State v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

92 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 94 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The first question for this court to determine is whether there is substantial competent evidence to support the district judge’s finding that the confession was voluntary. In determining whether a confession is voluntary, a court is to look at the totality of the circumstances. The burden of proving that a confession or admission is admissible is on the prosecution, and tire required proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Factors bearing on the voluntariness of a statement by an accused include the duration and manner of the interrogation; the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside world; the accused’s age, intellect, and background; and the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation. The essential inquiry in determining the voluntariness of a statement is whether the statement was the product of the free and independent will of the accused. State v. Price, 247 Kan. 100 , Syl. ¶ 1, 795 P.2d 57 (1990). When a trial court conducts a full hearing on the admissibility of an extrajudicial statement by an accused, determines the statement was freely and voluntarily given, and admits the statement into evidence at trial, an appellate court accepts that determination if it is supported by substantial competent evidence. See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 83-84 , 853 P.2d 34 (1993).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Brown

2. ““The stop of a vehicle, under the circumstances set forth in K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 22-2402 and Terry, is different than merely approaching an individual in a public place. Such a stop always constitutes a seizure. Therefore, to stop a moving vehicle an officer must have articulable facts sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63 , 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979). To stop a vehicle to investigate circumstances which provoke suspicion, an officer must be aware of ‘specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from the facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion’ that the vehicle contains individuals involved in criminal activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 , 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 , 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975). See State v. McKeown, 249 Kan. at 510 .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Reno

3. ““An out-of-court declaration by a third party to a police officer which is offered at trial merely to explain the officer’s conduct in the investigation of a crime, although hearsay, is usually admissible because it is not offered for the truth of the matter stated. However, when such declaration also directly incriminates the defendant, it is inadmissible unless it falls within one or more of the hearsay exceptions of K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60-460.” State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75 , Syl. ¶ 7, 853 P.2d 34 (1993).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Patton