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251 Ark. 149

Byrd v. State

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Decided October 11, 1971

Supreme Court of Arkansas · decided 1971-10-11

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently January 1979

12 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“It now appears that the use of the cross-implicating confessions in the case at bar is not permissible in a joint trial because of being in violation of the confrontation clause of the federal Sixth Amendment. The answer to the problem seems to be to delete any offending portions of the admissions with reference to a codefendant, if such deletion is feasible and can be done without prejudice, or to grant separate trials.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Patrick v. State, Stewart v. State

Relies on Bruton v. United States · Roberts v. Russell · Mosby v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1971-10-11

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Frank Holt, Justice.

¶1The appellants were charged with the crime of robbery. Upon a joint trial a jury found each appellant guilty and assessed James’ punishment at 3 years, Strickland 7 years, and Byrd 5 years imprisonment in the State Penitentiary. From the judgments on those verdicts comes this appeal.

¶2For reversal it is contended that it was error for the court to admit into evidence cross-implicating, confessions and, further, the trial court erred by refusing to give appellants’ requested cautionary instructions that any reference in a confession by one codefendant to another codefendant should not be considered by the jury.

¶3The written confessions of appellants James and Strickland, neither of whom testified, were admitted into evidence. These confessions were cross-implicating as to each declarant and, also, as to appellant Byrd who testified and denied any complicity in the alleged crime. In the case of Mosby & Williamson v. State, 246 Ark. 963, 440 S. W. 2d 230 (1969), we held that it was prejudicial error to allow cross-implicating confessions in a joint trial, as in the case at bar, since this is violative of the basic right to be confronted by an adverse witness with the accompanying right of cross-examination as is guaranteed by the federal Sixth Amendment, Further, this resulting prejudice could not be removed by a cautionary instruction to the jury that the admission of one declarant could not be considered as evidence against a codefendant. There we also said that the answer to the problem of cross-implicating admissions would be to delete any of the offending portions with reference to a codefendant, if a deletion is feasible and could be done without prejudice, or to grant separate trials. See, also, Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968) and Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293 (1968).

¶4Reversed and remanded as to each appellant.

Harris, C. J., not participating.
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