Nicholson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"We find no merit in the appellant's assignment relative to allowing the district attorney to cross examine him in regard to his recent conviction of the crime of manslaughter... . A majority of the jurisdictions hold a defendant may be impeached by the use of a previous conviction which is on appeal. The basis for so holding is that unless and until the judgment of the trial court is reversed, the defendant stands convicted, is no longer presumed to be innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, and may be impeached by that conviction. Of course, after the conviction has been reversed it cannot be used for impeachment purposes until the defendant is again convicted. When a jury in circuit court returns a verdict of guilty, it is a conviction of the crime charged, and unless and until it is reversed by this Court, the conviction stands, and may be used for impeachment purposes. Bucklew v. State, 192 So.2d 275 (Miss. 1966)." ( 254 So.2d at 883-883 ). [ 347 So.2d at 1319-30 ].”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Milstid v. State · Jackson v. State

2. ““Appellant first contends the trial court was in error in refusing to allow him to fully develop before the jury the circumstances of his arrest in order that he might show that his arrest was illegal. We find no merit in this contention. It is not necessary to pause to ascertain whether his arrest was legal, because assuming his arrest was illegal the trial court was correct in ruling the circumstances of his arrest were immaterial. The state did not use any evidence or a confession obtained by virtue of the arrest. Appellant was indicted by the grand jury, was present in court, and was tried after having been fully apprised of the charges against him. He was convicted in a fair trial in a county where the crime was committed, and the jurisdiction of the court was in no way impaired by the manner in which he was brought before it. Of course, a different situation exists where the state attempts to introduce evidence or a confession obtained as a result of an illegal arrest. Under these circumstances the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine then might well become applicable. Roberts v. State, 186 Miss. 732 , 191 So. 823 (1939); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 , 72 S.Ct. 509 , 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952).” 254 So.2d at 883 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Pasto v. State · 604 So. 2d 280 - Fleming v. State

3. ““In the face of conflicting testimony, the jurors may accept the testimony of some witnesses and refuse that of others, and may accept in part and reject in part the evidence on behalf of the state and on behalf of the accused. Cobb v. State, 235 Miss. 57 , 108 So.2d 719 (1959). The jury accepted the testimony on behalf of the state and it was ample to support their verdict of guilty.” 254 So.2d at 883 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Terry v. State