Severson v. Fleck’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

35 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The trial court determined as a matter of law, and we think quite properly, that the contract here was ambiguous. United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 1951, 188 F.2d 277 , 280: “ ‘The question as to whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is to be determined by the court as a matter of law. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 617; Whiting Stoker Company v. Chicago Stoker Company, 7 Cir., 171 F.2d 248 ; Golden Gate Bridge & Highway District of California v. United States, 9 Cir., 125 F.2d 872 .’ “Having determined that an ambiguity existed, the court was then presented with an issue of fact: What was the intent of the parties in executing the ambiguous contract? * * * This court said in Durasteel Co. v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 8 Cir., 1953, 205 F.2d 438 , 441: “ ‘An issue of fact is not genuine unless it has legal probative force as to a controlling issue, 35 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 144, p. 1205. * * * ’ “In the Floyd v. Ring Construction Corporation case, supra [8 Cir., 165 F.2d 125 ], this court, speaking through Judge Thomas, stated at page 129 of 165 F.2d: “ ‘The law is “that the terms of a contract, if it be ambiguous, are matters of fact to be determined in the same manner as other facts; by the jury, if it be a jury case, or by the court, if the jury be waived; while the construction of the contract and its legal effect are questions of law for the court.” [Citations] “ ‘It is the law, also, as the court observed in this case ( 66 F.Supp. 436 , at page 438), that wh”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Stetson v. Investors Oil, Inc. · Steele v. McCargo

2. “* * * a summary judgment upon motion therefor by a defendant should never be entered except where the defendant is entitled to its allowance beyond all doubt; only where the conceded facts show defendant's right with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy; with all reasonable doubts touching the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact resolved against the movant; giving the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence to the party moved against. `That one reasonably may surmise that the plaintiff is unlikely to prevail upon a trial, is not a sufficient basis for refusing him his day in court with respect to issues which are not shown to be sham, frivolous, or so unsubstantial that it would obviously be futile to try them.' Sprague v. Vogt, 8 Cir., 150 F.2d 795, 801; Traylor v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 8 Cir., 189 F.2d 213 ; Union Transfer Co. v. Riss & Co., 8 Cir., 218 F.2d 553 ; Caylor v. Virden, 8 Cir., 217 F.2d 739 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Realty Investment Co. v. Armco Steel Corp.

3. ““ * * ' * The judgmefit sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * * ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Morris v. Miller & Smith Mfg. Co.