McPhearson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

74 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 74 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"In light of the foregoing we therefore take the position that a criminal suspect is entitled to be represented by counsel at a pre-trial confrontation unless the facts and circumstances indicate that other interests of the suspect as well as those of society (as represented by law enforcement officials) outweigh the interest of the suspect in being represented by counsel at that time. One such situation that we are recognizing today is where the suspect is returned to the scene of the crime Immediately upon apprehension and where such apprehension occurs within a reasonably short time after the commission of the alleged offense. Commonwealth v. Bumpus (1968), 354 Mass. 494 , 238 N.E.2d 343 . Russell v. United States (1969), 408 F.2d 1280 , certiorari denied 395 U.S. 928 , 89 S.Ct. 1786 , 23 L.Ed.2d 245 . The facts in the instant case obviously fall within this category. Appellant was apprehended by police within minutes after the commission of the crime and taken directly to the service station to be identified by Hodgin. In appraising these circumstances, it would seem to this court, as we said in Lewis, that the best interests of the suspect as well as that of efficient law enforcement are served when the identification takes place immediately, though it be without counsel for the suspected party. At this stage of the police's investigation an obvious need is apparent for making a speedy determination as to the suspect's identity. If the wrong man is apprehended, certainly”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Iron Shell · Coker v. State

2. ““There was evidence in the record that there had been two participants in the robbery, — appellant and the second man who had had a pistol. Although the pistol had no direct bearing on the specific charge brought against appellant to-wit, robbery while armed with a knife, it was certainly relevant evidence tending to add credence to the story of the state’s principal prosecuting witness, Hodgin, that the robbery actually happened in the manner in which he testified that it did. Any evidence which substantiates the credibility of a prosecuting witness on the question of guilt is material and relevant, and may be properly admitted. Hodgin’s testimony relating to the actual hold-up was crucial to the state’s case and any evidence which would tend to substantiate his version of the events as they took place would definitely tend to throw light on appellant’s guilt. Hence the mere fact that the gun being offered into evidence was in no way directly tied to the particular offense charged, would not solely determine its admissibility.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Eiland v. State

3. ““Evidence is relevant which throws or tends to throw light on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” McPhearson v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 254 , 253 N.E.2d 226 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Moss v. State