Veney v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

59 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 59 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““At approximately 9:40 ?. M. on December 24, 1964, Luxie’s Liquor Store at 2002 Greenmount Avenue in Baltimore City was robbed. Several men were involved. Appellant was identified as one of those men. Lt. Maskell of the Baltimore City Police Department arrived on the scene, accosted appellant, and was in the process of taking him into custody when one of the robbers shot Lt. Maskell. Lt. Maskell was shot a second time. Appellant was identified as firing the second shot. Lt. Maskell was not fatally wounded. The culprits escaped. Between 10:0Q and 11:0G P. M. appellant and others alleged to have been involved were at the home of appellant’s sister. Discussion of the incident took place. Appellant, stated, T think I shot him, too.’ Sgt. Jack Cooper was one of those searching for the participants in the robbery and shooting of Lt. Maskell. Sgt. Cooper was seen at approximately 4:20 A. M. on December 25 by fellow officers. A few minutes later shots were heard from the direction in which Sgt. Cooper had gone. He was found fatally wounded near his police car, lying across an alley, face down, in an unconscious condition. The dome light of his car was on. The driver’s door was open. The microphone of the radio was lying on the front seat. The motor vehicle operator’s license of appellant was picked up from the floor of the police car. Just outside the car on the driver’s side under the open door were found the Social Security card, Selective Service card and birth certificate of appe”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Veney v. Warden

2. ““The issue before us is a narrow one. It does not involve the right of the prosecution to challenge for cause those prospective jurors who state that their reservations about capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt. Nor does it involve the State’s assertion of a right to exclude from the jury in a capital case those who say that they could never vote to impose the death penalty or that they would refuse even to consider its imposition in the case before them. For the State of Illinois did not stop there, but authorized the prosecution to exclude as well all who said that they were opposed to capital punishment and all who indicated that they had conscientious scruples against inflicting it. “ * * * “If the State had excluded only those prospective jurors who stated in advance of trial that they would not even consider returning a verdict of death, it could argue that the resulting jury was simply ‘neutral’ with respect to penalty. But when it swept from the jury all who expressed conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment and all who opposed it in principle, the State crossed the line of neutrality. In its quest for a jury capable of imposing the death penalty, the State produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Pace