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← 252 Pa. Super. 203 - Albert v. Alter

252 Pa. Super. 203 - Albert v. Alter’s Empirical Analysis

1977

Citation profile

84
cited by 84 later decisions
1
states following
June 2015
most recently cited

80 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 84 later decisions — most recently June 2015 · most notably 320 Pa. Super. 444 - Burch v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. (1983), 316 Pa. Super. 565 - Fish v. Gosnell (1983)

80 state decisions

56019771980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Vorbnoff v. Mesta Machine Co. · Whitner v. Lojeski · Burrell v. Philadelphia Electric Co. · Menarde v. Philadelphia Transportation Co. · Jones Et Vir v. Williams

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 84 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The defendant-physician, such as Dr. Sabeh, is legally responsible or liable for the injuries suffered by his patient if the defendant’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of those injuries. In order for the negligent conduct to be a legal cause, that conduct must have been a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries in question. If the injuries in question would have been sustained even if the physician had not been negligent, then the negligent conduct of the defendant physician would not be a substantial factor in causing the injuries in question. Stated differently, the negligent conduct of the defendant physician is a substantial factor in causing his patient’s injuries if the injuries would not have been sustained, had the physician not acted in a negligent manner. When a defendant physician, such as Dr. Sabeh, negligently fails to act or negligently delays in employing indicated diagnostic or therapeutic measures and his negligence is a substantial contributing factor in causing injuries to his patient, the plaintiff does not have to prove to a certainty that proper care would have, as a medical fact, prevented his injuries in question. If a defendant-physician’s negligent action or inaction has effectively terminated his patient’s chances of avoiding injuries, he may not raise conjectures as to the measure of the chances that he has put beyond the possibility of realiza tion. If there was any substantial possibility of avoiding injuries and the defendant has d”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “The issue is not merely one of semantics. There is a logical reason for the rule. The opinion of a medical expert is evidence. If the fact finder chooses to believe it, he can find as fact what the expert gave as an opinion. For a fact finder to award damages for a particular condition to a plaintiff, it must find as a fact that that condition was legally caused by the defendant’s conduct. Here, the only evidence offered was that it was “probably” caused, and that is not enough. Perhaps in the world of medicine nothing is absolutely certain. Nevertheless, doctors must make decisions in their own profession every day based on their own expert opinions. Physicians must understand that it is the intent of our law that if the plaintiff’s medical expert cannot form an opinion with sufficient certainty so as to make a medical judgment, there is nothing on the record with which a jury can make a decision with sufficient certainty so as to make a legal judgment.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““Where there is no obvious causal relationship, unequivocal medical testimony is necessary to establish the causal connection” ... But where “the disability complained of is the natural and probable result of the injuries, the fact-finding body may be permitted to so find, even in the absence of expert opinion.” . .. The two must be “so closely connected and so readily apparent that a layman could diagnose (except by guessing) the causal connection.” ... (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.