Volume 256 — Illinois Reports

<p>Appeal from the County Court of P'ike county; the Hon. Paul F. Grote, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—qualification of rule that statutory offense may be charged in words .of statute. The rule that it is sufficient to charge a statutory offense in the language of the statute or in terms substantially equivalent thereto is subject to the qualification that the indictment must, either by the statutory description or by other apt words, so identify the offense as to meet the requirements of the constitution.</p> <p>2. Same—legislature may provide that property which is the subject of a crime may be described generally. While the legislature cannot constitutionally enact a law which dispenses with a statement in the indictment of the essential elements of the crime charged against the accused, still it has power to provide that the property which is the subject of the crime may be described in general terms.</p> <p>3. Same—offense of- confidence game is complete without regard to kind or amount of money obtained. Under section 98 of division 1 of the Criminal Code the obtaining of money, in any amount or of any kind or value, by means and use of the confidence game, is an offense the character of which is not affected by the kind or value of the money.</p> <p>4. Same—word "money" in and of itself, imports value. The word “money,” in its ordinary sense, signifies cash or its equivalent, and while it includes coin it is not confined thereto but includes whatever is lawfully current in buying and selling, and such word, in and of itself, imports value.</p> <p>5. Same—when subject of the crime may be described merely as money. It is within the power of the legislature to provide that it shall be sufficient, in charging an offense where the subject of the crime is money and the grade of the offense does not depend upon the amount, to simply use the word “money,” without the addition of other words of particular description.</p> <p>6. Same—statute prescribing form of indictment for obtaining money by means of confidence game is not invalid. Section 99 of division 1 of the Criminal Code, which specifies what shall be sufficient to charge the offense of the confidence game, is not, as to offenses where the subject of the crime is money, alone, in violation of clause 9 of the bill of rights. (Morton v. People, 47 Ill. 468, explained.)</p>

Writ or Error to the Branch “B” Appellate Court for the Eirst District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Homer Abbott, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Municipal corporations—city possesses no inherent power to license any occupation. A city possesses no inherent power to license any occupation, but such power must be expressly granted in its charter or be a necessary incident to the powers so granted.</p> <p>2. Same—city of Chicago had power to pass the Chicago “bakery” ordinance. The term “other provisions,” used in clauses 50 and 53 of section 1 of article 5 of the Cities and Villages act, includes bakery products, and as the city is authorized by said clauses to regulate the sale of such products it has power to license bakeries in connection with their regulation.</p> <p>3. Same—the city of Chicago had power to impose the sanitary regulations prescribed in the “bakery” ordinance. The city of Chicago had power, under clause 78 of section 1 of article 5 of the Cities and Villages act, to impose the sanitary restrictions prescribed by the Chicago “bakery” ordinance, for the preservation of the health of the community and suppression of disease.</p> <p>4. Same—the Chicago “bread” ordinance and Chicago “bakery” ordinance are not in conflict. The passage of the “bread” ordinance by the city of Chicago did not exhaust its power to regulate the sale of bakery products but it had power to subsequently enact the “bakery” ordinance, which is not in conflict with the “bread” ordinance but can be enforced in harmony with' it.</p> <p>5. Same—what does not render Chicago “bakery” ordinance invalid. The fact that the Chicago “bakery” ordinance empowers the commissioner of health to determine whether a bakery license shall be granted and authorizes the mayor to revoke such license if the provisions of the ordinance are not complied with does not render the ordinance invalid, as granting them arbitrary power. (Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 340, followed.)</p>

<p>1. Special assessments—area of tracts assessed is not the only basis for assessment. The area of the tracts to be specially assessed may be considered along with the frontage of the tracts on the line of the proposed improvement, and other circumstances, in determining the question of benefits; but it would be as invalid to make an arbitrary assessment on the basis of area, alone, as upon the single basis of frontage.</p> <p>2. Same—what is not ground for modifying assessment. It is presumed that the superintendent of special assessments has performed his duty in spreading the assessment, and the assessment will not be modified, annulled or re-cast merely because there is a difference of opinion as to whether the officer exercised sound judgment in spreading it, unless the assessment is clearly inequitable or unjust or his action was so improper as to amount to fraud.</p> <p>3. Same—when failure to assess elevated railway is not fatal. The facts that the space occupied by the columns supporting an elevated railroad structure is excepted from the improvement and that no assessment is spread against the property of the elevated railroad company are not fatal to the assessment, where the proof does not make such a case of special benefit to the company as shows negligent or improper conduct by the superintendent of special assessments in omitting the property of the company from assessment.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. AdElor J. PETIT, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Burnt records—burden is upon defendant to show validity of his tax deeds. In a burnt records proceeding it is not necessary for the petitioner to set out that the title claimed by the defendant is invalid and wherein it is invalid, but the burden is upon the defendant to show the validity of tax deeds under which he claims.</p> <p>2. Same—when holder of certificates of tax sales is not entitled to reimbursement. The holder of certificates of tax sales upon which the time for the execution of deeds has expired is not entitled to reimbursement in a burnt records proceeding, as such certificates show, on their face, that they are void under section 225 of the Revenue act.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Dokrance Dibell, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch “B” Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Arthur H. ChETlain, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Municipal corporations—municipal corporation cannot buy land at tax sale unless authorised by statute. A municipal corporation, in the absence of an enabling statute, has no authority to become the purchaser of land at a tax sale, and the mere general power of a city to buy and hold real estate does not authorize such purchase. • -</p> <p>2. Same—section 72 of Local Improvement act permits city to buy lots at tax sale. Section 72 of the Local Improvement act authorizes a city, in default of other bidders, to purchase real estate at a sale for taxes or special assessments in which the city is interested.</p> <p>3. Same—city does not acquire tax lien by buying lots at tax sale. Under the Illinois statutes the lien existing upon real property for unpaid taxes or special assessments is a lien in favor of the people of the State, and a sale of the land for the amount of the unpaid taxes or assessments extinguishes such lien, whether the purchaser is a private individual or a municipal corporation.</p> <p>4. Tax deeds—mle that the holder cannot be reimbtirsed out of condemnation award applies to city. The rule that the holder of an invalid tax deed is not entitled to reimbursement out of the money awarded as compensation under the Eminent Domain law, applies where a city is the holder of such a deed as well as where the holder is an individual. (City of Chicago v. Pick, 251 Ill. 594, and O’Connell v. Sanford, 255 id. 49, followed.)</p>

<p>1. Practice—inquiry where Appellate Court reverses because of its finding of facts. Where the Appellate Court reverses a judgment of the trial court as a result of finding the facts in controversy different from the finding of the trial court and recites in the final judgment the facts so found, such finding is by the statute made conclusive, and the Supreme Court can only inquire whether the law was properly applied to the facts so found.</p> <p>2. Same—presumption as to facts not recited in the Appellate Courfs judgment. Where the Appellate Court reverses a judgment and recites certain facts in its judgment, it will be presumed that all facts not so recited were found by the Appellate Court the same as they were found by the trial court.</p> <p>3. Same—inquiry where Appellate Courfs reversal is based on its conclusion of law. Where the facts recited by the Appellate Court were not controverted but were admitted in the trial court but the judgment is reversed because the Appellate Court’s conclusion of law as to the defendant’s liability differs from that of the trial court, the inquiry in the Supreme Court is whether the Appellate Court was correct in its' conclusion of law, and if so, its judgment should be affirmed.</p> <p>4. Carriers—what provision in receipt is an attempt to limit common law liability. A provision in an express company’s receipt limiting the amount of liability to a certain sum less than the value of the goods, in case no valuation is given, is an attempt by the express company to limit its common law liability.</p> <p>5. Same—a shipper has no implied authority to bind consignee by contract limiting liability. A shipper has no implied authority to bind the consignee by a contract which limits the amount of the carrier’s liability to a fixed sum, unless the value is stated in the receipt, even though the goods are of greater value.</p> <p>6. Same—when shipper acts as agent for consignee in taking a receipt. Where goods are ordered from a dealer to be shipped by express, without naming any particular carrier, and the dealer separates the goods from his stock and packs them in a bundle marked with the consignee’s address and delivers the bundle to the express company, the title to the goods passes to the consignee, and in taking the carrier’s receipt the shipper acts as consignee’s agent.</p> <p>7. Same—shipper has no implied authority to make an unlawful contract for consignee. A shipper has no implied authority to bind the consignee by entering into an unlawful contract limiting the carrier’s common law liability, for the purpose of obtaining a lower rate of transportation than would otherwise be chargeable under the Inter-State Commerce act and the Elkins law.</p> <p>8. Same—a contract repugnant to public policy zuill not be enforced. A contract which is valid in the State where it is made but which is to be performed partly in that State and partly in Illinois, will not be enforced in Illinois if it is repugnant to the public policy, laws and institutions of this State and is expressly prohibited by our statutes.</p> <p>9. Same—limitation upon common law liability cannot rest on provision in receipt for goods. A limitation upon the common law liability of a carrier cannot rest upon any provision in a receipt given for the goods but must have the assent of the shipper, whether found in the receipt or in a bill of lading, and an agent has no implied authority to make such a contract for a citizen of this State.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch “B” Appellate Court for the Eirst District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John H. Hume, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ op Error to the Branch “B” Appellate Court for the First District ¡—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Ben M. Smith, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ op Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. George Kersten, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Albert C. Barnes, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Branch “B” Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Albert C. Barnes, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Dram-shops—there is no inherent right to carry on business of selling intoxicating liquor. There is no inherent right to carry on the business of selling intoxicating liquor, and the State may regulate the business or entirely prohibit it.</p> <p>2. Same—in Illinois the power of cities over dram-shops is coextensive with that of the State. In Illinois the power conferred upon cities to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor is co-extensive with that of the State, and includes authority to adopt any reasonable means to reduce the evils of the business, which do not violate constitutional rights.</p> <p>3. Same—power to license, regulate and prohibit must be exercised by ordinance. The power to license, regulate and prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor can be exercised only by an ordinance, and such ordinance must be a general one, specifying the manner and conditions of the issue of the license and the power conferred by it, and must be uniform in its operation upon persons within its scope.</p> <p>4. Same—legislature cannot authorize cities to make an unreasonable discrimination. The legislature cannot confer upon cities a power it does not possess, and cannot, therefore, authorize a discrimination between individuals not founded on a reasonable difference in conditions.</p> <p>5. Same—city has power to limit number of saloons within its boundaries. A city has power to limit the number of saloons within its boundaries, and the fact that such limitation prevents some persons from keeping saloons who might do so if no limitation existed is merely an incidental effect, which does not impair their constitutional rights.</p> <p>6. Same—effect where ordinance limits the number of saloon licenses. Where an ordinance limits the number of saloon licenses which may be issued in a city everybody has an equal right to apply for such a license, and if there are more applicants than there are licenses to be issued, the mayor has a reasonable discretion to determine the licensees.</p> <p>7. Same—statute limits life of a dram-shop license to the municipal year. In conferring upon cities and villages the power to license and prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor the legislature prohibited the issuance of a license to extend beyond the municipal year in which it is granted, and no discretion is vested in such cities or villages in that "regard.</p> <p>8. Same—a license from year to year is the same as a perpetual license. The right to a renewal of a dram-shop license from year to year, upon compliance with the ordinances of the city, is not different, in substance, from the right to a perpetual license, subject to the ordinances of the city.</p> <p>9. Same—when renewal provision of a dram-shop ordinance is invalid. A provision in an ordinance giving to the holder of a dram-shop license an absolute right to a renewal upon compliance with the city ordinances, and giving the same right to an assignee of the holder or his legal representatives, and authorizing successive assignments, is contrary to the statute limiting the life of a license to the municipal year in which the license was granted, and is invalid.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. TuThill, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. M. GridlEy, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Constitutional law—section 18 of Torrens law does not violate section 22 of article 4 of constitution. Section 18 of the Torrens law, relating to the admission in evidence of copies of abstracts of title, is not in violation of section 22 of article 4 of the constitution, which provides that in all cases where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted. (Waugh v. Glos, 246 Ill. 604, followed.)</p> <p>2. Same—the Torrens law is not local because operative only in counties adopting it. The Torrens law is not unconstitutional as a local law. because it is in force only in Cook county, as the law is applicable to all-counties if adopted by a vote of the people.</p> <p>3. Registration oE titles—when failure to re-publish notice after amendment of petition is not fatal. Failure to re-publish the notice after amendment of the description of the lots as given in the application is not fatal, where all the parties who had or claimed to have any interest in the lots were personally served by summons or entered their appearance in writing.</p>

<p>1. Drainage—purpose of amendment of 1909 to section 59 of Levee act. The purpose of the amendment of 1909 to section 59 of the Levee act was to provide a method whereby, upon the application of a majority of the adult land owners owning one-third of the lands in a proposed sub-district or upon application of one-third of the adult land owners owning a major part of the lands, a sub-district may be established which shall include all the lands of the sub-district, regardless of whether the owners sign the application or the proposed drains and ditches cross their lands.</p> <p>2. Same—extent to which sub-district may be formed upon application of some owner or owners. Under section 59 of the Levee act, both prior to and subsequent to its amendment in 1909, a sub-district may be organized upon application of “some owner or owners,” which shall include their own lands, but they cannot force into the district other lands not crossed by the proposed ditches and drains, without the consent of the owners of such lands.</p> <p>3. Same—when the county court cannot organize sub-district. Under section 59 of the Levee act, as amended in 1909, the county court is without jurisdiction to organize a sub-district embracing all lands therein, including those of owners who have not signed the application and which are not crossed by the proposed ditches and drains, unless the application is signed by a majority of the adult land owners owning one-third of the lands in the proposed sub-district or by one-third of the adult land owners owning a major part of the lands.</p> <p>4. Same—right of county court to allow signatures to be withdrawn upon hearing. Upon the hearing of an application to organize a sub-district under section 59 of the Levee act, the county court may purge the application of signatures improperly or fraudulently attached thereto, and may, in a proper case, permit signatures to be withdrawn where changes detrimental to the signers have been made in the plans since they attached their signatures; and in the absence of any showing to the contrary it will be presumed that the county court properly exercised its discretion in permitting signatures to be withdrawn.</p> <p>5. Same—what does not prevent the organization of new sub-district. Where the Supreme Court has held that a large proportion of the lands embraced in a sub-district have been improperly included therein, and the effect of such holding is to practically destroy such sub-district, the commissioners may abandon the sub-district and a new one may be established in the same territory by the county court upon a properly signed application and a proper report of the commissioners.</p> <p>6. Same—commissioners cannot be required to Hie an itemised statement on organising sub-district. Upon the hearing of an application to organize a sub-district under section 59 of the Levee act the commissioners cannot be compelled to file an itemized statement of prior receipts and disbursements, as the provisions of section 37 of such act requiring such itemized statement do not apply to a proceeding for the establishment of a sub-district.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Montgomery county; the Hon. Thomas M; Jett, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appear from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. L. D. Puterbaugh, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Original petition for mandamus.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane county; the Hon. Mazzini Slusser, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Deeds—manual possession of deed by a voluntary grantee is not essential to conveyance of title. The manual possession of a deed by a voluntary grantee is not necessary to the conveyance of title if he had knowledge oí the execution and recording of the deed and assented to it; and such assent is evidenced by the fact that he subsequently mortgaged part of the property.</p> <p>2. Same—recital of consideration cannot be contradicted to invalidate deed. The recital of consideration in a deed cannot be contradicted by parol for the purpose of invalidating the deed.</p> <p>3. Executors and administrators—when administrator may purchase land at foreclosure sale. An administrator may lawfully purchase for himself, at a foreclosure sale, land which the intestate formerly owned but which he had conveyed before his death.</p> <p>4. Same—what does not show a sale by administrator to himself. The facts that the purchaser at an administrator’s sale was the deputy county clerk under the administrator, and that he sold the land to the administrator some time later for the price he paid, does not show that the sale was by the administrator to himself, where the evidence shows that the purchaser paid the amount of his bid and that there was no collusion or understanding between him and the administrator.</p> <p>5. Homestead—there is no estate of homestead in land upon which householder does not reside. A householder has no estate of homestead in a tract of land to which he has title but upon which he does not reside, and none survives to his widow and children at his death.</p>

<p>Deeds—when a decree setting aside deed will be affirmed. A decree setting aside a deed will be affirmed where the evidence, although conflicting, establishes that the grantor was old and afflicted with paralysis; that she died of total paralysis ten days after executing the deed; that she was physically and mentally feeble and susceptible to the influence of the grantee and his wife, with whom she was living; that the grantee was active in procuring the execution of the deed and an order for the destruction of the grantor’s will, which disposed of the property to'the grantor’s church, and that the grantor was unable to read or write and signed both the deed and the order by making her mark.</p>

<p>1. Costs—determination of title is not merely incidental to a partition suit. The rule that costs cannot be awarded against the owner of a tax title where the removal of the cloud is only incidental to the relief sought does not apply to a partition suit, where the determination of titles is not merely incidental.</p> <p>2. Same—provision of the Partition act for apportioning costs construed. The provision of the Partition act for apportioning costs and solicitors’ fees among the parties in interest, where the rights of all parties are properly set forth, does not refer to contests between the real owners and one having1 no interest but claiming an interest which constitutes a cloud upon the title and which must be removed, and does not require the owners to pay the costs made by an unsuccessful assailant of the title.</p> <p>3. Same—when cost of reference to the master is properly adjudged against the holder of tax titles. Where the only issue in a partition suit requiring a reference to the master is .as to the validity of tax deeds and the amount in which the holder is entitled to be reimbursed, it is proper, upon holding the tax deeds to be invalid and as constituting clouds, to adjudge the costs of the reference to the holder of such deeds, provided a sufficient tender was made and refused before order of reference was made.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch “B” Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. George A. Dupuy, - Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Ejectment—when it is not necessary to prove title in the common source. Where both parties claim title through a common source, as provided in section 25 of the Ejectment act, it is not necessary to prove title in the common source but only from the common source.</p> <p>2. Appeals and errors—when damages cannot be assessed although the appeal is prosecuted for delay. Where a judgment in ejectment is affirmed on consideration of the errors assigned no damages can be assessed, even though it is apparent the appeal was prosecuted merely for delay, as section 23 of the Costs act applies only to judgments or decrees for the payment of money and section 101 of the Practice act only to cases of dismissal or affirmance for want of prosecution or failure to file an authenticated copy of the record.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Branch “B” Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Lockwood Honoré, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Kickham Scanlan, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John B. Owens, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Superior Court of Cook county ; the Hon. Richard E. Buricp, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ or Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. William H. McSurely, Judge, presiding.-</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; •the Hon. John R. Caverly, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Witnesses—extent to which husband may testify in a suit by wife. In a suit by a wife to set aside a contract of settlement made between her and the executors of her father’s will concerning her separate property, her husband, who was present when the contract was executed, is competent to testify as to the condition the contract was in at that time and may testify to any statements made to him by the executors, and is also competent to testify, in rebuttal, concerning statements which the executors testified that he made to them.</p> <p>2. Same—when conversation not in presence of complainant is inadmissible. In a chancery case, where the question whether certain names in a type-written contract were crossed out before or after the execution of the instrument, it. is improper to allow the stenographer, who has testified that she crossed out the names, at the direction of the party who dictated the contract, immediately after writing them, to testify to a conversation with such person with reference to the matter, where the complainant was not present at the time.</p> <p>3. Same—zvidow cannot testify to matter learned only by reason of the marital relation. In a suit to set aside a settlement contract between the complainant and the executors of her father’s will, the testator’s widow is incompetent to testify as to any fact or transaction the knowledge of which she could have acquired only by reason of being the testator’s wife.</p>

<p>1. Wires—rule as to giving peremptory instruction in a will contest case is the same as in suits at lavo. The same rule applies with reference to giving a peremptory instruction in a suit to contest a will as obtains in jury trials in actions at law, and the question presented by the motion for such instruction is whether there is any evidence fairly tending to prove the cause of action or fact affirmed.</p> <p>2. Same—when issue of undue influence should go to the jury. Proof that a son of the testator, the latter being ill at the time, took him in a buggy fifteen miles to a certain city on the pretense of seeing a doctor and there procured the execution of a will, by which he was largely benefited and his elder brother practically disinherited, is sufficient to require the submission of the issue of undue influence to the jury.</p> <p>3. Evidence—widow cannot testify as to the physical condition of the testator. In a suit to contest a will the testator’s widow is not a competent witness to testify as to the testator’s condition of health in the latter part of his life and to certain of his habits during that time, as she is not competent to testify to any fact or transaction the knowledge of which was obtained by reason of the marriage relation.</p> <p>4. Same—what may be testified to by widow in a will contest case. In a will contest case the testator’s widow may testify that a son, who was largely benefited by the will, called frequently at the house for some months before the will was executed, and that on the morning the will was executed he came to the house and took his father away in a buggy for the alleged purpose of consulting a physician, and that they returned late in the evening.</p> <p>5. Same—when objection to offer of evidence is properly sustained. In a will contest case it is proper to sustain an objection to an offer to make certain proof by the testator’s widow, where the offer as made contains matters concerning which the widow is not competent to testify though competent to testify as to the other matters.</p> <p>6. Undue influence—exent to which inequality of distribution may be considered. While the inequality of the distribution of property is not, in itself, evidence of undue influence, it may be considered as a circumstance in connection with other proofs on the subject.</p>

<p>1. Special assessments—a supplemental assessment cannot be levied if ordinance under which work was done was void. If the ' ordinance under which the work was done is merely defective or insufficient a supplemental assessment to pay for the work may be levied under sections 57 and 58 of the Local Improvement act, but if the ordinance was void no supplemental assessment can be levied.</p> <p>2. Same—when ordinance under which work was done is void. Where the ordinance under which a pavement is laid illegally attempts to assess as public benefits the cost of paving a strip which a street railway was bound to pave at its expense, the ordinance is not merely defective but void, and no supplemental assessment can be levied under a new ordinance, which provides for a pavement of the same width as that provided for .in the original ordinance but omits the strip in question.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District ,•—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon county; the Hon. William C. Johns, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Bureau county; the Hon. Joe A. Davis, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Montgomery county; the Hon. John L. Dryer, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. Arthur H. Erost, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. A. W. Deselm, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Saline county; the Hon. K. C. Ronalds, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—effect of amendment of section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act in 1911. The effect of the amendment of section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act, in 1911, was to do away with the necessity of there being some contingency upon which to base an additional road and bridge tax levy and to substitute therefor a reason certified by the highway commissioners to the board of town auditors and the assessor and consented to by them.</p> <p>2. Same—effect of sections 13 and 14 of Roads and Bridges act as. those sections now stand. Since the amendment, in 1911, of section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act, the effect of sections 13 and 14 now is, that the highway commissioners may levy a tax of thirty-six cents on the $100 for road and bridge purposes and to pay outstanding orders, and that an additional tax, not exceeding twenty-five cents on the $100, may be levied for such purposes with the written consent of the board of town auditors and the assessor, upon the filing of a certificate by the highway commissioners stating the reason for such additional levy.</p> <p>3. Constitutional law—the legislature may classify cities on basis of population. The legislature may lawfully classify cities on the basis of population and enact laws applicable to each class, provided there is a reasonable ground for the classification in view of the objects and purposes to be accomplished by the legislation.</p> <p>4. Same—proviso to section 1 of the Hospital act, concerning .taxes, is not invalid. The proviso to section 1 of the Hospital act, added to such section in 1911, (Laws of 191.1, p. 147,) to the effect that the annual hospital tax of three mills on the dollar shall not, in cities of over fifteen hundred inhabitants, be included in the aggregate amount fixed by section i of article 8 of the Cities and Villages act which can lawfully be levied for all corporate purposes, exclusive of bonded indebtedness and interest, is not invalid, as being special legislation.</p>

<p>1. Wills—rule as to jurisdiction to construe wills involving no trust. Courts of equity have always had the power to construe wills, but prior to the act of igii, which provides that such courts may hear and determine bills to construe wills notwithstanding no trust is involved, it was not proper to exercise the power if no trust was involved; but if the power was exercised the decree was not void, but was binding until reversed on appeal or writ of error.</p> <p>2. Same—effect upon contingent remainder where ividow relinquishes life estate. Where real estate is devised to the widow for life with a contingent remainder over, but she elects to take, under the statute, one-half the real estate in fee, the life estate in .the other half is relinquished by such election but the contingent remainder is not thereby destroyed.</p> <p>3. Same—rule where a devisee exercises his right of election. Where a legatee or devisee having a right of election exercises such right, the court will take hold of that which is relinquished, to compensate, as far as may be, the disappointed devisees, and equity will sequester the devise or bequest renounced and apply it in place of the devises or bequests defeated.</p> <p>4. Same—widow’s renunciation of will does not destroy the will. The fact that the widow chooses to renounce the provisions of the will in her favor and take under the statute does not destroy the will nor render any part of the estate intestate, but under the statute legacies and bequests are to be equalized and the property not taken by the widow passes by the will.</p> <p>5. Judicial sales—purchaser at partition sale has a right to rely. upon the decree. A purchaser at a partition sale who is not a party to the record has a right to rely upon the decree and is not required to look beyond the question of jurisdiction, and even if there is error in the decree for which it might be reversed he is entitled to protection.</p> <p>6. Same—court may summarily require bidder to pay his bid. Where a bidder at a partition sale refuses to comply with the terms of the sale the court may order a re-sale at his risk and hold him liable for any loss, or it may summarily require him to pay the amount of his bid by entering an order to that effect and enforcing such order.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. Lawrence T. Allen, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Wills—when a verdict finding testator was of sound mind •will be sustained. Where the Supreme Court reverses a decree in a contested will case upon the ground the evidence does not show that the testator was of unsound mind, as found by the verdict, a decree entered upon the second trial finding that the testator was of sound mind will be sustained, where the only additional evidence offered on the part of the contestant is of the same character and is no more conclusive than the testimony at the first trial.</p> <p>2. SamL—what is necessary in absence of direct proof of undue influence. In the absence of direct or positive proof of undue influence there must be evidence of such facts that the inference of the existence of undue influence may be naturally and reasonably drawn therefrom.</p> <p>3. Same—what does not require submission of issue of undue influence to jury. Testimony of a witness that he saw the testator’s wife and son, both of whom were substantial beneficiaries of the will, in company with the testator at the office of the lawyer who drew the will, on the day the will was executed, does not require the issue of undue influence by them to be submitted to the jury, where there is no proof tending to show that they influenced the making of the will or exercised any control over the testator in the management of his affairs and property. .</p> <p>4. Instructions—when refusal of a correct instruction will not reverse. Refusal of a correct instruction asked by the defeated party in a will contest case will not justify a reversal of the decree where the substance of the refused instruction is contained in .another instruction given at his request, even though the latter is not so explicit as the refused instruction.</p>

<p>1. Elections—name of a candidate cannot appear on different tickets on same ballot. Section 8 of the Ballot law, as amended in 1903, prohibits the name of a candidate from appearing upon the ballot under the name of more than one party or group of petitioners for the same office.</p> <p>2. Same—Primary Election law did not repeal section 8 of the Ballot law. Sections 58 and 59 of the Primary Election law of 1910 did not repeal, by implication, the provisions of section 8 of the Ballot law, prohibiting the name of a candidate from appearing upon the ballot under the name of more than one party or group of petitioners.</p> <p>3. Same—provisions of section 8 of Ballot law do not violate constitutional rights of candidates or voters. The provisions of section 8 of the Ballot law which prohibit the name of a candidate from appearing upon more than one ticket on the ballot for the same' office do not violate the constitutional rights of candidates or voters, as such provisions give each candidate the same opportunity to have his name upon the ballot once on the ticket of the party of his choice, and give every voter an opportunity to vote for him, and neither the candidate nor the voter has a constitutional right to demand more.</p> <p>4. Same—provisions of section 8 of Ballot law do not constitute an arbitrary discrimination. The provisions of section 8 of the Ballot law prohibiting the name of a candidate from appearing more than once on the ballot for the same office do not constitute an unconstitutional and arbitrary discrimination between political parties and between the voters of the different parties.</p> <p>5. Same—elections are subject to legislative control within the constitutional limitations. While the constitution requires all elections to be free and equal and all votes to be by ballot, yet the .legislature may prescribe the form of the ballot and provide for its custody and distribution, and may provide the method of conducting elections, and adopt such practicable regulations as will secure a full and fair expression of the will of the voters.</p> <p>6. Same—all reasonable and appropriate regulations concerning elections are constitutional. All regulations which tend to secure the integrity, secrecy and fairness of the ballot interfere to some extent with the convenience of the voter, but so long as they are reasonable and appropriate to the end sought and bear equally upon the voters they are constitutional.</p> <p>7. Same—object of the official ballot. The object of the official ballot is not to furnish the voters with information regarding the persons who are candidates of their respective parties or of any party, but to enable the voters readily to indicate, in the prescribed form, the candidates of their individual choice.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—village tax is void if original ordinance is Med with the county clerk. The statute requires the filing of a certified copy of the village tax levy ordinance with the county clerk as his authority for extending the tax, and the tax is void if the original ordinance is filed with the county clerk instead of a certified copy.</p> <p>2. Same—when amendment cannot be made at hearing. If the document filed with the county clerk as his authority for extending village taxes purports, on its face, to be the original tax levy ordinance, and there is nothing to indicate or from which it may be inferred that it is a copy, there is no authority for allowing an amendment on the hearing to show that it is a certified copy.</p>

<p>Taxes—what items of county and city taxes are not saved from reduction as the “road and bridge” taxes. The “road and bridge taxes” which section 2 of the amended Revenue law excludes from reduction and from the consideration of the county clerk in determining what taxing district has the highest aggregate rate per cent of taxes, are those, only, which are authorized by statute to be levied under the express designation of “road and bridge taxes” and separately certified to the county clerk to be extended as such, and the term does not include an item of the county tax based upon an appropriation for roads and bridges or an item of a city tax based upon an appropriation for streets, alleys and sidewalks.</p>

<p>1. Drainage—what constitutes a connection with ditches of a district. To constitute a connection, within the meaning of section 58 of the Levee act, it is not required that each owner shall dig a ditch from his own land to the ditches of the district, and if an owner of land adjoining the district makes a ditch leading from his land to, and draining the water therefrom into, the district ditches, and other land owners construct ditches on their lands connecting therewith so as to form a continuous line through which the waters from the said lands are drained into the district ditches, there is a connection within the meaning of the statute.</p> <p>2. Same—one owner cannot subject lands of others to inclusion in district. One land owner cannot, by connecting with the district drains a ditch from his own land, which carries water coming from the lands of others who have done nothing to connect their drains with the district, subject the lands of such owners to inclusion in the district.</p> <p>3. Same—what does not constitute connection within meaning of statute. If there is a natural water-course through lands, into which they are drained and through which the waters from such lands ultimately find their way into the ditches of the district, such condition does not constitute a connection, within the meaning of section 58 of the Levee act.</p> <p>4. Same—section 58 of Devee act does not require both con- . nection and benefits. Section 58 of the Levee act, concerning the annexation of lands to a district, which provides that lands shall be deemed to have made voluntary application to be included in the district where the owners thereof have connected them with the drains of the district or where the lands are or will be benefited by the work of the district, does not require that there shall be both connection and benefits; and if there is connection within the meaning of the statute, it is unnecessary to prove that the lands so connected are or will be benefited.</p> <p>5. Statutes—when the word “and” will not be substituted for “or.” While the word “and” is sometimes substituted for “or” in the construction of statutes or contracts or wills, to effectuate the intention, yet this will not be done unless it is necessary to prevent an absurdity or unreasonable result.</p>

<p>1. Municipal corporations—when authority of agent to sign contract for municipal corporation need not be proved. If an instrument purporting to be executed by a municipal corporation is such an instrument as the municipality could, under any circumstances, execute, and its execution is not denied by a verified plea, it is not necessary to prove the authority of the agent who signed the same on behalf of the municipality.</p> <p>2. Pleading—stipulation to introduce all proof under general issue does not waive requirement of verified plea. A stipulation that the defendants may introduce, under the general issue, proof of all matters which might be offered if they had been specially pleaded, does not cover such pleas as are required by the Practice act to be verified by affidavit.</p> <p>3. Contracts—zwhen defendant is estopped to deny validity of contract. Where a bridge company which has entered into a contract with a county to build a bridge refuses to perform the contract upon the ground that one of its officers made a mistake in his figures, which made the bid of the company too low, it is estopped, in a subsequent suit to recover the loss to the county, to change its ground and deny the validity of the contract.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—property of a railroad must be described so that it can be located. Section 42 of the Revenue act prescribes the form for describing railroad property for taxation, and while it- is not necessary to strictly follow the statute, yet the property of a railroad company denominated “railroad track” should be so described that it may be located by a competent surveyor.</p> <p>2. Same—when the court is without jurisdiction to render a tax judgment against railroad property. Where railroad property is described merely as “Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company.—Railroad tracks composed of the right of way, main track, second main track and turn-out, and the stations and improvements of said railway company on such right of way,” the county court is without jurisdiction to enter a judgment for taxes, even though the railroad company appears and files objections to the merits of the taxes, where no amendment of the description was made, as the proceeding is in rem and not in personam.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John P. McGoorty, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal- from the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John E. Owens, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. Lawrence T. Allen, Judge, presiding.</p>

Appear from the Branch “B” Appellate Court for the First District ;■—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Edward M. Mangan, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John E. Owens, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John J. Rooney, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes-—when provisions of amended section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act are complied ivith. If the highway commissioners certify the need of an additional road and bridge tax and the reason therefor, and the board of town auditors and the assessor consent thereto in writing, the provisions of section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act, as amended in 1911, are complied with.</p> <p>2. Same—proviso to section 1 of Hospital act, concerning hospital tax, is not invalid. The proviso, added in 1911, to section 1 of the Hospital act, (Laws of 1911, p. 147,) which authorizes the three-mill hospital tax, in cities having over fifteen hundred inhabitants, to be in addition to the limit of taxes for all corporate purposes imposed by section 1 of article 8 of the Cities and Villages act, is based upon a reasonable classification and is not invalid. (People v. DeKalb and Great Western Railroad Co. [ante, p. 290,] followed.)</p>

<p>1. Taxes—objector must overcome the prima facie case made by the People. Upon application for judgment and order of sale for delinquent taxes the objector has the burden of overcoming the prima facie case made by the People.</p> <p>2. Same—one claiming that board of supervisors did not act on certificates and delinquent lists must prove his claim. One objecting to road and bridge taxes on the ground that the certificates of the highway commissioners were not delivered to the supervisor and laid before and acted upon by the board of supervisors, and that the delinquent lists of the overseers of highways were not laid before the board of supervisors and acted upon, must prove those facts, - as they will not be inferred.</p> <p>3. Same—what does not overcome presumption that board of supervisors acted legally. To overcome the presumption that the board of supervisors, at its September meeting, performed the duties enjoined by law in the matter of acting upon the certificates of highway commissioners, it is not sufficient to introduce in evidence a portion, only, of the record of the proceedings of the board, even though it might be inferred from the portion introduced that the board had disregarded such duty.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Grundy county; the Hon. George Bedeord, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes-—item of $io;ooo “for court house claims’J is too indefinite. An item in the county tax levy of $10,000 “for court house claims” is too indefinite, as it cannot be told what claims it is intended to cover.</p> <p>2. Same—determination of authorities as to necessity for additional road tax is now final. The evident intention of the amendment to section 14 of the Roads and Bridges law was to leave it to the discretion of the board of town auditors and the assessor to determine whether a sufficient reason is shown for an additional road and bridge tax, and their determination of that question is now final.</p>

<p>1. Contracts—when an agreement to re-convey is not a mere option. A written agreement by the purchaser of land to re-convey the same to the vendor at a certain time and for a fixed price is not, when executed as a part of the consideration for the conveyance, a mere voluntary option which the purchaser may rescind before acceptance, but is a binding agreement to re-convey upon compliance with the terms therein set forth.</p> <p>2. Same—what does not invalidate sufficiency of notice of election to re-purchase land. The fact that the promisee’s notice to the promisor of his intention to re-purchase the land under the terms of an agreement to re-convey calls upon the promisor to go to a certain place for the money where he could not be required to go under the contract does not destroy the effect of the instrument as notice of the promisee’s election to re-purchase the land.</p> <p>3. Same—when it is not the promisee’s duty to prepare a deed. Under a contract whereby the purchaser of land agrees to re-convey the same at a certain time and for a fixed price upon compliance with the terms of the contract, and to give a warranty deed “free from all liens and demands, the current lease of the premises, if any, not to exceed one year from the first day of March, 1912, excepted,” it is the duty of the promisor to prepare and execute the deed; and he cannot lawfully refuse to perform the contract because the deed prepared and tendered by the promisee for execution omitted the reservation as to the lease, which omission the promisee’s attorney offered to supply in the deed before its execution.</p>

<p>Taxes—no contingency need,. exist to authorise an additional road and bridge tax. Since the amendment, in 1911, of section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act it is no longer necessary that a contingency shall exist to authorize an additional levy for road and bridge purposes, but the same is authorized if the highway commissioners certify the reason for the levy to the board of town auditors and the assessor and they consent thereto in writing.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Lawrence county; the Hon. J. A. Benson, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Original petition for mandamus.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. A. W. DESELM, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Iroquois county; the Hon. John H. Gillán, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Registration or title—when speciñc objection to admission of abstracts of title cannot be urged. Where the defendant to an application to register title does not object to the admission in evidence of an abstract of title or to the preliminary proof but asks and obtains permission to file objections later, he is not entitled, after the applicant’s testimony is closed, to urge before the examiner specific objections, in writing, which should have been made orally at the time the evidence was offered.</p> <p>2. Same—exceptions to examiner’s report must .be as speciñc as exceptions to report of master in chancery. Exceptions to the report of an examiner of titles must not be so general as to require a search through the evidence to ascertain whether they are well taken, but must point out the evidence objected to and the reasons for the objections.</p> <p>3. Constitutional law—section 18 of Torrens law is not unconstitutional. Section 18 of the Torrens law, concerning the admission in evidence of abstracts of title or certified copies thereof, is not unconstitutional. (Brooke v. Glos, 243 Ill. 392, Waugh v. Glos, 246 id. 604, and Tower v. Glos, ante, p. 121, followed.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. A. W. Deselm, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the Branch “D” Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Samuel C. Stough, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Probate Court of Madison county; the Hon. J. P. StrBuber, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Taxes—reason given fof- an additional road tax need not be a definite specification of a particular purpose. Under section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act, as amended in 1911, the reason stated in the certificate for an additional road tax need not be a definite specification of a particular purpose as distinguished from general road and bridge purposes.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. Edgar ErdredgE, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Whiteside county; the Hon. William A. Blodgett, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Iroquois county; the Hon. John H. Gillan, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of White county; the Hon. Julius C. Kern, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court fqr the Fourth District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Schools—constihition does not limit right of legislature to ñx school tax rates. There is no constitutional limitation placed on the right of the legislature to fix such rates of taxation for school purposes as it may see fit, nor with reference to the formation of school districts or the agencies the State shall adopt for providing for free schools.</p> <p>2. Same—the legislature has power to authorise township high school boards to levy taxes. The legislature has the power to provide for the establishment of township high schools as well as school districts, -and to confer upon the boards of education a power of taxation to the extent of the will of the legislature.</p> <p>3. Taxes—township high school boards have the same limit on taxes for educational purposes as the school directors. Under sections 85, 91 and 189 of the School law (Laws of 1909, p. 342,) the boards of education in township high school districts have the right to levy a tax for educational purposes up to the limit of $1.50 on the $100 of assessed property in the township, regardless of the amount of the tax levies for such purposes made by the several school districts of the township. (Russell v. Board of Education, 212 Ill. 327, and People v. Read, 233 id. 351, distinguished.)</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William N. Gemmill, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Contempt—what record is required where commitment is for alleged contempt in open court. Where a witness in a case is committed to jail for an alleged contempt committed in open court, without charge, plea, issue or trial, the only record required to be made for review is the order of commitment.</p> <p>2. Same—what must appear from the order of commitment for contempt in open court. Where a witness is committed to jail for an alleged contempt in open court, the order of commitment should set out the facts constituting the offense so fully and certainly as to show that the court was authorized to make the order, taking the facts stated to be true.</p> <p>3. Same—when county judge has no jurisdiction to punish for alleged contempt. The county judge has no authority to sit with the board of election commissioners on the hearing of a petition addressed to the county judge and the board of election commissioners charging certain “irregularities and uncertainties” in the affidavits of lodging-house keepers, and has no power to make any order in the matter nor to punish, as for contempt of court, a person claimed to have made a false affidavit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. Lawrence T. Allen, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of DuPage county; the Hon. Henry B. Willis, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeals and errors—a bill to establish vendor’s lien does not involve a freehold. A bill to establish a vendor’s lien does not involve a freehold, and an appeal from a decree establishing such lien lies to the Appellate Court where no other question is involved which would give the Supreme Court direct appellate jurisdiction.</p>

<p>1. Corporations—results which may follow the merger of corporations. As a result of a merger of corporations the corporate existence of each of the constituent companies may be continued, or the existence of one, only, of the several corporations may be continued, or the existence of all may be extinguished and a new corporation be formed, and in determining which of such results ‘ follows a particular agreement it is necessary to consider the true intent and purpose of the parties as expressed in the merger agreement, viewed in the light of the statute under which the merger was effected.</p> <p>2. Railroads—meaning of word “purchase” in act authorising one railroad to purchase another. Section 1 of the act of 1885, authorizing one railroad corporation “to purchase and hold in fee simple or otherwise, and to use and enjoy the railway property, corporate rights and franchises” of other railroad corporations, gives the right to acquire such properties by any form of lawful agreement, and it is not necessary that the transaction should take the form of a technical sale.</p> <p>3. Same—how one railroad corporation may acquire property of another. Under section 1 of the act of 1885, relating to the purchase of the property of one railroad company by another, it is sufficient if the contract has the effect of merging the property, franchises and corporate rights of the merging company into the merger corporation, and that as a net result of the transaction the merger corporation has lawfully acquired the property and franchises disposed of by the other corporation.</p> <p>4. Same—when merger agreement does not provide for a new corporation. A merger agreement between three railroad corporations, which provides that two of them have sold to the other all of their property and franchises; that the purchasing corporation shall hold the property forever, unto itself and its successors and assigns; that the name of the purchasing corporation shall remain the same until changed in a manner prescribed by law, and provides for an increase of the capital stock of the purchasing corporation and for the adjustment of the assets and liabilities of the merging companies and the rights of the stockholders, does not provide for a new corporation but continues the existence of the purchasing corporation, with an increase of capital stock, as the successor to the title, rights and duties of the others.</p> <p>5. Words and phrases—legal signification of the zvord “purchase.” The. word “purchase,” in its enlarged and legal signification, means the acquisition of real property by any voluntary act of the parties as distinguished from title by descent, which results from the operation of the law.</p>

<p>1. Dedication—when the maker of a plat and his grantees are estopped, to deny dedications. Where property is subdivided and a plat is made thereof, which is recorded but which fails in some respects to comply with the statute, there is a common law dedication; and if the owner of lots designated on the plat conveys according to the description contained in the plat and by reference thereto, he adopts the plat with all its dedications, and he and those who succeed to his title cannot deny such dedications.</p> <p>2. Same—when failure to-reserve easement in a deed is of no significance. If a private alley over one end of three lots is shown on a plat made by the owner, and all the lots are conveyed by the owner by the description contained in the plat and by reference thereto, all the lots are subject to the easement shown by such plat, even though the deeds to two of the lots expressly reserve such easement whereas the deed to the other lot contains no reference thereto.</p> <p>3. Same—what does not show intention not to dedicate a strip for continuous alley. The fact that on the plat of certain lots the lot lines are extended across the strip cut off by the dotted line and designated as a private alley does not show an intention not to dedicate the strip for a continuous alley, but rather that the owner intended to retain the fee of the alley and dedicate only an easement therein.</p>

<p>Taxes—the amendment of 1911 authorises an additional tax to repair roads and bridges. The amendment, in 1911, of section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act authorizes an additional tax levy for the purpose of repairing roads and bridges, provided the commissioners of highways certify the reason for the additional levy and the board of town auditors and the assessor consent thereto.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Edgar county; the Hon. Dan V. Dayton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>i. Appeals and errors—revenue must be directly involved to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction. To give the Supreme Court direct appellate jurisdiction upon the ground that the revenue is involved, the revenue must be directly, and not incidentally, involved.</p> <p>.2. Same—when revenue is not directly involved. Where a city repeals an ordinance establishing a public library after the library board has purchased the site and let the contract for the building and after the building is begun and library taxes have been appropriated for one year, a subsequent proceeding by mandamus to compel the city council to pass an ordinance appropriating a sum to maintain the library for another year and levy the sum as a tax does not directly involve the revenue.'</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of -Montgomery county; the Hon. John L- Dryer, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Elections—county court has no power to hear contest of primary election for representative. Under the provisions of the two Primary acts of 1910 the county court is without jurisdiction to hear a contest of á primary election for representative in the General Assembly, but such jurisdiction is in the circuit court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Macon county; the Hon.'Ó. W. Smith, Judg-e, presiding.</p>

<p>Appear from the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. Edgar Erdredge, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ oe Error to -the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Warren county; the Hon. Robert J. GriER, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Scott county; the Hon. O. P. Thompson, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Constitutional law—purpose of provision concerning title of act. The purpose of the constitutional provision that no act shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in its title is to prevent matters being inserted in a bill which have no relation to the title, by means of which the members of the legislature and the public might be deceived.</p> <p>2. Same—how title of an act may be amended. Where it is sought to add provisions which are not embraced in the title of the original act, it is not unlawful to provide in the amendatory act for the amendment of the title of the original act so that the amended title shall embrace the subject matter of the amendments.</p> <p>3. Same—Woman’s Ten-hour law of ipn is not invalid. The fact that the Woman’s Ten-hour act of 1911 added to the list of employments mentioned in the original act of 1909 employments not embraced within the title of such original act does not render such amendatory act unconstitutional, as the title of the original act was itself amended by the amendatory act so as to embrace the added employments.</p> <p>4. Municipal corporations—a municipal corporation bears a dual relation to the State. A municipal corporation bears a dual relation to the State,—one governmental and the other private,— and while in its governmental capacity it is the agent of the State, in its private capacity it represents those proprietary interests that appertain to it in common with other corporations.</p> <p>3. Same—in its private capacity a city is governed by the same rules as individuals. In its private capacity a municipal corporation may sue and be sued, and is governed by the same laws and rules and. is subject to the same regulations and limitations that natural persons are, except so far as it may be exempt by express enactment.</p> <p>6. Same—State has power to coerce performance of duties by municipal corporation. In securing the performance of specific duties imposed upon municipal corporations the State has the same power of coercion and same method of redress for non-performance as in case of individuals or purely private corporations.</p> <p>7. Same—Woman’s Ten-hour law applies to isolation hospital owned by city. The Woman’s Ten-hour law of 1911, which prohibits the employment of women more than ten hours a day in any “public institution, incorporated or unincorporated, in this State,” embraces an isolation hospital owned by a city, and the city is bound to observe the law the same as an individual.</p> <p>8. Same—city may be prosecuted, for violation of the Woman’s Ten-hour law. A city which violates the provisions of the Woman’s Ten-hour law may be prosecuted by information and fined, as its power “to regulate” hospitals does not authorize regulation in violation of law.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Ogle county; the Hon. Frank B. Reed, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Elections—will of the voter must be allowed to govern, if possible. The intent and will of the voter, when it is expressed in accordance with the provisions of the law and can be ascertained, will govern.</p> <p>2. Same—when candidate cannot claim place on official ballot. Where all candidates for vacancies in the municipal court of Chicago consent to the grouping arrangement made on the primary ballot by the election commissioners, by which some forty names are printed as the candidates for the nine regular six-year-term vacancies and two are printed as candidates, in accordance with their petitions, for a six-year term newly created by ordinance, the defeated one of such two candidates is not entitled to a place on the official ballot as a candidate for one of the other six-year-term vacancies, even though his vote was higher than the lowest successful candidate therefor.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch “B” Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. HomEr Abbott, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—meaning of section 14 of Roads and Bridges act, as amended in ipn. The meaning of section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act of 1911 is, that in case the highway commissioners are of the opinion that a greater levy than that authorized by section 13 is needed for road and bridge purposes, and shall certify an additional levy, with the reason therefor, the additional levy may be made if the board of town auditors and the assessor consent thereto in writing; and their determination of the question whether the reason certified justifies the additional levy is final.</p> <p>2. Same-—what is a proper subject for an additional levy under section 14. The building of a concrete retaining wall and the widening of the traveled roadway constitute a legitimate purpose for making an additional levy under section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act, as • amended in 1911; and section 15 of said act, authorizing a levy to pay damages for laying out, widening, altering or vacating roads, does not apply.</p> <p>3. Same—additional levy under amended section 14 need not be for some unusual purpose. To justify an additional levy under section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act, as amended in 1911, the purpose therefor need not be an unusual or extraordinary one but may be for ordinary road and bridge purposes, provided the reason is certified by the highway commissioners and assented to, in writing, by the town auditors and the assessor.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Macoupin county; the Hon. Truman A. Snell, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. J. B. Weaver, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Taxes—consent of board of town auditors and assessor establishes sufficiency of reason for an additional levy. The consent of the board of town auditors and the assessor to an additional road and bridge tax establishes the sufficiency of the particular reason which was certified by the highway commissioners for such levy.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Edgar county; the Hon. D. V. Dayton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Crawford county; the Hon. E. E. Newlin, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Quo warranto—the Practice act of 1907 did not repeal section 2 of the Quo Warranto act. The Practice act of 1907 did not repeal, expressly or by implication, the provision of section 2 of the Quo Warranto act of 1874 authorizing a summons issued in term time to be returnable at the same term, not less than five days after the date of the writ.</p> <p>2. Same—the Practice act does not control procedure for summoning defendants in quo warranto. Section 2 of the Quo Warranto act of 1874, which authorizes a summons issued in term time to be made returnable at the same term, not less than five days from the date of the writ, was intended to provide a different procedure for summoning defendants in quo warranto proceedings from that provided by the Practice act for ordinary civil actions at law. (Lavalle v. People, 68 Ill. 252, explained.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Pike county; the Hon. Paul F. Grote, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Equity—the effect where an answer under oath is waived. Where an answer, under oath, to a bill in chancery is waived, it is immaterial, so far as its force as evidence is concerned, whether the answer is sworn to or not or what is said therein in denial.</p> <p>2. Same—motion by defendant to dismiss bill at close of complainanfs evidence is not proper practice. After a case is upon final hearing before the chancellor, a motion by the defendant to dismiss the bill, on the evidence submitted, at any stage of the proceeding, is not proper practice, and such a motion, if made, is nothing but a submission of the case to the chancellor.</p> <p>3. Fraud—effect where a confederate corroborates a false representation. Where a person who has in his possession alleged certificates of deposit falsely asserts that they represent actual deposits of money in the bank, and the' party to whom the representations are made accompanies the holder to the bank, where a confederate of such holder corroborates the false representation, such corroboration does not exonerate the holder or show that the other party relied solely on the confederate’s corroboration.</p> <p>4. Same—when a gi'antee must show affirmatively that he purchased in good faith. A grantor who seeks to set aside a conveyance upon the ground of fraud has the burden of proving such fraud, but when the fraud is proved, one who holds title under the fraudulent grantee must show affirmatively that he purchased in good faith, without knowledge of the fraud, and for a valuable consideration.</p> <p>5. Deeds—what is not'legal consideration for a deed. A deed obtained by the grantee in consideration of the compromise of a criminal prosecution against the grantor, who had been arrested and imprisoned, is not based upon a valuable, or even a legal, consideration.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. WindEs, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—presumption is that tax to pay bonded indebtedness was properly excluded in reducing rate. Under section 2 of theact of 1901, concerning the levy and extension of taxes, which provides that in reducing the tax rate the tax to pay bonded indebtedness of cities shall in certain cases be excluded, it will be presumed, upon an application for judgment and order of sale .for taxes, that a tax to pay the bonded indebtedness of a city was lawfully excluded in reducing the tax rate, and the burden is upon the objector to prove the contrary.</p> <p>2. Same—delinquent list makes a prima facie case entitling the collector to judgment. Upon application for judgment and order of sale for taxes the delinquent list makes a prima facie case entitling the collector to judgment for the amount shown by it, unless an objector proves a defense to some part or all of it.</p> <p>3. Same—an additional road tax may be levied if a reason exists therefor. Under section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act, as amended .in 1911, the highway commissioners may levy an additional tax of twenty-five cents on the $100 for road and bridge purposes if for any reason the regular levy of thirty-six cents is not sufficient, provided they first certify the reason to the board of town auditors and the assessor and they consent to the levy; and the decision of the board of town auditors and assessor as to the sufficiency of the reason is final.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on appeal from the, Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. Thomas M. Jett, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Christian county; the Hon. C. A. Prater, Judge, presiding.</p>