Fitzgerald v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

68 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"it would be unreasonable to fault anyone but the appellant himself for the failure to have the assistance of counsel at his trial. There are many instances in the law in which one may waive a particular right by his own conduct with respect to that right, and were no other considerations present in this case, we would be inclined to characterize the conduct of the appellant as amounting to just such a waiver. Ordinarily courts are unwilling to reward a litigant for his own misconduct. Notwithstanding the above, in the case at bar we are dealing with no ordinary right but rather with a constitutional right of fundamental importance-the right to the assistance of counsel. Constitutional rights have occupied a sacred position in our legal system and rightfully so. The concepts, principles and rights embodied in both the United States and Indiana Constitutions command the most sensitive protection the courts can provide. In fact, protection of all constitutional rights is our most solemn duty. Recognizing this duty, both this court and the U.S. Supreme Court have insisted that constitutional rights may not be waived except by the appellant himself, knowingly, intelligently and understandingly. A heavy burden is borne by the state whenever it is claimed or alleged that a constitutional right of a defendant has been waived. A silent record is not enough."”

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Poynter v. State · Seniours v. State

2. “"Although we believe that the conduct of the appellant had reached the point where remedial action by the court was indicated, we believe that the trial judge had other means at his disposal short of proceeding with the trial, with which to deal with the situation in this case. The court, in its judicial discretion, could have appointed an attorney to handle appellant's defense conditioned on the payment of the legal fees by appellant. Alternatively the court could have granted appellant a further continuance to renew his 'efforts' in securing a lawyer, such efforts to be inspired by the clear warning by the court that failure to secure such counsel would be deemed an interference with the administration of justice and punishable as contempt. Either one of these actions or a combination of the two by the trial court would seem adequate to bring the appellant to trial. "Proceeding with the trial as occurred in this case, in light of the mandates of the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions and prior case law decided thereunder, was improper, irrespective of how strongly we are convinced that appellant sought to avoid said trial. Without a clear waiver, certain constitutional rights, such as the assistance of counsel, must be afforded the defendant about to be tried. As we have indicated, however, the trial court is not powerless where a defendant attempts to prostitute the system and thwart the ends of justice."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hardy v. State · Gilmore v. State

3. ““[a] determined effort ... to avoid being tried at all and to bring about delay and disruption of the criminal proceedings through his own inaction.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hardy v. State · Suits v. State