Spires v. Nix’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"The trouble about the application of this theory [privity of possession, allowing tacking] to the status of complainant in this case is that it contemplates a situation where the prior claimant by adverse possession had not acquired the title to the property at the time of his conveyance to the complainant but only acquired a status of adverse possession which could lead to a title in complainant when tacked to her possession subsequently occurring. If the Robertsons had acquired the title by adverse possession at the time of the conveyance to complainant, that title could only pass to the complainant by a sufficient conveyance or by the status of adverse possession for the required length of time by the complainant subsequent to her conveyance from them."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Motley v. Crumpton · 356 So. 2d 625 - Watson v. Price

2. ““(5). .It is true that sometimes a general description will yield to a particular one but, when so, the particular description must itself be accurate and precise and be of such character as that it was evidently intended to take precedence over the general description. That theory is emphasized in the case of Guilmartin v. Wood, 76 Ala. 204 . “In the case of Sumner v. Hill, 157 Ala. 230 , 47 So. 565 , the description under consideration was of the Hancock Place, followed by a more particular description by government numbers. The question in that case was whether the general description ‘The Hancock Place’ or the government numbers which followed should prevail. Since the government numbers did not embrace all of the Hancock Place, it was held that the term ‘Hancock Place’ is a sufficiently definite description without the aid of a more particular one by government numbers, and the Court declared the principle to be applicable that where a deed of conveyance contains a general description which is definite and certain in itself and followed by a particular description, the latter will not limit or restrict the grant which is clear and unambiguous in the general description. “To the same effect is Pendry [Pendrey] v. Godwin, 188 Ala. 565 , 66 So. 43 . The description there under consideration in the deed was of the place known as the ‘ “Jess Myers Place,” described as follows’ followed by government numbers. It was there observed that it was the manifest purpose of the granto”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Withers v. Burton