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252 Ga. 312

314 S.E.2d 421

Evans v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided March 15, 1984

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1984-03-15

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“used for overhearing, recording, intercepting, or transmitting sounds.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Ellis v. State

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986)

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1984-03-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 37 later decisions — most recently February 2015 · most notably United States v. Rodriguez (1992), Luangkhot v. State (2013)

6 federal appellate · 2 district · 25 state decisions

1801984199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Gregory, Justice,

¶1concurring.

¶2I agree with all that is said in the majority and add these thoughts with regard to Division One of the opinion. OCGA § 16-11-60 (1) (Code Ann. § 26-3009) defines “device” as “an instrument or apparatus used for overhearing, recording, intercepting or transmitting sounds . . . and which involves in its operation electricity [or] electronics. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (1980), defines “sound” as “a vibratory disturbance in the pressure and density of a fluid, or in the elastic strain in a solid, with frequency in the approximate range between 20 and 20,000 cycles per second, and capable of being detected by the organs of hearing.” (Emphasis supplied.)

¶3Electrical impulses in telephone wires are not sounds. The induction coils placed outside the Atlanta Judicial Circuit intercepted electrical impulses, but not sounds. At the earliest, sounds were intercepted when these electrical impulses were recorded in Fulton County.

¶4The right of privacy is the thing to be protected by OCGA Title 16, Ch. 11, Art. 3 (Code Ann. § 26-3001 et seq.). That right is not violated by the interception of an electrical impulse any more than the interception of a letter in the mail violates that right. Of course, the potential for violation exists in both cases. But it is only the opening and reading of the letter on one hand, and, at least, the recording and, perhaps, hearing on the other, which violates one’s right of privacy. Our legislature chose to use the word “sound” rather than a broader term which might include an electrical impulse.

¶5I note that both the state and federal statutes contain safeguards. There is an obligation to destroy all matter obtained by surveillance if evidence of one of the specific crimes set forth in the wiretap law has not been obtained within 30 days, and to certify this fact under oath in writing to the judge who issued the warrant. OCGA § 16-11-64 (b) (6) (Code Ann. § 26-3004). If information of such a crime is obtained, the prosecuting attorney must notify the accused of the existence and substance of the evidence or information, and must make it available for inspection and copying if it has been reduced to permanent form. OCGA § 16-11-64 (b) (7) (Code Ann. § 26-3004). An exclusionary rule exists by statute. OCGA § 16-11-64 (b) (8) (Code Ann. § 26-3004). Violations of the wiretap law are misdemeanors, OCGA § 16-11-83 (Code Ann. § 26-9931a), and can support actions for invasion of privacy, OCGA § 16-11-64 (b) (8) *323(Code Ann. § 26-3004). Violations of the federal law can lead to awards of actual damages, punitive damages and attorney fees. 18 USCA § 2520. These sanctions should assure sufficient restraint upon law enforcement officials and provide adequate protection to the right of privacy.

¶6I am authorized to state that Justice Weltner joins in this concurrence.

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