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← 252 F.3d 952 - Huss v. Graves

Huss v. Graves’s Empirical Analysis

252 F.3d 952 · 2001

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
4
states following
April 2017
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Williams v. Taylor · Schlup v. Delo · United States v. Jorn · Arizona v. Washington · United States v. DiFrancesco

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he prohibition of a retrial prevents the government from `gain[ing] an advantage from what it learns at the first trial about the strength of the defense case and the weaknesses of its own.'”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““[H]abeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy,” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 , 115 S.Ct. 851, 863 , 130 L.Ed.2d 808, 831 (1995). Because of the equitable nature of the writ, a federal court “has broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief [and is] authorized ... to dispose of habeas corpus matters ‘as law and justice require,’ ” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 , 107 S.Ct. 2113, 2118 , 95 L.Ed.2d 724, 732 (1987). When a double jeopardy violation is found on habeas review, the normal relief is to release the prisoner and forbid further retrial. This case, however, is quite obviously far removed from the norm. Rather than maintaining his innocence, Mr. Huss sought at his bench trial to be excused from his acts because of insanity. Even if Mr. Huss had received what he asked for, therefore, he would have been deprived of his liberty, since a defendant in Iowa who is found not guilty by reason of insanity is subject to involuntary commitment in a mental facility. If we were to release Mr. Huss, he would be in a better position than he would have been in if the bench trial had concluded in his favor. We do not believe that under the unique circumstances of this case the double jeopardy clause prohibits the retrial of Mr. Huss altogether. The Constitution does not absolutely require “that every time a defendant is put to trial before a competent tribunal he is entitled to go free if the trial fails to end in a final judgment,” Wade v. Hunt”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[I]t is appropriate to issue a writ of habeas corpus releasing Mr. Huss, unless the State of Iowa, within 90 days after the mandate issues in this case, retries Mr. Huss by submitting the stipulated record from the first trial to the new judge.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.