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254 Ind. 4

256 N.E.2d 913

Williams v. State

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided April 13, 1970

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1970-04-13

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Surely it can not be said that to constitute a violation of the statute (Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-4220 (1969 Supp.)), the offer must be express and in precise statutory langauge. The offer was implicit in appellant’s words and actions when taken in the context in which they occurred. As was said in Burton v. State (1952), 232 Ind. 246 , 111 N.E.2d 892 , this court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men.””

quoted by 3 later decisions, including State v. Hartman, 155 Ind. App. 599 - Andrews v. State

Relies on Glover v. State · Burton v. State · Estes v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1970-04-13

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently January 2005

15 state decisions

901970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Hunter, C.J.

¶1Appellant was .charged by affidavit in two counts with having offered to commit for hire acts of sexual intercourse and sodomy. Trial before the court resulted in a finding of guilty and sentence on both counts to the Indiana *5Women’s Prison for not less than two nor more than five years.

¶2It is appellant’s sole contention that the evidence is insufficient to uphold the conviction. A review of the evidence most favorable to the appellee discloses the following: the chief prosecuting witness, one Fred Cipriani, a police officer assigned to the vice squad, saw appellant and four other female subjects standing on the corner of the second hundred block of East Twenty-Fourth Street. Cipriani had stopped in his car for a stop sign when he was approached by one Diane Hamilton who asked if he wanted “to party.” Upon inquiry as to the type of party, Miss Hamilton indicated that for ten dollars she would indulge in a “half and half.” Cipriani was then asked if he wanted a “two-girl party” at which time Miss Hamilton called appellant to the car. Upon learning of the offer and purported acceptance by Officer Cipriani, appellant took the parties to her house on North Talbott. On the way to the house appellant informed Cipriani that he need not worry about the police as they had not yet discovered the fact that she was using the place for such “parties.” Once inside the house Miss Hamilton began undressing but appellant refused to do so until she received the ten dollars agreed upon. Cipriani asked her what the money was for, to which she responded that it was for the same thing Miss Hamilton said she would do. At this point both women were placed under arrest.

¶3As noted, appellant’s only challenge to the conviction is that the evidence was insufficient. More particularly, appellant asserts that there was no offer on her part to commit acts of sexual intercourse or sodomy. Such an offer, however, can .clearly be implied from her actions in conjunction with those of Miss Hamilton. Appellant and Miss Hamilton appeared to be loitering on a street corner. Miss Hamilton approached Cipriani and asked him if he wanted “to party” and that it would cost ten dollars for a “half and half.” Upon the agreement of Cipriani, appellant came along to afford a “two-girl *6party.” She told Cipriani that for her ten dollars she would do the same thing that Miss Hamilton had offered to do.

¶4A “half and half” is defined in Wentworth and Flexner, Dictionary of American Slang 688 (1967) as follows:

“half-and-half [taboo] n. Fellatio followed by conventional sexual intercourse. Orig. prostitute’s use.”

¶5Webster’s Third New Unabridged Dictionary (1961) defines fellatio as “the practice of obtaining sexual satisfaction by oral stimulation of the penis.” Such has been held to be sodomy. Glover v. State (1913), 179 Ind. 459, 101 N. E. 629; Estes v. Estes (1964), 244 Ind. 691, 195 N. E. 2d 471.

¶6The evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom clearly shows that appellant offered to commit acts of sexual intercourse and sodomy. Surely it can not be said that to constitute a violation of the statute (Ind. Ann. Stat §10-4220 (1969 Supp.)), the offer must be express and in precise statutory language. The offer was implicit in appellant’s words and actions when taken in the context in which they occurred. As was said in Burton v. State (1952), 232 Ind. 246, 111 N. E. 2d 892, this court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men.

¶7For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶8Judgment affirmed.

¶9Arterburn and Givan, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., dissents with opinion in which DeBruler, J., concurs with opinion.

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