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253 Ga. 429

322 S.E.2d 228

Head v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided October 17, 1984

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1984-10-17

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“In my view a person who defends himself or herself against an aggressor’s attack and who, without malice or intent, causes the aggressor’s death in self-defense, should not nevertheless be guilty of felony murder on the basis that such person is guilty of possession (however momentary) of a firearm by a convicted felon. That is to say, in my view, a person should not be denied the right of self-defense because such person is a convicted felon.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Cauley v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1984-10-17

How this case has been cited

Cited by 108 later decisions — most recently February 2023 · most notably Childs v. State (1987), Phillips v. State (2009)

2 federal appellate · 106 state decisions

40019841990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Hill, Chief Justice,

¶1concurring specially.

¶2I concur in the opinion of the court, except paragraph (d) of Division 3. Although paragraph (d) is procedural, my disagreement with it is substantive.

¶3In my view a person who defends himself or herself against an aggressor’s attack and who, without malice or intent, causes the aggressor’s death in self-defense, should not nevertheless be guilty of felony murder on the basis that such person is guilty of possession (however momentary) of a firearm by a convicted felon. That is to say, in my view, a person should not be denied the right of self-defense because such person is a convicted felon.

¶4As this substantive issue is not before us at this time, I concur in the judgment.

¶5I am authorized to state that Justice Clarke and Justice Smith, join in this special concurrence.

Bell, Justice,

¶6concurring specially.

¶7I concur in the opinion of the court, except paragraphs (a) and (b) of Division 3. I would hold that in cases where the count charging possession of a firearm is not material to the more serious charge, the trial of the possession charge must be severed and held before a different jury. This would eliminate the danger that evidence of the more serious crime will prejudice the jurors during the subsequent trial of the possession charge, and would also foreclose the possibility that inquiries relative to the possession charge during voir dire will unfavorably affect the defendant during trial of the more serious charge.

¶8I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Marshall and Justice Smith join in this special concurrence.

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