your Honor’s remarks are unwarranted, uncalled for and not appreciated and I would like to be heard” the judge stated he would hold the attorney in contempt if he took any more of the court’s time. When the attorney then stated he had a right to be heard on the judge’s comments, the judge held the attorney in contempt.
¶4The trial judge in his statement says it is “questionable” whether he used the exact language in the purported quotation of his remarks with reference to the attorney’s conduct, but he says “the substance of the thought was definitely voiced” and the attorney was told that his conduct was “improper, unprofessional, and unfair to fellow members of the bar.” The judge’s statement does not contradict the attorney’s statement that when the attorney sought to reply to the judge’s remarks he was held in contempt.
¶5Thus the issue presented is whether a judge may in open court charge a lawyer with professional misconduct (the exact language of the judge is not material) and deny the lawyer the right to reply to that charge, and hold the lawyer in contempt when he attempts to reply. We are not here concerned with the correctness of either the judge’s position or the lawyer’s position with respect to the propriety of the submission of the proposed ex parte order.
¶6 In the representation of a client in court a lawyer has the right to press his claim, even if it appears farfetched and untenable, but if the court’s ruling is adverse, the lawyer has no right to persist in pressing his claim. His right is only to preserve his point for appeal and thus protect his client’s interest.
¶7A charge that an attorney is guilty of unprofessional conduct is a serious charge and is even more serious and damaging when made by a judge in open court. Fundamental fairness requires that *657the attorney be given reasonable opportunity to answer such a charge. A judge has no right to make such a charge and then deny the attorney the right to be heard, and it is not contempt of court for the attorney to insist on being heard. Of course the attorney does not have unlimited time to be heard and his answer must be in a respectful manner, but he does have the right to be heard and should not be penalized for attempting to exercise that right.
¶8Reversed.
¶9. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952).
¶10(dissenting) .
¶11Where I differ with the majority is at that point where they state that “[w]e are not here concerned with the.correctness of either the judge’s position or the lawyer’s position with respect to the propriety of the submission of the proposed ex parte order.” To me, the propriety of the attorney’s action in submitting the motion is decisive to the disposition of this case.
¶12If the attorney were to shout obscenities to the judge, and the judge were to comment that such conduct was unbefitting a member of the Bar, it would be absurd to suggest that the misbehaving attorney had the absolute right to reply to such well-deserved rebuke. I could go along with the majority if they limited their holding to cases unvolving unjustified attacks on attorneys from the bench. If the attorney’s conduct is improper, however, judicial admonitions are proper and justified.
¶13The majority suggest that the general principle that an attorney must desist from further argument once ordered by the court to do so, should not be arbitrarily applied without considering the matter which provokes the attorney’s persistence. But I would suggest that it is equally arbitrary to base the right of an attorney to persist on the nature of the judge’s comments without considering the circumstances which called forth the judicial censure.
¶14*658I have examined the record in the instant appeal as to the entire course of events leading up to the contempt citation. I find that the appellant’s conduct was worthy of censure and that, therefore, the judge was justified in rebuking him for it. This being the case, I can see no reason for reversing the contempt conviction.
¶15The record shows that on August 7, 1968, appellant submitted a “Motion for Ratification of Sale of Securities” to Judge Ryan to be ruled on as a “preliminary matter.” Preliminary matters are matters which are not scheduled for hearing by the court but which judges, by custom and for the convenience of attorneys and their clients, will entertain in summary fashion. Generally preliminary matters are not matters in controversy but which have been previously agreed on by the litigants and require only formal court approval. This approval is generally automatic. The judge sitting on preliminary matters can justifiably rely on the integrity of the attorneys who bring such matters before him.
¶16Obviously, this method of handling preliminary matters is feasible only when those using the privilege deal fairly with opposing counsel and honestly and candidly with the court.
¶17That appellant’s conduct was less than candid is apparent from the nature of the matter which he presented to Judge Ryan as a preliminary matter and his failure to give any indication that it was anything more than the typical pro forma consent order. Appellant did not call to the judge’s attention the fact that the subject matter of the motion might be foreign to the case under which the motion was captioned.
¶18These technical deficiencies alone made the motion submitted by appellant entirely inappropriate for consideration as a preliminary matter. In addition, the object of the motion, the invasion of the corpus of a trust set up for the education of minor children, in the amount of $11,000, was such as to preclude summary, ex parte disposition.
¶19The merits of the motion, of course, were not considered by Judge Ryan. His concern was not whether the end sought was legally justified or not, but whether the means attempted to be used to achieve that end were ethical.
¶20As it turned out, the beneficiaries, represented by their mother’s attorney, did file *659an opposition within the five-day period, and vigorously, although unsuccessfully, challenged the granting of the motion. The subsequent adversary proceeding on the motion indicates that, contrary to the impression given by appellant — that the matter was not in contention — there was in fact considerable controversy on the merits of the motion.
¶21Appellant knew that the motion he submitted was not a matter which should be treated ex parte as a preliminary matter. His thirty years at the bar negate any possible inference that his attempt to have it so treated was due to inexperience.
¶22To quote Judge Ryan, appellant was ‘ improperly trying to stampede the court in signing an order favorable to his client.” Such an attempt might itself constitute contempt of court and warrant punishment.
¶23Canon 32 of the Canons of Professional Ethics warns that the importance of a client or cause, or the correctness thereof, cannot justify improper actions in their support and that “[w]hen rendering any such improper service … the lawyer invites and merits stern and just condemnation.”
¶24I believe that the appellant’s improper conduct warranted the judge’s remarks and that he invited the contempt citation by taking issue with them. For that reason, I would affirm.
¶25. The motion was captioned under the name and docket number of a divorce proceeding which had been heard and decided by Judge Atkinson, the parties to which were the appellant’s client and the client’s wife. The motion asked the court to authorize the sale of securities under the terms of a trust set up by the brother of appellant’s client to provide for the education of the three minor children of the parties to the divorce action. Since the only interested parties to the resolution of the motion would be appellant’s client, as trustee, and the minor children, as beneficiaries, there was a discrepancy between the interested parties and those involved in the suit. At the time of the service in question, the beneficiaries had no counsel of record. It is for this reason that the term “opposing counsel” is not technically correct. In all candor, the appellant, who must have been aware of the discrepancies, should have alerted the judge to the possibility that the motion was inappropriate as put forth.
¶26. The motion had been signed by Mr. Kagen, counsel for the mother of the beneficiaries under the trust. A notation had been typed above the place where Mr. Kagen was to acknowledge receipt of service, which read: “Seen — No Objection.” This notation had been inked out and, beside it was handwritten: “received but not read with copy of proposed order.”
¶27. Even if appellant had been mistaken in first presenting the motion to Judge Ryan, the judge gave him ample opportunity to realize and correct that mistake, by warning him on two occasions prior to the verbal reprimand that such a motion was unappropriate as a preliminary matter.
¶28. In re Caffrey, 63 Wash.2d 1, 385 P.2d 383 (1963).