Moskowitz v. Marrow’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 2 district · 153 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 162 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It would be preposterous to claim that an appropriation of personal property by one joint owner to his personal use could divest the interest of the other joint owner.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Griffith · Walsh v. Keenan

2. ““ The plain implication is that as between the depositors themselves, the form of the deposit gives rise to a presumption and nothing more, but that after the death of either leaving a deposit then subsisting, the presumption becomes conclusive as to the title of the survivor. “ A reading of the statute that would make the presumption irrebuttable except within these limits would do violence to intention and foster litigation. It would do violence to intention, for those who open such accounts have seldom any thought of restricting their enjoyment of the fund, their right to draw and spend, by the shackles of a formula [case cited]. It would foster litigation, for each of the two depositors, the one opening the deposit as fully as the other, would be subject to an accounting for moneys afterwards withdrawn, and forced to make division on the footing of equality. An irrebuttable presumption would close the door to testimony, direct or circumstantial, that in opening the deposit the incidents of a joint tenancy had been varied by agreement. Many a family settlement, made in the informal fashion to be expected among relatives, would be opened up for scrutiny after years of acquiescence.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Neill v. Royce · In re the Estate of Kessler

3. ““There had been a ruling by this court in Kelly v. Beers ( 194 N. Y. 49 ) that a deposit by one in the name of himself and another or the survivor, was unavailing in and of itself to give to the other any interest whatever, either conclusive or presumptive. The intention thus revealed was thought to be abortive in default of evidence of the delivery essential to a gift. The aim of the statute superseding that decision was not to cramp intention, but to give it power to prevail. Capacity was to be liberated, not cabined or confined. Bank accounts in this form are opened not infrequently by the simple and the humble. The last thing that was 'in view was to encompass them with new embarrassments, to penalize their ignorance. What was sought and what was needed was to let them carry out their will. There was to be flexibility and simplicity, not rigidity and formalism, in an adjustment between means and ends. A presumption, to be sure, there is that the form of the deposit, unqualified by agreement, is an accurate expression of the realities of title. The presumption is no longer subject to be rebutted — the form, in the words of the statute, becomes ‘conclusive evidence’ of the intention — when one of the depositors dies with the deposit still intact. But except after death, or in circumstances where prejudice would result to a bank acting without written notice of a countervailing interest, the true agreement may be proved, though in proving it there is a departure from the ter”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 29 Wash. 2d 733 - Munson v. Haye