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255 F. App'x 644

Fain v. Morgan

U.S. Courts of Appeals

Decided November 28, 2007

U.S. Courts of Appeals · decided 2007-11-28

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently March 2014

2 district ·

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“alleging that [the Parole Board officials] violated his due process rights ... at his parole eligibility hearings by relying on the fabricated evidence in denying his parole, [the application does not present a “core” habeas challenge because] the Parole Review Board still could have denied him parole at his review hearing [relying on non-falsified evidence, since] the Parole Review Board bases its decision to grant or deny parole on numerous factors....”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Toolasprashad v. Grondolsky

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 1915 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Heck v. Humphrey · Wilkinson Director Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction et al. v. Dotson et al. · Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2007-11-28

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1 OPINION

PER CURIAM.

¶2 Appellant, Andre Fain, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s orders dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A and denying his motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the District Court’s orders and remand for further proceedings.

¶3 Fain filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Appellees violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence and falsifying documents for use at his parole eligibility hearings, by relying on the fabricated evidence in denying his parole, and by intentionally concealing the fact that such evidence was used at his eligibility hearings. The District Court sua sponte dismissed Fain’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fain filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court also denied. Fain appeals.

¶4 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) is plenary. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.2000).

¶5 The District Court construed Fain’s complaint as asserting that his due process rights were violated at his parole revocation hearing and concluded that Fain must raise his claims in a habeas petition because any challenge to the revocation of his parole would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Fain asserts, however, because his complaint is challenging the constitutionality of his parole review hearings, not the validity of his parole revocation hearing, his claims do not necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement. We agree.

¶6 An inmate may file a § 1983 action for procedural challenges if the action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005). Fain’s complaint is challenging the validity of his parole review hearings, not his parole revocation hearing. In his motion for reconsideration, Fain reiterates that, contrary to the District Court’s interpretation, his complaint does not challenge the validity of his parole revocation hearing, which he concedes was proper. 1 Additionally, in his motion for reconsideration, Fain concedes *645 that, even without the allegedly fabricated evidence, the Parole Review Board still could have denied him parole at his review hearing. We agree. The Parole Review Board bases its decision to grant or deny parole on numerous factors. See N.J. A.D.C. 10A:71-3.11. Accordingly, Fain’s complaint does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement and may be filed pursuant to § 1983. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81, 125 S.Ct. 1242.

¶7 For the foregoing reason, we will vacate the District Court’s orders and remand for further proceedings. Fain’s motion for sanctions is denied. See Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir.1995).

1

¶8 . Even if the claims in Fain's complaint were unclear, the District Court should have informed Fain that he had leave to amend his complaint, especially in light of Fain’s motion *645 for reconsideration. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.2002).

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