Baker v. Mason’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

61 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““You are instructed that when a person is confronted with a sudden emergency, not of his own making without sufficient time to determine with certainty the best course to pursue, he is not held to the same accuracy of judgment as would be required of him if he had time for deliberation. Accordingly, if he exercises such care as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise when confronted by a like emergency, he is not liable for an injury which resulted from his conduct, even though another course of conduct would have been more judicious or safer, or might even have avoided the accident. Therefore, if you find from a fair preponderance of the evidence in this case that the defendant was faced or confronted with a sudden emergency not of her own doing, and that thereafter she pursued a course of conduct that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person would pursue or follow when confronted with the same emergency, then the defendant would not be liable to the plaintiffs, even though you believe that another course of action or conduct would have been more judicious, safer or might have even avoided the accident.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Taylor v. Todd · Collins v. Rambo

2. ““In other words, the jury was told that, in determining whether the appellee was negligent, they were to place the reasonable prudent person in the same situation in which they believed the appellee to have been. Except for the ‘sudden emergency’ language, the instruction could stand as a proper test for determining negligence. It has already been established that there was no evidence from which the jury could have found a ‘sudden emergency’ to have existed prior to the impact. Thus, the jury would have to have either found this instruction to be inapplicable or placed the ‘reasonable prudent person’ in the situation in which they believed the appellee to have been. In the first case, the instruction would have been harmless; in the second case, the jury would have applied the proper test in ascertaining the appellee’s negligence. In either case, the instruction could not have prejudiced the appellant so as to require a reversal of the trial court’s judgment.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Taylor v. Todd · Lashbrooks v. Schultz

3. “"This is not to say that, in a proper factual situation, an unwarranted 'sudden emergency' instruction could not in and of itself constitute a reversible error. In Dwyer v. Christensen (1956), 76 S.D. 201 , 75 N.W.2d 650 , 56 A.L.R.2d 734 , the party requesting the instruction had probably been confronted by a sudden emergency, but the evidence indicated that it was his negligence which had created the emergency. The South Dakota Court held that a sudden emergency instruction would not be warranted since the emergency was created by the party's own conduct. Furthermore, the instruction could prejudice and mislead the jury since they could find that the party was actually confronted with a sudden emergency. Accord, Pullin v. Nabors (1961), 240 Miss. 864 , 128 So.2d 117 ."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Evans v. Palmeter · Collins v. Rambo