¶1concurring specially.
¶2I concur in the judgment but write to point out the distinction between our opinion in this case and our opinion in Butler v. State, 252 Ga. 135 (311 SE2d 473) (1984). Here we-hold that the presumption of sanity, which exists as to everyone if nothing more be shown, is not a “bursting bubble” presumption, McCormick on Evidence, Second Edition, § 345(A), p. 821 (1972), and does not dissipate in the face of evidence of insanity. In Butler, supra, we held that an involuntary civil commitment by a Probate Court has the result of removing the presumption of sanity which would otherwise attach to an individual.
¶3In criminal cases, where the issue of insanity is reviewed by an appellate court, the standard of review is that established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and applied by this court in Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 71 (295 SE2d 727) (1982), “whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the crime.” In the trial court the defendant has the burden to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. On review, the appellate court must answer the question, whether any rational fact finder could have determined from the evidence that the defendant failed to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence? In our review of the case sub judice, the evidence before the jury, and before us on review, included the presumption of sanity. In Butler, supra, proof of the defendant’s civil commitment removed the presumption of sanity from consideration *135by the jury and by this court on review.