Iseli v. Clapp’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““On 19 June 1968 she filed ‘supplementary objections’ to the ratification of the sale claiming ‘Laurel did not have title or right to bring foreclosure’ proceedings because (a) M & A ‘did not have the legal capacity to execute a mortgage’ since it held the property ‘as constructive trustee’ for her, and (b) ‘Laurel had notice of the infirmity in’ M & A’s title and was not therefore a bona fide purchaser. Laurel, she went on to allege, knew or should have known that the property was in possession of a person other than the grantor and that the deed to M & A shows ‘it was given for a grossly inadequate consideration.’ ... “On 22 November 1968 Judge Shearin overruled Mrs. Iseli’s objections to the sale____ Filed also was his opinion, excerpts from which follow: ‘The petitioner, as a result of our holding in Equity 33385, may be able to obtain some redress against the perpetrator of the fraud upon her (and her late husband). She will also be entitled to any surplus derived from the foreclosure sale involved herein. ‘While neither of these avenues may lead to complete relief, we must, nevertheless, for the reasons set forth above, ratify the sale objected to herein.’”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hand v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co.

2. “‘[S]he placed properly executed deeds for certain of her properties in the possession of persons who later borrowed on these properties substantial sums of money from apparently innocent third parties. The questions we are concerned with are the rights of these third parties, not the rights of the appellant against the person who induced her to execute these deeds, and as between the appellant and these third parties, the familiar principle that, ‘when one of two persons must suffer loss by action of a third person, the loss should fall on him who has enabled the third person to occasion such loss’ must apply. In this case, the action of the appellant in executing and delivering the deeds enabled Weissenborn to mortgage the properties to the appellees, and, as we think these last named are bona fide holders for value, their claims must prevail as against those of the appellant.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hand v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co.