Raasch v. NCR Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “... Raasch contends that because the arbitration provision excepts from its coverage certain disputes, which it contends are typical of the kind which NCR itself would be most likely to initiate, it lacks mutuality, presumably because NCR retains the right to go to court for disputes it is more likely to initiate whereas its employees do not retain that right for disputes they are more likely to initiate. Even if the disputes excepted from ACT would generally be of the type NCR itself would be more likely to initiate, it miscomprehends the mutuality of obligation doctrine to state that this poses a problem. Mutuality requires only that both Raasch and NCR be bound to the terms of any dispute that is required to be submitted to the arbitrator. For example, NCR cannot expect Raasch to be bound by the arbitrator’s ruling on a question of age discrimination if it retains the right to reject the ruling in the event it is ultimately unfavorable to it, or if it retains the right to change the ground rules on how the arbitrator is permitted to reach its conclusion. Upon review, the Court finds no indication in ACT’s provisions that NCR has withheld its own obligation to abide by any decision rendered by an arbitrator pursuant to a Stage 3 dispute. That is all that is required insofar as mutuality of obligation is concerned; nothing in that doctrine requires that just because both parties agree to arbitrate discrimination disputes and the like they also must agree to arbitrate every o”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 153 Wash. 2d 293 - Zuver v. Airtouch Communications, Inc. · 277 F. Supp. 2d 794 - Dantz v. APPLE OHIO LLC.

2. “[w]hile arbitration awards were enforceable, see, e.g., Brennan v. Brennan, 164 Ohio St. 29 , 128 N.E.2d 89 , 94 (1955) (noting that binding arbitration awards were held enforceable in Ohio, except where obtain|d by fraud or the like, at least as far back as 1835), American courts in general demonstrated hostility toward ordering specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate, seemingly adopting a jealous notion held by the common law courts of England that arbitration agreements were nothing less than a drain on their own authority to settle disputes. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 , 219-220 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. 1238 , 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 277 F. Supp. 2d 794 - Dantz v. APPLE OHIO LLC. · Cooper v. MRM Investment Co.

3. “a. substantive unconscionability, by-showing that the contract terms are so unfair to one party that their enforcement would be unreasonable, and b. procedural unconscionability, by showing that there was an absence of meaningful choice or understanding of the terms on the part of one party.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 494 F. Supp. 2d 826 - Stepp v. NCR Corp. · 523 F. Supp. 2d 650 - Boyd v. Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp.