Volume 251 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

CIVIL – Pursuant to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, trial court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over otherwise secular state law claims where sole evidence offered in support of those claims requires the interpretation of religious doctrine.

Contempt receivership receiver authority subject-matter jurisdiction final judgment standing judgment creditor purge conditions

Accelerated appeal summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) breach of contract promissory estoppel fraud affidavit salary reduction untimely payment of wages R.C. 4113.15(B). Trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of university on plaintiff's claim for breach of contract arising out of university's unilateral reduction of contracted salary amount. Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of university on related promissory estoppel and fraud claims. Existence of an express, written contract between the parties precluded a claim of promissory estoppel, and the trial court correctly determined that no summary judgment evidence was presented that university's statements regarding its financial condition were knowingly false or made with utter disregard and recklessness as to their truth or that plaintiff justifiably relied on any such representations and was injured by that reliance.

The trial court erred in entering summary judgment for appellees in the amount of $280,000 and later entering final judgment on two jury verdicts (breach of contract and conversion) that involved the same $280,000 in damages. Appellees had no viable conversion claim the asserted conversion claim did not exist separately from a breach-of-contract claim. The trial court properly entered judgment for appellees on a jury verdict for $540,000 based on appellant-cross-appellee's breach of an interim operating agreement. The trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest because appellees failed to seek it within the time provided by Civ.R. 59(B). The trial court correctly directed a defense verdict on appellees' request for punitive damages. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for filing of a new final judgment entry.

Appellant's conviction for single counts of first-degree felony kidnapping and rape were affirmed where the trial court did not err by admitting certain alleged inadmissible hearsay evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 803(2) and 803(4), where appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and where the jury's verdicts finding appellant guilty of the kidnapping and rape offenses was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In an appeal of a divorce decree and judgment, the appellant failed to demonstrate the trial court erred in determining a mistrial was not warranted, in classifying and allocating of marital and separate assets and debts, in finding the appellant committed misconduct, and in making certain determinations concerning exhibits. Judgment affirmed.

Reckless conduct R.C. 2152.421 claim motion to dismiss intentional infliction of emotional distress notice pleading. John Doe, a dance student at Tri-C's Creative Arts Academy, was sexually assaulted by his teacher, who was hired by Tri-C after being terminated by Cleveland School of the Arts due to allegations of improper conduct with the students. John Doe filed a complaint against appellant teachers in Tri-C's Creative Arts Academy for reckless or wanton conduct, a failure to report child abuse in violation of R.C. 2151.421(A)(1)(a), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Applying Ohio's liberal pleading standard and construing all factual allegations as true and making all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, we are unable to conclude that John Doe's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment denying appellant's motion to dismiss.

CIVIL - punitive damages compensatory damages municipal corporation political subdivision employee of political subdivision immunity official capacity attorney fees exceptions to American Rule bad faith malice motion for judgment on the pleadings

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part cause remanded. In an action filed by a law firm seeking unpaid court costs in collections cases allegedly advanced under a contingency fee agreement when representing a payday lender, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the lender because genuine issues of material fact existed as to the terms of the parties' agreement. In addition, the trial court improperly weighed the evidence and made credibility when ruling on the summary judgment motion. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the lender on the firm's the tortious interference with contract claim because the lender had unrebutted evidence that its representative had the authority to terminate the parties' attorney-client relationship.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION – SCHEDULED-LOSS BENEFITS – R.C. 4123.57(B) – PARTIAL AMPUTATION – FUNCTIONAL LOSS OF USE: Because an injured worker's loss of use of an amputated body part is an inherently permanent condition and there was some evidence in the record to support the commission's finding that the considerable amputations of the injured worker's left foot have functionally resulted in the worker's total loss of use of his foot, for all practical intents and purposes, the commission did not abuse its discretion in awarding injured worker scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B). Objections to magistrate's decision sustained in part and overruled in part.

motion to dismiss standing prior litigation Dormant Mineral Act Marketable Title Act res judicata record evidence justiciable.

Divorce de facto termination date statutory presumption for date of last hearing R.C. 3105.171 equitable division of marital property and assets 3105.17(F) spousal-support award 3105.18(C)(1) factors (a)-(n) not an abuse of discretion award of attorney fees R.C. 3105.73(A). Husband appeals from the trial court's journal entry granting him a divorce from Wife. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Husband could not overcome the statutory presumption that the termination date for their marriage as the date of the last hearing. A review of the record showed that the trial court divided the parties' assets and real property equally and the decision was supported by competent, credible evidence. The trial court's award of spousal support was based on testimony and evidence and was within the trial court's sound discretion. Last the trial court's award of Wife's attorney fees was also within the trial court's discretion. There is certainly enough information in the record for the trial court to justifiably award $3,000 a month for spousal support to Wife. The award was well within the trial court's sound discretion.

Sulek - Finding of contempt and setting purge condition of paying $27,000 as appellant's share of his children's medical expenses not an abuse of discretion where although some of the expenses were up to ten years old, appellee presented the bills over three years before the show cause hearing and appellant still failed to make any payments or plans for any payments

Exhibits not admitted sufficiency prosecutorial misconduct

CIVIL LAW - civil stalking protection order CSPO Civ.R. 65.1 Civ.R. 65.1(G) denial of request for a continuance challenge to the trial court's adoption of magistrate's findings.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion for a mistrial where a defense witness was questioned regarding appellant's prior drug conviction. Evid.R. 405(A).

The present appeal is a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). We hold the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for preliminary injunction because the political question doctrine foreclosed judicial intervention in this dispute. Courts are not hall monitors duty-bound to intervene in every political squabble. The trial court's order granting appellees' motion for preliminary injunction is vacated and the cause is dismissed.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Voir dire; Fair and impartial jury; Actual prejudice; Presumed prejudice. Defendant-appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to voir dire a prospective juror whose son was the primary witness for the prosecution.

Judge Duhart. No ineffective assistance of counsel merely because trial counsel allowed defendant to enter a guilty plea which resulted in the loss of his ability to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.