253 Pa. Super. 538 - Jack v. Jack’s Empirical Analysis
1978
Citation profile
45 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 46 later decisions — most recently January 2008 · most notably Fried v. Fried (1985), 310 Pa. Super. 23 - Remick v. Remick (1983)
45 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Stambaugh v. Stambaugh · Henderson v. Henderson · Heilbron v. Heilbron · 242 Pa. Super. 170 - Wiegand v. Wiegand · 156 Pa. Super. 136 - Commonwealth v. Scholl
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““No standard is fixed for determination of the amount of counsel fee other than the requirement that it must be reasonable. Consideration must be given to the husband’s ability to pay, to the wife’s necessity, and to the extent of her separate estate. See Freedman, Law of Marriage and Divorce, Second Edition, Section 465. ‘How much shall be allowed as alimony and for counsel fees and expenses is a matter of judicial discretion and the validity of the order depends upon the proper exercise of that discretion . . This court will not reverse an order of the court below “except for plain abuse of discretion” . . . There are no fixed rules as to the amount to be allowed. It is not to be measured solely by the value of counsel’s services or by the wife’s necessities. “The husband’s ability to pay, the separate estate of the wife, the character, situation and surroundings of the parties are all to be considered in determining a fair and just amount which ’ the husband should pay” ... To deny a destitute wife the means to pay for process and professional aid is to deny her justice . . . and likewise to deny an innocent and injured husband a divorce unless he pay counsel fees beyond his ability to pay is to close the doors of the courts to many worthy suitors. The statute contemplates the payment of a reasonable counsel fee, limited by the necessities appearing from the evidence, such as will as nearly as possible promote the administration of fair and impartial justice by placing the”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage““In case of divorce from the bonds of matrimony . the court may, upon petition, in proper cases, allow a spouse reasonable alimony pendente lite and reasonable counsel fees and expenses . . . ””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.