Volume 255 — Minnesota Reports

<bold>Constitution — equal-protection clause — purpose</bold>. <block_quote> 1. The purpose of the equal-protection clause of U.S. Const. Amend. <cross_reference>XIV</cross_reference> is to secure every person within the state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.</block_quote> <bold>Taxation — uniformity — requirements</bold>. <block_quote> 2. Uniformity of taxation does not permit the systematic, arbitrary, or intentional valuation of the property of one or a few taxpayers at a substantially higher valuation than that placed on other property of the same class.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 3. Discrimination in the imposition of the tax burden, resulting from systematic, arbitrary, or intentional undervaluation of some property as compared to the valuation of other property in the same class, violates the uniformity clause of Minn. Const. art. <cross_reference>9</cross_reference>, § <cross_reference>1</cross_reference>, and the equal-protection clause of U.S. Const. Amend. <cross_reference>XIV</cross_reference>, even though the property so discriminated against be not assessed higher than its fair market value or higher than the percentage of fair market value adopted as a uniform basis in the making of assessments.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 4. Absolute equality is impracticable of attainment and the taxpayer may not complain unless the inequality is substantial.</block_quote> <bold>Same — assessment officer — presumption of good faith</bold>. <block_quote> 5. The good faith of tax assessment officers and the validity of their actions are presumed, and the burden of proof of overcoming such presumption rests upon the complaining party.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 6. Good faith alone does not, however, justify an assessment which is discriminatory in fact.</block_quote><page_number>Page 65</page_number> <bold>Same — uniformity — requirements</bold>. <block_quote> 7. State v. Cudahy Packing Co. <cross_reference>103 Minn. 419</cross_reference>, <cross_reference>115 N.W. 645</cross_reference>, <cross_reference>1039</cross_reference>, is hereby overruled.</block_quote>

<bold>Evidence — admissibility — conversation with deceased party</bold>. <block_quote> 1. Under M.S.A. <cross_reference>595.04</cross_reference>, it is not competent for a party to an action to give evidence of or concerning any conversation with a deceased party relative to any matter at issue. <italic>Held</italic> this provision applicable notwithstanding survival of other participants in such conversations from both sides of controversy who may contradict fabrications in such testimony. Ehmke v. Hill, <cross_reference>236 Minn. 60</cross_reference>, <cross_reference>51 N.W.2d 811</cross_reference>, limited to situations where witnesses testifying to such conversations are relating conversations adverse to their own interests.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 2. In Pomerenke v. Farmers Life Ins. Co. <cross_reference>228 Minn. 256</cross_reference>, <cross_reference>36 N.W.2d 703</cross_reference>, this court held that intent of legislature in enacting § <cross_reference>595.04</cross_reference> should be given full effect, even though this statute establishes a strict rule of evidence. In view of clear and unambiguous terms of § <cross_reference>595.04</cross_reference>, trial court had no recourse but to apply its provisions here.</block_quote><page_number>Page 99</page_number>

<bold>Appeal and error — appeals to district court — consolidation</bold> <bold>— application of rules of civil procedure</bold>. <block_quote> 1. Since M.S.A. <cross_reference>106.631</cross_reference>, subd. 2(c) — as a part of a special statutory proceeding enumerated in Appendix A of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure — permits the consolidation of appeals to the district court even though such appeals do not <italic>involve a common question of law or fact</italic>, it is inconsistent or in conflict with Rule 42.01 and the latter rule, pursuant to Rule 81.01, is inapplicable.</block_quote> <bold>Trial — cross-examination — adverse party — county in ditch</bold> <bold>proceeding</bold>. <block_quote> 2. Since a county, in a county or judicial ditch proceeding, is not an "adverse party" within the meaning of Rule 43.02, it follows that the ditch engineer, appointed by its board of commissioners, is not subject to call for cross-examination.</block_quote> <bold>Principal and agent — "managing agent" — defined under rules</bold>. <block_quote> 3. Under Rule 43.02, a managing agent of an adverse party must be an agent who is vested with powers and duties which entail some<page_number>Page 116</page_number> discretionary control, management, or supervision of such adverse party's business activities, policies, or employees.</block_quote>

<bold>Habeas corpus — as substitute for appeal or writ of error</bold>. <block_quote> 1. It is elementary that habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for a writ of error or appeal or as a cover for a collateral attack upon a judgment of a competent tribunal which had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the defendant. This principle applies even though defendant has permitted the time for appeal to elapse.</block_quote> <bold>Constitution — due process — right to assistance of counsel</bold>. <block_quote> 2. Relator contends that he has been denied a public trial as guaranteed by U.S. Const. Amend. <cross_reference>VI</cross_reference>, on the grounds that the record fails to show that his waiver of representation of counsel was voluntarily, understandingly, and intelligently exercised, but this amendment does not apply to a state criminal prosecution and therefore we need only consider whether relator has been denied a public trial and the right to have the assistance of counsel in his defense as guaranteed by Minn. Const. art. <cross_reference>1</cross_reference>, § <cross_reference>6</cross_reference>, so as to deprive him of due process of law in violation of U.S. Const. Amend. <cross_reference>XIV</cross_reference>, as well as of Minn. Const. art. <cross_reference>1</cross_reference>, § <cross_reference>7</cross_reference>.</block_quote><page_number>Page 228</page_number> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 3. The purpose of the right to have counsel made available is to protect the accused from a conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 4. Good practice requires that the court before arraignment of the accused inform defendant in precise terms of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel, and that such informative action by the court be at all times made a matter of record.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same — waiver</bold>. <block_quote> 5. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 6. When an accused without counsel acquiesces in a trial resulting in his conviction, and later seeks release, the rule is well settled that the burden rests upon him to establish that he did not voluntarily, understandingly, and intelligently waive his right to assistance of counsel, and the same rule applies to a subsequent claim that the plea was induced by coercion, by threats, or by intimidation.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 7. While the right to counsel, as secured by the due process clause of U.S. Const. Amend. <cross_reference>XIV</cross_reference> in a state prosecution, does not justify forcing counsel upon an accused who wants none, the due process clause invalidates a state court conviction where an unrepresented accused has not voluntarily, understandingly, and intelligently waived the benefit of counsel and where the circumstances show that his rights could not have been fairly protected without counsel.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 8. The record fully supports the findings of the court below that relator waived his rights to the assistance of counsel voluntarily, understandingly, and intelligently.</block_quote>