¶1concurring specially.
¶2While I concur in the majority’s conclusion that either the Nonresident Motorists Act, OCGA § 40-12-1 et seq., or the Long Arm Statute provision relating to one who commits a tort in this state, OCGA § 9-10-91 (2), may be used to serve a nonresident motorist, I do not agree with the wholesale disapproval of any case dealing with *449the NRMA which states or implies that the NRMA is the “proper method” of obtaining personal service on nonresident motorists “to the extent that this statement states or implies that the NRMA is the exclusive method” of obtaining service without individual analysis of each such case. For example, Rose v. Ryan, 209 Ga. App. 160 (433 SE2d 291) (1993), which I authored, involved a situation in which the only service attempted was by publication under OCGA § 9-11-4 (e) (2). Rosediscusses both appropriate possibilities of service, the NRMA and the Long Arm Statute, finds neither complied with, and appears consistent with the majority’s analysis. Therefore, I object to its disapproval.
¶3I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope, Presiding Judge Smith, and Judge Mikell join in this opinion.