Wilson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

97 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 97 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"A jury's verdict may not be impeached by testimony of the jurors. Even the slightest consideration of such a practice under the circumstances would create an intolerable situation and no jury verdict would ever be lasting or conclusive."”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Fox v. State · 147 Ind. App. 408 - Jessop v. Werner Transportation Co.

2. ““Appellant suggests that this court adopt a principle whereby any restraint and transportation of the victim would be considered only as an integral part of the charge of rape and not as a separate charge of kidnapping. In other words, that because the rape in this case also included a kidnapping or transportation under restraint he should not be prosecuted separately for that crime. Carrying the argument further it seems the victim was not carried very far to constitute a real kidnapping and it was merely incidental to the rape. Of course, the argument fails because a transportation or kidnapping is not necessarily involved in a rape. It might likewise be urged in any crime of violence that the victim was touched only ‘lightly’ and only incidental to the main crime, and therefore should not be subject to a separate or included charge of assault and battery with intent. In such cases as this the attacker is guilty of a compound crime as happens in instances when a victim is also killed in the commission of another crime, or also kidnaps, while committing a robbery. We do not approve any principle which exempts one from prosecution from all the crimes he com-mits_ because he sees fit to compound or multiply them. Such a principle would encourage the compounding and visciousness of the criminal acts. * * *””

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tewell v. State · Critchlow v. State

3. ““There was no question in the prosecutrix’s mind to the identity of her assailant. She stated she was with the appellant for about one (1) hour. He talked to her freely and made no attempt to conceal his identity. He attempted to persuade her to have another rendevous with him, but to no avail. She had ample opportunity to take notice of his clothing and physical characteristics. This is not a case of a witness merely getting a fleeting glimpse of a fleeing suspect. . . . * * * On the basis of the record before us we therefore find that the in-court identification of the appellant by the prosecutrix as her assailant had a sufficient independent origin from the alleged prejudicial pre-trial confrontation. United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 . . ."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 157 Ind. App. 83 - Hutts v. State