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255 N.C. 507

121 S.E.2d 882

Stancil v. Stancil

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided October 11, 1961

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1961-10-11

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“. . . Consent judgments for the payment of subsistence to the wife are of two kinds. In one, the court merely approves or sanctions the payments which the husband has agreed to make for the wife’s support and sets them out in a judgment against him. Such a judgment constitutes nothing more than a contract between the parties made with the approval of the court. Since the court itself does not in such case order the payments, the amount specified therein is not technically alimony. In the other, the court adopts the agreement of the parties as its own determination of their respective rights and obligations and orders the husband to pay the specified amounts as alimony. A contract-judgment of the first type is enforceable only as an ordinary contract. It may not be enforced by contempt proceedings and, insofar as it fixes the amount of support for the wife, it cannot be changed or set aside except with the consent of both parties in the absence of a finding that the agreement was unfair to the wife or that her consent was obtained by fraud or mutual mistake. . . . A judgment of the second type, being an order of the court, may be modified by the court at any time changed conditions make a modification right and proper. The fact that the parties have agreed and consented to the amount of the alimony decreed by the court does not take away its power to modify the award or to enforce it by attachment for contempt should the husband wilfully fail to pay it. (Citations.) Alimony is”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 36 N.C. App. 705 - Britt v. Britt

Relies on Barnette v. Woody · City of Goldsboro v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. · Holden v. Holden

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1961-10-11

How this case has been cited

Cited by 30 later decisions — most recently July 1985 · most notably Bunn v. Bunn (1964), Walters v. Walters (1983)

30 state decisions

120196119701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

DeNNy, J.

¶1 The appellant in his case on appeal undertakes to set out six assignments of error. However, no exceptions appear anywhere in the record, not even under the purported assignments of error. Even so, in the absence of any exceptions, or when exceptions have not been *509 preserved in accordance with the requirements of our Rules, the appeal will be taken as an exception to the judgment. Holden v. Holden, 245 N.C. 1, 95 S.E. 2d 118; Barnette v. Woody, 242 N.C. 424, 88 S.E. 2d 223. Therefore, in view of the state of the record on this appeal, we are limited to the question whether or not error appears on the face of the record.

¶2 Where no exceptions have been taken to the admission of evidence or to the findings of fact, such findings are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Goldsboro v. R.R., 246 N.C. 101, 97 S.E. 2d 486; James v. Pretlow, 242 N.C. 102, 86 S.E. 2d 759; Beaver v. Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 82 S.E. 2d 113; Donnell v. Cox, 240 N.C. 259, 81 S.E. 2d 664.

¶3 The defendant argues and contends that a contempt proceeding cannot be based on a consent judgment. Holden v. Holden, supra; Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E. 2d 118; Brown v. Brown, 224 N.C. 556, 31 S.E. 2d 529; Davis v. Davis, 213 N.C. 537, 196 S.E. 819. An examination of these and similar cases reveals that the husband’s obligation to make certain payments was based upon a contract merely sanctioned by the court and the court did not order the payments to be made as it did in the instant case.

¶4 Our cases hold that although a judgment may be entered by consent, based on a written agreement, if such judgment orders and decrees that the husband shall pay certain sums as alimony for the support of his wife, a wilful refusal to make the payments as directed therein will subject the husband in a proper proceeding to attachment for contempt. Dyer v. Dyer, 212 N.C. 620, 194 S.E. 278; Davis v. Davis, supra; Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N.C. 181, 22 S.E. 2d 576; Smith v. Smith, 247 N.C. 223, 100 S.E. 2d 370.

¶5 It will be noted in Davis v. Davis, supra, and Holden v. Holden, supra, the judgment entered in these respective cases did not order and direct the husband to pay anything, but merely recited what the parties had agreed upon. Hence, these and similar cases do not control the factual situation revealed on this record.

¶6 In the instant case, the court ordered that the defendant "pay to the plaintiff alimony and subsistence for herself the sum of $250.00 per month, beginning March 14, 1960, and continuing on the 14th day of each month thereafter until final determination of this action …

¶7 The record does not reveal that the defendant has made any motion for a reduction of the amount of alimony or subsistence, by reason of inability to pay or for any other reason.

¶8 The case of Webster v. Webster, 213 N.C. 135, 195 S.E. 362, cited by the appellant, contains language that would seem to support the defendant’s position. However, an examination of that opinion reveals *510 that the appeal merely involved a construction of the provisions of the consent judgment with respect to the rights of the parties. The question of contempt was not before this Court, and what was said in the opinion with respect to the judgment being nothing more than a contract between the parties, was mere dictum, and we so hold.

¶9 In our opinion, the facts found by the court below are sufficient to support the judgment entered, and no errors appear upon the face of the record which would warrant a reversal or a further hearing.

¶10 The judgment of the court below is

¶11 Affirmed.

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