253 Pa. Super. 360 - McCaskey v. McCaskey’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I]t shall be lawful for the innocent and injured spouse to obtain a divorce from the bond of matrimony, whenever it shall be judged, . . . that the other spouse: . . . [sjhall have offered such indignities to the person of the injured and innocent spouse, as to render his or her condition intolerable and life burdensome.” “While our appellate courts have been reluctant to formulate a general definition of what constitutes ‘indignities,’ we have noted that indignities may consist of vulgarity, unmerited reproach, habitual contumely studied neglect, intentional incivility, manifest disdain, abusive language, or malignant ridicule. Gehris v. Gehris, supra, 233 Pa.Super. at 147-48 , 334 A.2d at 754-755 . See also McKrell v. McKrell, 352 Pa. 173 , 42 A.2d 609 (1945).” Hargrove v. Hargrove, 252 Pa.Super. 120 , 381 A.2d 143, 148 (1977). Moreover, “It has thus generally been determined that such conduct must constitute a course of behavior which is humiliating and degrading, inconsistent with the injured individual’s position as a [spouse] making that condition intolerable and life a burden to [him or] her. A single act of indignity is not sufficient, but a course of treatment ‘of such character as to render the condition of any [person] of ordinary sensibility and delicacy of feeling intolerable and . . . life burdensome will’ present grounds for divorce. Commonwealth ex rel. Whitney v. Whitney, 160 Pa.Super. 224, 228 , 50 A.2d 732, 734 (1947) (emphasis original). Such conduct is u”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 278 Pa. Super. 275 - Moorhead v. Moorhead · 261 Pa. Super. 102 - Leucci v. Leucci

2. ““The law is clear that when a divorce matter is heard by a judge sitting without a jury, this Court must make a complete and independent review of the record of the proceedings below. Eifert v. Eifert, 219 Pa.Super. 373 , 281 A.2d 657 (1971). The Court’s review extends even to matters of credibility. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 169 Pa.Super. 617 , 84 A.2d 261 (1951). The Court must ‘examin[e] the record to discover inherent improbabilities in the stories of the witnesses, inconsistencies and contradictions, bias and interest, opposition to incontrovertible physical facts, patent falsehoods . . ..’ 12 P.L.E. § 143 Divorce; see also, Faszczewski v. Faszczewski, 182 Pa.Super. 295 , 126 A.2d 773 (1956); Rankin v. Rankin, 181 Pa.Super. 414 , 124 A.2d 639 (1956).” Ryave v. Ryave, 249 Pa.Super. 78, 85 , 375 A.2d 766, 770 (1977); Barton v. Barton, 248 Pa.Super. 278 , 375 A.2d 96 (1977); Shacreaw v. Shacreaw, 248 Pa.Super. 223 , 375 A.2d 68 (1977). However, we have frequently stated: “while the findings and recommendation of the master are only advisory, where the issue is one of credibility and the master is the one who heard and observed the witnesses, his findings should be given the fullest consideration. Schrock v. Schrock, 241 Pa.Super. 53 , 359 A.2d 435 (1976); Gehris v. Gehris, 233 Pa.Super. 144 , 334 A.2d 753 (1975).” DeBias v. DeBias, 245 Pa.Super. 266, 272 , 369 A.2d 396, 399 (1976).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 278 Pa. Super. 275 - Moorhead v. Moorhead